Source Control Phases I-II: Source Control Phases I-II: Main findings  Facility: drinking water and sewage treatment utility in Apatity, Murmansk region, Russian Federation  Risk Assessment Methodology at Hazardous Industrial Facilities (chemical hazards - chlorine) was developed incorporating ISO approach  Analysis of risks was performed; recommendations made to reduce facility risks  Facility: drinking water and sewage treatment utility in Apatity, Murmansk region, Russian Federation  Risk Assessment Methodology at Hazardous Industrial Facilities (chemical hazards - chlorine) was developed incorporating ISO approach  Analysis of risks was performed; recommendations made to reduce facility risks Phase I Chemical Hazards  Facility: Fuel Research Department (FRD) of State Scientific Centre of Russian Federation “Scientific and Research Institute of Atomic Reactors” (SSC RF NIIAR)  Risk Assessment Methodology at Hazardous Industrial Facilities developed in Phase I of the Project was applied to the radiation hazard facility incorporating ISO approach;  Priorities for corrective actions were identified;  Recommendations to enhance the safety of the facility were made based upon the analysis of risks  Facility: Fuel Research Department (FRD) of State Scientific Centre of Russian Federation “Scientific and Research Institute of Atomic Reactors” (SSC RF NIIAR)  Risk Assessment Methodology at Hazardous Industrial Facilities developed in Phase I of the Project was applied to the radiation hazard facility incorporating ISO approach;  Priorities for corrective actions were identified;  Recommendations to enhance the safety of the facility were made based upon the analysis of risks Phase II – Radiation Hazards

Source Control Project, Phase III Objectives:  Verify and finalize the developed Risk Assessment Methodology at radiation and chemical hazardous facilities of the Industrial North of Russia  Carry out the risk assessment and develop recommendations to reduce the risk at selected hazardous facilities Sites:  FSUE “CS Zvezdochka"  The facility activities include nuclear submarine decommissioning, repair and upgrade of vessels and nuclear submarines  FSUE "Atomflot“ The facility maintains and repairs nuclear powered vessels The facility maintains and repairs nuclear powered vessels The project is implementing by:  IBRAE RAN, FSUE "Atomflot" and FSUE “CS Zvezdochka" supporting by US Department of Energy Duration:  2005 – 2008

Phase III : FSUE “CS Zvezdochka“ The Complex includes:  Part of special quay 40 m long where a portal crane is installed;  Building for loading of transport containers with SNF;  Temporary storage facility for transport containers, and;  Site for forming of special train The technological cycle includes operations on transportation and loading of spent nuclear fuel into transport containers, storage of containers loaded with SNF, loading/unloading works and transportation of containers loaded with SNF, and deactivation operations Onshore complex for unloading of the SNF from the decommissioned submarines

The facility maintains and repairs nuclear powered vessels as well as repairs reactor equipment, manages solid and liquid radioactive waste. Phase III : FSUE “Atomflot“  Total length of berthage is over 1 km  3 portal cranes including KONE  3 portal cranes including KONE crane of 100 ton capacity for SNF container unloading  2 branch lines of local railway over 1 km long  Storage facility for SRW containers of 400 cubic meters  Storage facility for  Storage facility for high level SRW of 216 cells torage facility forof 200 cubic meters  Temporary storage facility for LRW of 200 cubic meters

Phase III: Project Management Plans PMP FSUE «CS «Zvezdochka» PMP FSUE «Atomflot» 1.Forming a working team, 1.Forming a working team, distribute the functions and responsibilities 2.Studying of requirements of regulatory and legal documents 3.Planning and organization of works 4.Identification of hazards and preliminary risk assessmen 4.Identification of hazards and preliminary risk assessment, selection of the most hazardous scenarios to carry out a detailed quantitative risk assessment 5.Preparing more detailed data on selected 5.Preparing more detailed data on selected scenarios and quantitative risk assessment 6.Making conclusions and development of the recommendations on risk management and reduction of risks in the future 1.Forming a working team, 1.Forming a working team, distribute the functions and responsibilities 2.Studying of requirements of regulatory and legal documents 3.Planning and organization of works 4.Identification of hazards and preliminary risk assessmen 4.Identification of hazards and preliminary risk assessment, selection of the most hazardous scenarios to carry out a detailed quantitative risk assessment 5.Preparing more detailed data on selected 5.Preparing more detailed data on selected scenarios and quantitative risk assessment 6.Making conclusions and development of the recommendations on risk management and reduction of risks in the future

