Programme of Self Assessment and Condition Report at Qinshan NPP IAEA Conference 27 June – 2 July 2004 Russia Jiapeng YAN Qinshan Nuclear Power Company,

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Presentation transcript:

Programme of Self Assessment and Condition Report at Qinshan NPP IAEA Conference 27 June – 2 July 2004 Russia Jiapeng YAN Qinshan Nuclear Power Company, Haiyan, Zhejiang, CHINA

 YAN Jia-Peng, the Deputy General Manager of Qinshan Nuclear Power Company(QNPC)  20 year’s of experience in nuclear power industry  To receive the RO, SRO license in 1985 & 1990 and work as RO and Shift-Supervisor for seven years  Assistant General Manager in 2001 and responsible for all aspects of plant operations safety, nuclear safety surveillance and QA  Deputy General Manager in Sept and responsible for plant operating, planning, system engineering, physical health and technical support RESUME RESUME

 Introduction  System Development  Practice of SA and CR  Conclusion TOPICS TOPICS

Introduction Part one

Introduction-QNPP Introduction-QNPP  QNPP is the first NPP of 310MWe PWR in China Mainland which was designed, constructed and operated domestically. It is located inside Haiyan county, Zhejiang province and is 100km west to Shanghai city and 90km east to Hangzhou city.  QNPP began to construction on March 21th,1985,  QNPP first connected to the grid on December 15th, 1991  QNPP Carried out the OSART mission on Jan, 1997

 QNPP has continuously improved its safety, reliability and achieved the better operation performance through upgrading equipment and system, developing five-year goal, enforcing operating experience feedback, carrying out ten-year Periodic Safety Review (PSR) and Probability Safety Analysis (PSA) etc.  QNPP has been continuously operated 443 days without scram in the 7th fuel cycle.  WANO Performance Indicator Index of the plant reached the world median level first time in Introduction-QNPP Introduction-QNPP

No.Indicator Unit Capability Factor93.9%67.8%89.2% 2Unplanned Capability Loss Factor0.5%2.8%0.20% 3Forced Loss Rate0.22 4Unplanned Automatic Scrams Per 7000H Critical Safety System Performance HPSIS AFWS E D/G Fuel Reliability (Bq/g) Chemistry Performance Collective Radiation Exposure (Man.Sv) Industrial Safety Accident Rate PI Index Introduction-QNPP Introduction-QNPP

 Purpose of Self-Assessment(SA)/Condition Report (CR) establishment is to sustain improvement of plant’s safe operation and good performance  The establishment of the SA and CR systems were supported by IAEA CPR/0/009 TC Project (2000 to 2001). There were 46 QNPP’s senior managers and 24 host plant’s experts involved this project.  QNPP developed and implemented improvement’s plans and made significant achievements in ten areas on the past three years. The SA and CR systems are the two most successful areas. Introduction-SA/CR Introduction-SA/CR

IAEA CPR/0/009 Final Review Meeting

System Development Part two

System Development- OBJECTIVES System Development- OBJECTIVES 1. Detect and report the weakness of plant conditions and management problems to maintain the plant’s continuing improvement system and good performance. 2. Ensure all the management, plant system and equipment were under well controlled, the abnormal conditions are identified and corrected in time. 3. Ensure to carry out the Root Cause Analysis and develop Corrective Actions Enhancing personnel Safety Culture consciousness.

System Development- PROCEDURE System Development- PROCEDURE 1.Condition Report Management Procedure (QSZ-D-044) 2. Methodology of Root Cause Analyze (Manual) 3.Operation Experience Feedback Management Procedure (QSZ- D-022) 4.Operation Event Report Procedure (QSZ-D-053) 5.Operation Experience Feedback Engineer Procedure (QSZ-D- 050) 6.Self-Assessment Management Procedure (QSZ-D-051) 7.Self-Assessment Committee Programme (QSZ-A) 8.Self-Assessment Criteria and Guidelines (Manual) 9.Self-Assessment Methodology (Manual)

System Development- PROCEDURE System Development- PROCEDURE Manual Example: Root cause Analysis Self Assessment Operation Experience Human Performance WANO PI Self Assessment C&O

System Development - PROCESS System Development - PROCESS Departments decide and submit the SA plan to NSLD SA committee hold meeting to review the SA plan NSLD develop the plant SA plan. General manager review and approve the SA plan SA plan distributed to departments/Training Department establish assessment team and implement the plan SA report was submitted to NSLD and reviewed by SA Committee The AFIs and correction actions development / CR process  Self-Assessment (SA) Process flow Chart (simplified)

System Development- PROCESS System Development- PROCESS  Condition Report (CR) Process Chart (simplified) Equipment Deficiency License Dep. Review Discu. and Review daily CR Meeting Close/ transfe r ? Classif y Sig. ? Classif y Sig. ? Analyze Root Cause Develop CA & Approve Develop Correct Actions Implement CA Evaluate Close Repor t Close Repor t Other programs Manag. Weakness & SA AFIs Outside Events (SOER, SER)

System Development- PROCESS System Development- PROCESS  Corrective Actions (CA) Process Chart (simply) Determine Problem Investigate Analyze investigated Result Determine Root Cause Develop Corrective Actions Approve Report

System Development- ORGANIZATION System Development- ORGANIZATION  Self-Assessment (SA) committee. -Review and approve the SA plan and Review the state of SA; -Evaluate the implement of overall SA plan and Review SA report; -Review the implementation of AFI.  Nuclear Safety Licensing Department. -Accept and review CRs and report to the CR Review Meeting; -Tracking the completion of the CA; -The secretariat of the SA committee; -Following up the state of SA plan implementation and AFIs; -Provide supports to OEF engineers.

