“Why Single Naval Battle” Ellis Group June 2012 UNCLASSIFIED

Inputs from the Ellis Group Capability Development DOTMLPF Experiments, Wargames, Exercises CONOPS, Architecture & Analysis Strategy Concepts Educate & Stratcom Innovation

Ellis Initiatives Develop How We Fight Center for Naval Analysis: Single Naval Battle Littoral preparation of the battlespace model Littoral Warfare CONOPs w/ supporting connector strategy Develop force aggregation and command arrangements Naval/SOF: Tri-Service Concept for Engagement & Crisis Response Center for Naval Analysis: Detailed wargame and assessment Single Naval Battle and Littoral Maneuver Strategy series Enhance the Naval Board Support Air Sea Battle: Expeditionary Operations Concept GCCs’ Operational Challenges

Evolution of Littoral Maneuver... Sea as Maneuver Space…Begins over the horizon Vertical & surface maneuver via multiple entry points Exploit gaps, avoid obstacles & gain landing site superiority Sustained force…the measure of expeditionary I wanted to take a moment to talk about World War II because I think there's a couple of lessons learned we should recall when we deal with today's challenges. Not only from the perspective of concept of operations but also the defense reductions following World War II. While today's environment is a little bit unique in the sense that we're already starting to see the decline in DoD resources, even before the war is over, this is certainly not the first time in our nation that we've faced great pressure to reduce the Defense Department's budget. It happened after World War II. It happened after Korea. It happened after Vietnam. It happened after the Cold War and Desert Shield and Desert Storm. And of course, the most drastic cuts were probably seen after World War II, where we experienced an almost historic reduction in demobilization.   The Marine Corps was close to 450,000 strong the day that they landed on Iwo Jima. So the Secretary of Navy at the time, Secretary Forrestal, is standing there on a ship, standing next to Howlin' Mad Smith, and he's looking at the Marines raising the flag on Suribachi, and he says, "Howlin', that flag raising will guarantee a Marine Corps for another 500 years." A little over a year later, the Marine Corps was fighting for its existence. By 1949, the Marine Corps wasn't exactly gone, but our endstrength was about 65,000 and heading south. That particular debate about the existence of the Marine Corps ended in 1950, with the assault of the North Korean People's Army across the 38th parallel into South Korea. The United States at that time became engaged in a major land war in an unexpected time, in an unexpected place. And the initial results were absolutely disastrous. However I wanted to make another point. Projecting forces ashore in the 21st century bears little resemblance to what we did in WW II. Given the nature of the objectives and technology of the day, in WWII we had little choice but to land multiple regiments abreast to reduce fixed fortifications through an overwhelming frontal assault. Even then, however, we were looking for alternate approaches…The bottom line is we don’t land like that because...[Next Slide} UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO (U) US technical-overmatch will decline with the proliferation and advancement of A2AD threats (U) New capabilities & strategies challenging U.S. interests warrant a new warfighting approach (U) A2/AD challenges are not new, but they have evolved (U) New A2/AD capabilities and strategies challenge U.S. ability to project power (U) Combined Arms in Area Denial is a lattice rather than kill chain approach (U) US technical-overmatch will decline with the proliferation and advancement of A2AD threats (U//FOUO) The Air-Sea Battle Concept looks at the “High-Right” in the full-spectrum of operations within the ROMO. As seen on the slide ASB addresses A2/AD challenges to our Services. These challenges are not new to warfare, and there are examples throughout history. The Battle of the North Atlantic during WWII and Doolittle’s Raid on mainland Japan is yet another. An increasingly adaptive adversary now integrates the A2 with area denial to increase the challenge. This is an integrated combined arms adversary using our own combined arms doctrine against us. (U//FOUO) How do we meet the challenge: disrupt ; locally control ; Force the threat to react; Raise the adversary’s signature; complicate his targeting by: deception and littoral maneuver. (U//FOUO) Understand and recognize the adversary’s patterns of operations (U//FOUO) Disrupt and defeat (U//FOUO) Attack across multiple and independent lines of operations across all domains 5

