1 Review and Assessment of the Korea Rail ’ s Safety Performance using Risk Assessment Models International Railway Safety Conference 2009, Sweden Chan-Woo Park, Jong-Bae Wang, Sang-Log Kwak, Don-Bum Choi National Railway Safety R&D Program Office, Korea Railroad Research Institute

2 IIntroduction Contents II How do risk assessment models assess the safety performance? III Safety Performance IVConclusion

3 Background 1. Introduction Cyclic occurrence of major train accidents Cyclic occurrence of major train accidents : Daegu, subway train fire accident, 191 fatalities : Daegu, subway train fire accident, 191 fatalities : Gupo, train derailment accident, 78 fatalities : Gupo, train derailment accident, 78 fatalities : Kyongsan, train collisions, 54 fatalities : Kyongsan, train collisions, 54 fatalities Environmental changes in Korea - KTX (Korea Train eXpress) operation at Structural reform of railroad industries - Electrification of conventional lines - Preparation of TCR & TSR “Railway Safety Act” announced in Focused on the risk-based safety management - Focused on the risk-based safety management - Nation-wide railroad safety program & safety regulations - Hazard analysis, risk assessment & control

4 1. Introduction Research Objective Since Oct. 2005, KRRI has developed the common hazard analysis & risk assessment models for the Korea Railway. - Developing procedure of the risk models - Application of the developed model to the Korea railway - the Korea rail industry’s safety performance against some defined risk areas Research Objective is to introduce

5 2. How do risk assessment models assess the safety performance? Risk Assessment Procedure Railway Accident Appearance Scenarios Railway Accident Appearance Scenarios FTA Model Railway Accident Progress Scenarios Railway Accident Progress Scenarios ETA Model Casual Analysis Consequence Analysis Hazard Identification Defining the Initiating Hazardous Events Development of Accident Scenarios Risk Evaluation & Reduction HazardousEvents

6 System & Boundary Definition Typical railway system configuration proposed in SAMRAIL project According to the accident classification of “Railway Accident Report Regulation”, The scenarios were divided into the five main areas 1) Train collision accident, 2) Train derailment accident, 3) Train fire accident, 4) Level crossing accident, 5) Railway (traffic/safety) casualty accident. 2. How do risk assessment models assess the safety performance?

7 Risk Measure Method Collective Risk (Average Number of FWI/year) =Frequency (Average frequency at which the scenario sequence occurs) XConsequences (the number of FWI/scenario sequence) Risk assessment model : the form of a cause and consequence analysis : using fault trees and event trees. Injury degreeDefinitionRatio FatalityDeath occurs within 72 hours of the accident.1 Major injuryInjuries that resulted in hospital attendance for more than 3 weeks.10 Minor injuryAll other physical injuries How do risk assessment models assess the safety performance?

8 Data Population Industry safety data: safety related incidents within industry database. Incidents recorded range from train collisions to passenger burns from coffee spills Many thousands of records are reviewed and classified Where data was not available, Use was made of: - Human error probability assessments : using a revised Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique (HEART) - Safety expert judgments from in-house expertise within Korea railway. - Statistical methods including Monte Carlo simulation and Bayesian uncertainty distributions. 2. How do risk assessment models assess the safety performance?

9 3. Safety Performance Risk Areas Public Behaviors Workforce Behaviors Passenger Behaviors Engineering Suspected Suicide Inside Station On Train Boarding/Alighting Outside Station Level Crossing Train Crew Train Driver Shunter and Signaler Station Staff Rolling Stock Engineer Infrastructure Engineer Energy/Signal Engineer Level Crossing Worker Office Worker Railway Associate Employee Irregular Employee Rolling Stock Infrastructure Equipment Suspected Suicide Regulation Violation Level Crossing Carelessness

10 3. Safety Performance Risk Profile Most of the risk is to members of the public. Passenger risk arises from a number of sources. Workforce risk arises largely from areas that are under the control of the workforce. Relatively few non-fatal public injuries are recorded. Most of the risk arises from factors being primarily the responsibility of the injured party.

11 3. Safety Performance Recent Safety Trends The risk in 2007 has been decreased by more than 55% over 2003 year. The harm to members of the workforce has been maintained at the lower levels. Fatalities and weighted injuries to members of the public decreased from year to year. Passenger-km increases 2% every year. Considering this factor, the safety performance has improved.

12 3. Safety Performance Risk Profile by Risk Areas Public Behaviors Passenger Behaviors Workforce Behaviors Engineering

13 3. Safety Performance Train Accidents Serious train accidents are rare, trends in train accident precursors were analyzed. The train accident precursors have been decreased by more than 34% over The increment of the train accident precursors in 2004 and 2005 is largely due to the introduction of the Korea Train eXpress (KTX) operation.

14 3. Safety Performance Passenger Safety Main Passenger Risk Areas

15 3. Safety Performance Main Risk Areas of the Passenger Safety Passenger Suspected Suicides Inside Station Passenger Violation & Carelessness on Train Passenger Violation & Carelessness Inside Station

16 3. Safety Performance Public Safety

17 Level Crossing 3. Safety Performance The number of level crossing had decreased from 1,657 in 2003 to 1,455 in % of level crossings has automatic protection equipments. The risk in level crossings has been decreased by more than 30% over The risk level associated with level crossings is average FWIs per year. Pedestrian risk accounts for 45% of all risk associated with level crossings. The risk caused by “road vehicle breaking through or detouring the barrier" governs the most part of the road vehicle occupant fatalities.

18 3. Safety Performance Workforce Safety Main Workforce Risk Areas

19 3. Safety Performance Trespass and Suspected Suicide Fatalities

20 3. Safety Performance F-N Curve: Annual Korea Railway F-N curve

21 3. Safety Performance Comparison Between UK's F-N Curve and Korea’s F-N Curve

22 4. Conclusion This study Developed the common risk assessment model for the Korea railway Reviewed the Korea rail industry’s safety performance against defined risk areas The risk including suspected suicides in 2007 Was FWIs Has been decreased by more than 55% over 2003 year The developed model will provide a generic model of the safety risk on the Korea railway which will Increase the industry’s knowledge of the risk from the operation and maintenance Allow the identification of areas of railway operation that need further risk controls Allow sensitivity analyses to be carried out to determine the risk reduction Allow cost benefit analysis of proposed changes

23 Thank you!