Pandemic Preparedness Rome | June |1 | Pandemic Preparedness FAO/ OIE/ WHO Technical Meeting on Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza, June, 2007, Rome. Paul Gully WHO HQ Geneva

Pandemic Preparedness Rome | June |2 | Overview Sporadic human infections, continue to reflect animal outbreaks Technical dilemma: –pandemic risk remains & will persist –evolution & severity of the threat cannot be predicted –need to "de-link" the threat posed by H5N1 and the absolute requirement to prepare for a pandemic Political dilemma: –limited resources –competing health and other priorities Public Health advocacy: –investment in pandemic preparedness is an investment in the resilience of health systems and society to respond to many crises & pathogens, including influenza

Pandemic Preparedness Rome | June |3 | WHO Strategic Action plan: 5 key areas that concern human health Reduce human exposure to H5N1 virus –Reduce mortality and morbidity –Reduce chance of re-assortment Strengthen early warning system –Ensure data + clinical specimens available for risk assessment Intensify rapid containment operations Build capacity to cope with pandemic –National Pandemic Preparedness Plans including non-health sector preparedness –WHO role in a pandemic –Collaboration with other UN Agencies and NGOs Coordinate global scientific research & vaccine development –Novel influenza virus & Pandemic vaccines, antiviral drugs –Community mitigation strategies

Pandemic Preparedness Rome | June |4 | Progress Globally, great progress has been made in pandemic preparedness, experience gained and gaps identified Majority countries have Pandemic Preparedness Plans –Wide variations in completeness Technical and resource needs vary –Often resource poor environments have fragile infrastructure and information systems –IHR (2005) should assist in strengthening their capacities Ethical issues should be fully explored and communicated

Pandemic Preparedness Rome | June |5 | The future: building on experience, addressing gaps Continuation of original areas of work Wider scope: cross governmental and multi-sectorial –Operational –Test and review plans through exercise process Resilience of the health system Inclusion of Rapid Containment in national plan Community mitigation –population must be informed and engaged –national authorities cannot respond to all communities simultaneously

Pandemic Preparedness Rome | June |6 | Conclusion Pandemic preparedness activities should be continued & expanded in scope and depth from central to local level, across governments and sectors Gaps identified need to be addressed, specifically health systems, community preparedness & Rapid Containment inclusion in National Influenza Preparedness Plans Funding streams need to be identified WHO activities will continue in close collaboration with international partners, UNSIC & UN humanitarian agencies. Collaboration at country level through UN country teams is vital for WHO country representatives and Regional Offices Investment should not be seen as disease specific but as a contribution to the resilience of society and health systems to respond to many crises

Pandemic Preparedness Rome | June |7 | Thank you