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO (U) US technical-overmatch will decline w/ advancement of threat weapons-systems. (U//FOUO) Proliferation and advances in A2AD threats (supersonic, ballistic) push ships further from shore ~ 12 nm ACV / AAV launch ~ 25 nm notional Outer Sea Echelon Connector Shuttle > 25 nm notional Potential Future Not every amphibious operation requires forcible entry against A2AD. Proliferation of modern A2AD capabilities to more threats, including non-state. Within 12NM of shore, combined-arms threat increases risk to amphibs. Shaping/reduction of ASCM threat can be accomplished to allow discharging landing force at 12NM, but at risk and cost imposition (DDG/PC/Air support.) Crisis-response timelines may preclude/limit Joint shaping. Maneuver from beyond 25NM reduces threats and increases operational surprise. Conditions for entry vary depending on the means employed. 4/22/2017

Single Naval Battle…within the Joint fight Joint Operational Access Concept Air-Sea Battle Concept Naval Operating Concept Single Naval Battle Marine Corps Operating Concepts UNCLASSIFIED

Marine Corps Perspective on ASB Operation Odyssey Dawn March 2011 USS Kearsarge and Ponce transit Suez 2 March 1st BN/2nd Marines embarks 5 March USS Kearsarge on-station Gulf of Sidra 7 March JFACC HQ TACAIR AVIANO, ITALY JFACC Decision Cycle 350 nm / hours Distance to target area 1000 - 3000 nm JIC coverage of JOA (XI) Acted as JIC/N2 for all embarked staffs 24 X 7 tracking of Libyan Naval/Coast Guard units Provided all intel/targeting in support to strike on Libyan Coast Guard unit Red Data Base Manager for entire JOA Intel support to Coalition: pushed CIP/I&W via CENTRIX Managed Common Intelligence Picture Imagery/strike support to 78 Combat air sorties to include BDA ELINT tracking of Libyan SAM threat iso MEU ACE mission ashore Information Ops Messaging: Leaflets took time to develop Regular shipboard transmitters able to conduct long range broadcasts Broadcasts more flexible, able to keep pace with operational changes PDU 5: AV-8 had mechanical difficulties deploying PDU-5, drop was four hours past mission Assessed to open over sea or leaflets blown out to sea Armed helo: Excellent SSC platform / pouncer PON AFSB Second PR platform provides flexibility along with capability to perform multiple missions and greater coverage Coalition Comms Chat/messages: no issues; R/T: UHF/HF Crypto: no problem with Coalition, but lacked USAF crypto Coalition integration Direct N2/LNO interaction with Coalition via CENTRIX (CDG/GAR) MEU Decision Cycle 800 ft / minutes Distance to target area 100 - 300 nm AV-8B Targets Destroyed: 35 T-72s 25 APCs 4 HET Vehicles 2 SP Arty 2 MRL 1 SCUD Navy-Marine Corps Team provides premier Crisis Response…Buys National Leadership “Decision Space” AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY 8

Marine Corps Perspective on ASB Ship to Objective Maneuver in Libya 175nm -Capable of direct insertion of ground forces to secure US national interest (people, sensitive/critical sites) -MEU chosen by COCOM for its capability and capacity to execute 9 9 9

Single Naval Battle A Single naval battle approach envisions the maritime domain as an indivisible whole, considering the actions and forces within the maritime domain as inherently integrated in effect. It provides a unifying perspective for naval operations. Develops and supports the interwoven nature of sea control and naval power projection into a cohesive whole. The idea of single naval battle is a main theme and observation from the 2011 ACWG. SNB recognizes that the Navy/MC can’t be individually stovepiped– this isn’t new, but requires new focus. If we recognize the definition of the littoral as having the characteristics of ashore and at sea, then there can be only one unified effort when conduction operations within that littoral battlespace. Single naval battle ignores the traditional sense of it is the Navy’s responsibility at sea and when ashore it is the Marine Corps. These two can’t be separated, they must be considered as a whole. Example Opportunities: How can we best create/use “Naval wargames”? What are the USMC contributions to the at sea fight and Navy contributions to the ashore? Naval Logistics Integration– existence since 2002/2003 Details: Pg 34-35 of ACWG report One fight: sea control, power projection & littoral maneuver! UNCLASSIFIED