Phase III: Preliminary Risk Assessment  Loss of offsite power;   Fire or eventual overheating;  Fall equipment component  Fall equipment component containing SFA  External impacts (earthquake forces, fall aircraft plane)  Loss of offsite power;   Fire or eventual overheating;  Fall equipment component  Fall equipment component containing SFA  External impacts (earthquake forces, fall aircraft plane) The following initial events was studied: Goal: Goal: selection of the most hazardous scenarios to carry out a detailed quantitative risk assessment

/ Risk Matrix FSUE “CS Zvezdochka“ Phase III: Quantitative Risk Assessment / Risk Matrix FSUE “CS Zvezdochka“ Scenarios No. Initial Event of Significant Scenario Probability, 1/year INES Level 1 Fall of reloading container loaded with SFA 2.5·E Fall of a guiding device or cover of TC-18 container 5·E Aircraft crash 1·E-71·E-71·E-71·E-72

/ Risk Matrix FSUE “Atomflot“ Phase III: Quantitative Risk Assessment / Risk Matrix FSUE “Atomflot“ No. Initial Event of Significant Scenario Probability, 1/year INES Level 1 Fall of transport container (TUK) 2·E Failure of container carriage -0 3 Fall of reloading container loaded with SFA 1.3·E-31.3·E-31.3·E-31.3·E-33 2 Fall of a guiding device or cover onto TC-18 container 1.2·E Fall of technological equipment onto the train loaded with SNF 2·E-42·E-42·E-42·E-43

Phase III: Risk Assessment Methodology at HIF and Facilities Handling Radioactive/Nuclear Materials The work is implemented in accordance with the Risk Assessment Methodology developed in the framework of earlier Phase I and Phase II of the Source Control Project ( ).The work is implemented in accordance with the Risk Assessment Methodology developed in the framework of earlier Phase I and Phase II of the Source Control Project ( ). The Document includes detailed description of the main stages of risk assessment, the procedures of hazards identification and assessment and the method of corrective actions ranking in accordance with their priorities and terms of execution. The Document includes detailed description of the main stages of risk assessment, the procedures of hazards identification and assessment and the method of corrective actions ranking in accordance with their priorities and terms of execution. The work is implemented in accordance with the Risk Assessment Methodology developed in the framework of earlier Phase I and Phase II of the Source Control Project ( ).The work is implemented in accordance with the Risk Assessment Methodology developed in the framework of earlier Phase I and Phase II of the Source Control Project ( ). The Document includes detailed description of the main stages of risk assessment, the procedures of hazards identification and assessment and the method of corrective actions ranking in accordance with their priorities and terms of execution. The Document includes detailed description of the main stages of risk assessment, the procedures of hazards identification and assessment and the method of corrective actions ranking in accordance with their priorities and terms of execution. Phases III The changes was made in order to provide better understandingThe changes was made in order to provide better understanding List of federal and departmental legal documents regulating facility activities during SNF unloading is added to the DocumentList of federal and departmental legal documents regulating facility activities during SNF unloading is added to the Document The changes was made in order to provide better understandingThe changes was made in order to provide better understanding List of federal and departmental legal documents regulating facility activities during SNF unloading is added to the DocumentList of federal and departmental legal documents regulating facility activities during SNF unloading is added to the Document

Phase III: Main Findings 1.The risk assessment was performed at SNF unloading coastal facilities of FSUE “CS Zvezdochka" and FSUE “Atomflot" 2.The executed risk analysis shows that the facilities have acceptable level of safety. 3.The conclusions were made and the recommendations on risk management and reduction of risks in the future were developed 4.Work results demonstrate adaptability of developed methodology for radiation and chemically hazardous industrial facilities 1.The risk assessment was performed at SNF unloading coastal facilities of FSUE “CS Zvezdochka" and FSUE “Atomflot" 2.The executed risk analysis shows that the facilities have acceptable level of safety. 3.The conclusions were made and the recommendations on risk management and reduction of risks in the future were developed 4.Work results demonstrate adaptability of developed methodology for radiation and chemically hazardous industrial facilities