 OEF Engineer System (more 20 engineers) -Support their department managers to analyze the root cause, develop correct actions and follow-up; -Promote OEF improvement in their departments  Condition Report Review Meeting (daily routine meeting at 11:00 AM ) -Report the coming CRs, review and clarify them. -Assign the CRs to responsible department for develop the CA. -Review class A CRs’ Root Cause Analysis results and Correct Actions. -Review the industrial OE information. System Development- ORGANIZATION System Development- ORGANIZATION

System Development- CR REPORTABLE AREA System Development- CR REPORTABLE AREA 1. Operational/Material/Maintenance/Welding- Related Conditions 2. Configurations/Systems/Equipment 3. Radiological Protection/Industrial Safety/Fire Protect/ Security Conditions. 4. Human Performance/Administrative. 5. Internal/External Operating Experience 6. Self-assessment AFIs

System Development- CR CLASSIFCATION System Development- CR CLASSIFCATION Category A: Significant CRs.Root Cause Aanalysis and Corrective Action are needed Category B: Non-Significant CRs.Only corrective action is needed Category C: No need further action, Condition can be directly closed or transferred to other process (Below A &B)

Sig CRs Non-Sig CRs CR B Threshold CR A Threshold Other Systems Indus Safety QA QC Ops Depart. Impr Plan Equip related cond. Maint. Prob. doc. Contl. Plant Managers focus Dep. Managers focus Staffs focus CR C Threshold System Development- CR CLASSIFCATION System Development- CR CLASSIFCATION

Practice of SA and CR Part three

Practice- SELF-ASSESSMENT Practice- SELF-ASSESSMENT  Establish Committee and Procedures, Training, Planning, Team setup  Maintenance, Chemistry and Production Planning areas finished in 2003 as follow AreaAFIs Number Strengths Number 1Maintenance Chemistry 7 2 3Production planning 16 1

 Plan in 2004: five areas as Operation, Radiological Protection, Training, Engineering Support and In- Service Inspection  Most reviewers come from own plant, but some external experts are invited Practice- SELF-ASSESSMENT Practice- SELF-ASSESSMENT

Self Assessment Plan in 2004

Practice- CONDITION REPORT Practice- CONDITION REPORT  CR report number in 2002

Practice- CONDITION REPORT Practice- CONDITION REPORT  CR report number in 2003

Administrative control Configuration control Equipment deficiency Work practice Area Operation Maintenance Engineering support Material condition Radiation protection Security Training Org. &admin Emergency planning Chemistry Practice- CONDITION REPORT Practice- CONDITION REPORT  CR Problem Trending by Areas (one month sample)

Practice- CONDITION REPORT Practice- CONDITION REPORT  Follow up CR Corrective Actions implementation

Practice- CONDITION REPORT Practice- CONDITION REPORT  CR in QNPP Intranet (example)example

QNPC Main Web Page Nuclear Safety

NSLD Main Web Page Condition Report Self Assessment

Condition Report Main Web Page CR list in latest 30 days

One of Condition Reports in Web Page WANO SER

One of Condition Reports in Web Page Root Cause

One of Condition Reports in Web Page Correct Actions

CR Search Web Page Easy to search

Practice- CORRECT ACTION Practice- CORRECT ACTION  Case Study –RCA and Corrective Actions development On May 2001,QNPP had an event “Loss of Power to Protection System Results in RCP A/B Trip Signal Actuation, followed with Reactor and Turbine Trip Automatically”. (EAR TYO ) The Root Cause Analysis by Event Cause Factors was developed. Human error,Equipment deficiency, Lack of patrol control, Lack of safety culture consciousness were main 4 factors to cause this events

One worker twist the DC24V power supply bushing as another worker ’ s suggestion Loss of power supply because of the shaking of power supply input lead, which connected in a wrong pattern RCPA/B trip intermediate relays in the CP5414 lost its power supply Reactor and turbine tripped automatically Position of the DC24V and DC220V breaker is near, even the input line was tied together DC220V power supply connected with the terminal in wrong pattern Preventive maintenance never carried out to these breakers since the beginning of operation Deficiency in equipment acceptance The plant management system do not cover the preventive maintenance, reliability and risky analysis of some key equipments Number labeled on the DC24V bushing toward inside Maintenance staff lack of the awareness in safety culture and safety risk Maintenance staff violating the plant safety regulation and program Maintenance staff lack of question attitude and the self check requirement Deficiency in safety culture, risk awareness management and education Two I&C maintenance workers cannot see the number labeled on the lead of DC24 branch power supply management/ safety culture Programe Work practice Establishment and acceptance of equipment Equipment maintenance / test/ surveillance EAR TYO , Loss of Power to Protection System Results in RCP A/B Trip Signal Actuation, followed by Reactor and Turbine Trip Automatically EVENT DATE: 10 May 2001

Conclusion Part four

Conclusion-1 Conclusion-1 1. Develop a window and allow all the reportable condition and abnormalities covering all near missed incidents as well as management problems to report and follow up by this window. 2. The Plant Managers understand and timely control the unit’s conditions and significant issues by the systems 3. The Operation Experience Feedback (OEF) system has been significantly improved by the establishment of CR system.

4. The Operation Experience Feedback (OEF) system has been significantly improved by the establishment of CR system. -Reportable number increased (50 to 400) -Clearly classify to A B C -OEF Engineers contributing to Root Cause Analysis -More external events into CR system (Approximately 50 international OEF reports and all WANO SOER and SERs) Conclusion-2 Conclusion-2

Conclusion-3 Conclusion-3 5. SA and CR systems made significant contributions to increase the plant’s risk control capability, and decreased the human error events, and improve the unit’s operation safety management and performance. QNPC clearly recognizes that the plant will continue to recognize weaknesses and avoid complacency in the future by continually striving for both improving safety and operational performance

THANK YOU! YOU!