Eliminativism Philosophy of Mind Lecture 5 (Knowledge and Reality)

Today’s lecture plan: 1. The ‘theory-theory’ of common sense psychology 2. A Choice: Vindication or elimination (Isomorphic causal roles.) 3. Arguments for Eliminative Materialism 4. Arguments against Eliminative Materialism (Long live structure!)

The Churchlands

Paul Churchland A claim about our common sense conception of psychological states. The ‘theory-theory’. A predictive device. Postulates mental states and a network of laws. Like theoretical terms in science.

The structure of what folk psychology (‘FP’) says produces behaviour. Compare that with: The structure of what in brain produces behaviour. Question: Is there an isomorphism? The more similarity the more vindicationist; the more dissimilarity the more eliminativist. Degrees of fit.

Arguments for eliminativism Folk psychology is an empirical theory…. Has its successes, so Fodor says… But Churchland says… that it also has failings… mental illness, sleep, imagination, intelligence. Possible reply to Churchland: (as) That shows FP is incomplete. And (b) it might still be a good theory of what it does cover.

Stephen Stich

Stich He draws attention to the generalisations of FP. Science is supposed to explain why they hold. Structure of FP and the real structure of the mind uncovered by ‘cognitive science’. FP, is like folk biology, folk physics, folk astrology… Why think we are so good at knowing about our own minds?

So it is possible that FP is false. Example: folk conception of earthquakes…actually rolling and tumbling are different… Similarly FP assumes one unitary belief state, which underlies utterances and also that figures in practical reasoning.

Argument: FP hasn’t changed for 1000s of years. Reply? This doesn’t show much. The longevity of theory is due to the fact that it is true? Argument: FP doesn’t cohere with other fields, such as brain science, biology etc. Reply?: what about history, economics, anthropology?

Arguments Against Eliminativism (1) Predictive success makes it likely that FP is true, that the entities and laws it postulates exist. (Fodor) And… there is isomorphism of folk functional roles with what brain science has discovered.

(2) FP not a theory Not clear that the existence claims of FP are due, or entirely due, to predicting behaviour of other bodies. we are not like scientists… instead we empathetically put ourselves in other’s shoes. (‘Simulation’ theory.) We do not use some sophisticated theory. Autism/young children research seems to support this.

(3) Self-refutation? Eliminativism... is it self defeating? Baker argues that it is Eliminativism asserts/believes/thinks it is reasonable to think that: There are no assertions? No beliefs? Nothing is rationally acceptable? –That all looks self-refuting.

Lynne Baker

Reply by Churchland Analogy with ‘life’ and ‘vital spirit’? Eliminativists say that it is question begging to use the old to terms to express an objection to the theory. BUT: there is a problem with dispensing with rational norms. Perhaps one could think that another person has no beliefs, and has no reason to believe anything. Not of oneself!.. (Remember Nagel on 1 st and 3 rd person perspectives.) This argument doesn’t seem question-begging.

So eliminativsm is problematic. It seems we exist as Descartes though. But it seems that we are stepping outside of science to say that. Is that ok? (A big question.) Next week… on to Free Will