© 2013 The SmartenIT Consortium 1 Commercial in Confidence 2.4: Game Theoretic approach to Horst-RB Mateusz Wielgosz, AGH ? ?, ? ?, 2014 Socially-aware Management of New Overlay Application Traffic combined with Energy Efficiency in the Internet European Seventh Framework STREP FP ICT

© 2013 The SmartenIT Consortium 2 Commercial in Confidence Players – End user and Provider  Provider is interested in reduction of his inter-domain traffic. He must weigh cost/benefit (C, B) of the mechanism.  End user benefits from higher QoS (Q), but may suffer from delay (due to searching for local/prefetched content) and may need encouraging to participate in WiFi sharing mechanism (privacy issues?) (D, S). User \ ProviderProvider supports HORSTHORST not supported Using HORST[Q – (D+S), B – C][0, 0] Not using HORST[0, B-C][0, 0]

© 2013 The SmartenIT Consortium 3 Commercial in Confidence Chain migration  More users participate home router sharing, more likely each user is to benefit from improved QoS.  Assuming gaussian distribution of users, cumulative benefit function therefore is expected to reflect cumulative distribution of normal distribution.

© 2013 The SmartenIT Consortium 4 Commercial in Confidence To be adressed  Simulation analysis  Delay aspect of HORST search for local content.

© 2013 The SmartenIT Consortium 5 Commercial in Confidence Thank you ! Questions?