1 Remedies under Article 82 EC Per Hellström DG Competition, European Commission (speaking in a personal capacity - the views expressed are not necessarily.

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Presentation transcript:

1 Remedies under Article 82 EC Per Hellström DG Competition, European Commission (speaking in a personal capacity - the views expressed are not necessarily those of the European Commission)

2 The Legal framework in Europe Article 82 of the EC Treaty Article 82 of the EC Treaty Regulation 1/2003 Regulation 1/2003 Case law of the Community Courts Case law of the Community Courts Decisional practice of the European Commission Decisional practice of the European Commission

3 Regulation 1/2003 Context for remedies Context for remedies - Article 7 "prohibition decisions“ - Article 7 "prohibition decisions“ - Article 9 "commitment decisions" - Article 9 "commitment decisions" - Article 8 "interim measures" - Article 8 "interim measures"

4 Regulation 1/2003 Article 7 "prohibition decisions“ Article 7 "prohibition decisions“ “[…] to bring such an infringement to an end. For this purpose, it may impose on them any behavioural or structural remedies which are proportionate to the infringement committed and necessary to bring the infringement effectively to an end. Structural remedies can only be imposed either where there is no equally effective behavioural remedy or where any equally effective behavioural remedy would be more burdensome for the undertaking concerned than the structural remedy. […]”

5 Recital 12 of Reg 1/2003 “Structural remedies should only be imposed either where there is no equally effective behavioural remedy or where any equally effective behavioural remedy would be more burdensome for the undertaking concerned than the structural remedy. Changes to the structure of an undertaking as it existed before the infringement was committed would only be proportionate where there is a substantial risk of a lasting or repeated infringement that derives from the very structure of the undertaking”

6 Framework in practice Standard scenario: cease-and-desist order plus fines Standard scenario: cease-and-desist order plus fines A remedy is an expansion of a cease-and-desist order A remedy is an expansion of a cease-and-desist order Where the anti-competitive effects on the market persist even though the restriction of competition itself is no longer in place, remedies are necessary Where the anti-competitive effects on the market persist even though the restriction of competition itself is no longer in place, remedies are necessary Alternative solutions: Alternative solutions: Prescribe a certain action, or Prescribe a certain action, or Prohibit a certain action, leaving the firm discretion on what precisely to implement. Prohibit a certain action, leaving the firm discretion on what precisely to implement.

7 Design of remedies Remedies/commitments should be: Remedies/commitments should be: Effective Effective Proportionate/Necessary Proportionate/Necessary Clear and precise Clear and precise Cost-efficient Cost-efficient Transparent Transparent Consistent Consistent

8 Effectiveness Possible criteria for assessment: Possible criteria for assessment: Does the remedy lower barriers to entry? Does the remedy lower barriers to entry? Does the remedy change the incentive or ability of market participants to compete? Does the remedy change the incentive or ability of market participants to compete? Is the remedy likely to increase consumer welfare? Is the remedy likely to increase consumer welfare? Does the remedy reduce efficiencies in production? Does the remedy reduce efficiencies in production? How likely is it that the remedy prevents future competitive detriment? How likely is it that the remedy prevents future competitive detriment? Can the remedy be practically implemented, monitored and enforced? Can the remedy be practically implemented, monitored and enforced? How quickly can the remedy restore competition? How quickly can the remedy restore competition? …

9 Behavioural remedies Classification - infringement type: Classification - infringement type: Anti-foreclosure Anti-foreclosure Anti-collusion Anti-collusion Anti-exploitation Anti-exploitation

10 Monitoring and Enforcement of Remedies in general Monitoring Monitoring Commission Commission Sector specific regulator Sector specific regulator Competitors, customers Competitors, customers Trustees Trustees National courts National courts Arbitration Arbitration Organizational question Organizational question

11 Structural remedies A structural remedy is a measure that effectively changes the structure of the market by a transfer of property rights regarding tangible or intangible assets, including the transfer of an entire business unit, that does not lead to any ongoing relationships between the former and the future owner. After its completion, a structural remedy should not require any further monitoring. A structural remedy is a measure that effectively changes the structure of the market by a transfer of property rights regarding tangible or intangible assets, including the transfer of an entire business unit, that does not lead to any ongoing relationships between the former and the future owner. After its completion, a structural remedy should not require any further monitoring.

12 Structural remedies Involve the transfer of (property) rights → divestiture Involve the transfer of (property) rights → divestiture Should not create ongoing links between competing firms → “clean break principle” Should not create ongoing links between competing firms → “clean break principle” Remove incentive and/or means of a firm to infringe competition law (no regulation nexus as in behavioural remedies); Remove incentive and/or means of a firm to infringe competition law (no regulation nexus as in behavioural remedies); Monitoring and enforcement only necessary until divestiture completed Monitoring and enforcement only necessary until divestiture completed Rarely used under Article 82 Rarely used under Article 82

13 The purpose of a remedy “An antitrust remedy … must stop the offending conduct, prevent its recurrence, and restore competition. Preventing recurrence must involve proactive steps to address conduct of similar nature. Restoration requires prospective relief to create lost competition and may involve actions to disadvantage the antitrust offender and/or favour its rivals.” “An antitrust remedy … must stop the offending conduct, prevent its recurrence, and restore competition. Preventing recurrence must involve proactive steps to address conduct of similar nature. Restoration requires prospective relief to create lost competition and may involve actions to disadvantage the antitrust offender and/or favour its rivals.” Charles A. James. The Real Microsoft case and Settlement, 16 Antitrust 58, 60 (2001)