Single Naval Battle: integration & renewed focus Opportunities Integrated force development guidance, experimentation, & exercises Marine Corps contribution to JFMCC Forward Naval force posture Force aggregation to meet crises Scalable naval forces Support assured access and enable Joint entry The idea of single naval battle is a main theme and observation from the 2011 ACWG. SNB recognizes that the Navy/MC can’t be individually stovepiped– this isn’t new, but requires new focus. If we recognize the definition of the littoral as having the characteristics of ashore and at sea, then there can be only one unified effort when conduction operations within that littoral battlespace. Single naval battle ignores the traditional sense of it is the Navy’s responsibility at sea and when ashore it is the Marine Corps. These two can’t be separated, they must be considered as a whole. Example Opportunities: How can we best create/use “Naval wargames”? What are the USMC contributions to the at sea fight and Navy contributions to the ashore? Naval Logistics Integration– existence since 2002/2003 Details: Pg 34-35 of ACWG report One fight: sea control, power projection & littoral maneuver! UNCLASSIFIED

Single Naval Battle Not coordination, integration At all echelons of command, we must enhance our ability to conduct integrated planning, execution, and assessment. Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower Single-battle is a unifying perspective of operations, which holds that actions anywhere in the operational environment can affect actions elsewhere. MCDP 1-0 Marine Corps Operations Not coordination, integration Link Sea Control, Power Projection & Littoral Effects Creates powerful capabilities within the Joint force Effects of the naval force in the human domain Thinking across the breadth of naval capabilities and across the whole of the maritime domain Challenges: Forward Deployed force posture Force Aggregation Command Arrangements C4 Integration JFMCC & Marine Corps Shared Operating Concepts Operational Cyber Functional integration SOF Naval CAX UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO Aggregating the Force Beyond Amphibious Ships Requires A SNB Perspective USMC in JFMCC CWC Come as you are! 3 Ships AAV Plt 6 Ships 2 x AAV Plt (U//FOUO) Immediate response will be conducted by forces aggregated from forward deployed MEUs & other readily available forces (e.g. MEUs in work-ups). (U//FOUO) Within 20 days 9-15 amphibious ships may be available for forcible entry or crisis. (U//FOUO) Reinforcement by AFOE, FIE, MPS (and lift alternatives) critical for MEF Ops. (U//FOUO) A minimum surface assault echelon of 4 inf bns (2 per MEB) is the postulated minimum requirement to meet a MEF-level (2xMEB) JFEO. (U//FOUO) Current inventory <30 ships (with timely availability of approximately 23 ships) generally limits the number of embarked amphibians that can be employed in a single ship- to-shore assault to approximately four AAV Co’s (4 inf bns). (U//FOUO) APCs beyond those four AAV Co’s could come ashore by surface connector, MPS or pier-side, obviating the tradeoffs required to swim long distances in open ocean. (U//FOUO) The MLP, LMSR, T-AKE revolutionize at sea transfer opportunities integration to provide ground combat power (vehicles, tanks, HIMARS), & logistics to support landing forces. 9 Ships 3 x AAV Plt 15 Ships 6 x AAV Plt 2 Battalions of Lift 19 Ships Crisis response timelines will require ‘come as you are’ elements for timely response, with the assembled force aggregated from available amphibious ships, MPS, AFOE, FIE and other platforms or connectors. 4/22/2017

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO SNB: Bringing Reinforcing Capabilities to Support Operations in the Littorals At Sea Arrival, Assembly & Transfer Dynamic Positioning-Skin to Skin Dedicated Connectors Personnel Transfer Flight / Well Decks Transfer Systems MV-22 CH-53K (Sustainment) Quay Wall or Pier LPD LSD LCAC LCU One enabler to our response capability is viewing the all capabilities as part of a Naval Expeditionary System. Linking JHSV, connectors, and MPS into a supporting or reinforcing capability offsets our limitations in a crisis. However continued development as augmentation or complementary capability is essential. MLP JHSV LHD JHSV INLS FIE Pax RRDF MV-22 CH-53K MLP LMSR T-AKE

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO Seamless From and Through the Littorals to Gain Landing Site Superiority Enables maneuver to exploit gaps or weakness Exploit advantage of MV22B / UH1Y Self deploying amphibious vehicle secures landing site Develop small craft capability to secure landing sites or provide escort Improved landing craft secure landing site w/LAV/Tank Landing craft (LCU 2000 or new program) deploy amphibious vehicle near shore & enable amphib vehicle Small craft escort landing craft carrying ACV/MPC from >25NM There are multiple means available to achieving landing-site superiority (Vertical insertion, clandestine delivery, small-craft and land maneuver). (U//FOUO) Littoral maneuver crosses the sea/air/land seam at a landing site. Without the presumption of dominance, the naval force must create landing site superiority at the HLZ or CLZ. There are multiple means available to achieve this. (U//FOUO) The service has eschewed direct forcible entry (frontal assault from the sea) since the 1950s. (U//FOUO) Precedent for infiltration and maneuver to overcome static linear defenses in the face of advanced technology (WWI: machineguns, indirect fire; Modern: A2AD.) (U//FOUO) USMC operating concepts are designed to avoid tracked amphibians fighting their way ashore against a defended beach. (U//FOUO) Modern ACE allows exploitation of the depth of the battlespace. (U//FOUO) Joint shaping (precision, mass) overcomes conventional linear defenses. (U//FOUO) Integration of complementary SOF and MAGTF capabilities supports entry. (U//FOUO) Unmanned systems have potential in breaching, suppression, deception. (U//FOUO) Tracked amphibians are useful where conditions allow, but there are multiple means available to the MAGTF to execute our operating concepts.

Continuos SNB Perspective Connectors Assault Amphibians Aviation Delivered Small Craft A Littoral Maneuver CONOPS is needed to provide …

U) Summary Applying the lessons of the last decade Single Naval Battle UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO U) Summary Applying the lessons of the last decade Single Naval Battle Enhancing littoral maneuver Sea-based CAS MEB OBJ ANGLICO Connectors BLT OBJB MEU/ARG BLT OBJ A  Assumption: Littoral maneuver, practiced through multiple means, is the principal enabler for modern amphibious operating concepts. Combined with the ability to achieve landing site superiority, it allows the amphibious force to dictate the terms of the fight. Rationale:\Littoral maneuver (codified in OMFTS and STOM) relies on creating and leveraging opportunities to avoid enemy surfaces, off-balance the enemy and strike gaps. The maneuver logic of the LV(A), AAAV, EFV, LCAC, and MV22 (means) emphasizing range, speed and at-sea maneuverability remains sound in the 21st century security environment. A sea-based force capable of littoral maneuver has a unique ability to redefine the battlespace geometry and control tempo. Littoral maneuver is achieved by amphibious ships, aviation, small-craft (boats), amphibians and high-speed surface connectors – the means must be compatible with the ways. The current MAGTF relies on surface connectors to deliver up to 85% of its vehicles and sustainment (breaching, tanks, arty, LAVs, MTVRs, C2, JLTV, sustainment) High-speed connectors are essential to MAGTF littoral maneuver but the programmatic strategy does not reflect their importance – Platforms, Crew, Endurance, Range LCAC inventory must be stabilized to provide 60 operationally available LCACs supporting amphibious operations and MPS reinforcement – connector bathtub from FY17-FY27. Future landing craft should increase the payload required by LCAC replacement from 74 tons to 80 to 90 tons to ensure maneuver capacity. LCU (R) must be realized. Connectors MEU/ARG MPF