Combined Maritime Forces Counter-Piracy Briefing CAPT Chris Chambers 19 May 2009 Overall Classification UNCLASSIFIED

Combined Maritime Forces Australia Denmark Netherlands Coalition of the Willing Primary Missions: Counter violent extremists and terrorist networks Work with regional and coalition partners to improve overall maritime security and stability CTF 150 Established in support of Operation Enduring Freedom CTF 151 Counter-piracy CTF 152 Arabian Gulf maritime security Bahrain Belgium Canada France Germany Greece Italy Japan Kuwait Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) patrols more than 2.5 million square miles of international waters to conduct both integrated and coordinated operations with a common purpose: to increase the security and prosperity of the region by working together for a better future. CMF is working to defeat terrorism, prevent piracy, reduce illegal trafficking of people and drugs, and promote the maritime environment as a safe place for mariners with legitimate business. New Zealand Pakistan Singapore South Korea Spain Portugal Turkey United States Saudi Arabia United Kingdom United Arab Emirates Non-Members with staff presence Jordan Qatar Yemen

Combined Task Force (CTF) 151 CMF established CTF 151 as a mission based Task Force: 12 Jan 09 under a UNSCR counter-piracy mandate CTF 151 is a mission specific CTF not geographically constrained Mandate based upon the range of counter-piracy UNSCRs Provides significant flexibility to the command to undertake operations Critical factors for mission success: International force participation in coalition Maritime merchant community participation and active self defense Merchant marine active communication with UKMTO/US MARLO to maintain situational awareness CMF established a new mission based Task Force (CTF 151) in Jan 2009 composed of forces from coalition nations who have agreed to deploy Naval forces and cooperate to the fullest extent to reprise acts of piracy and armed robbery in the CMF AOR. CTF 151 is a mission specific CTF not geographically constrained that has the flexibility to operate across the CMF AOR as necessary to counter piracy. The mandate on which CTF 151 was created is based upon the range of UNSCRs applicable to countering piracy within the maritime domain. This basis provides significant flexibility in the range and application of force available to the command to undertake operations. The effectiveness of CTF 151 relies on a number of key factors: International force participation in coalition Maritime merchant community participation and active self defence, and Merchant marine active communication with UK MTO/US MARLO to maintain situational awareness UNCLASSIFIED

Area of Responsibility CTF 152 RDML Tidd, USN CTF 151 RDML Howard, USN CTF 151 RDML Bener, TUR FOCUSED OP FOCUSED OP CTF 151 AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY IS MISSION-SPECIFIC TO COUNTER PIRACY AND IS NOT GEOGRAPHICALLY RESTRICTED WITHIN THE CMF AOR RDML Howard will hand over command of CTF 151 to CTF 150 RADM Hinden, FR

Countering Piracy - Strategic Aspects Piracy is an international problem requiring an international solution Solution is ashore in Somalia Must establish conditions ashore that preclude criminal activity at sea Enforce the rule of law in Somalia to deny pirates safe havens Until the solution is reached ashore, counter-piracy must focus on three interrelated elements Improved security and defensive efforts by the shipping industry International naval presence to deter / disrupt / defeat pirate attempts International legal framework for resolving piracy cases These elements must be addressed in harmony None will be successful individually International problem that requires International solution Ultimate solution is ashore in Somalia Establish conditions that preclude criminal activity at sea and ashore Stability, security, economic prosperity, governance, rule of law Piracy is about money – no ties to terrorism -- yet

Piracy – Current Assessment There is significant military presence in the GOA (CMF, NATO, EU, National) CMF hosts monthly coordination meetings with representatives of most participating navies CTF 151 coordinates warship positioning with other maritime participants to maximize effectiveness of limited assets Knowledge of piracy Pattern-Of-Life is still in development – military assets focused on deterrence / disruption of pirates rather than intelligence collection Favorable weather in Somali Basin has enabled pirates to increase activity Seasonal trend that follows the monsoon transition periods Somali Basin area is 5 times larger than the GOA Full military coverage of this area will not be possible From 25th February – 31st March 2009, 7% of the unsuccessful piracy attempts were the result of direct military presence and/or intervention The proportion of vessels being attacked is still below 1% in GOA, but has peaked at 1.4% in the Somali Basin

Piracy – Current Assessment Pirate capacity and capability remains high Number of ships being attacked and pirated has increased Total number of ships pirates can hold for ransom unknown Greater number of reports of attempts / false alarm calls noted by IMB Assessed due to better awareness in the merchant shipping community Military counter-piracy efforts in the GOA continue to have limited success No direct correlation between coalition presence and piracy incidents, although greater military presence on whole has resulted in better chances of preventing a successful piracy attack The most effective method for avoiding piracy is still through the merchant ship’s own defensive actions Pirates do not give up unless they cannot board or are threatened Speed with maneuver, charged fire hoses Professionally trained security teams capable of repelling pirate attacks Pirates unable to gain control of ship once onboard Maximum number of ships held for ransom at one time has been 19. Total capacity is unknown.

Pirate Tactics Motherships Length of attack Thought to be a requirement for the long range operations in the Somali Basin One recent example of this not being the case In GOA, may be a pirated vessel (Dhow, fishing vessel, etc) or an accomplice Recent example of migrant smugglers acting as mother ship Length of attack GOA attacks tend to be 30 minutes or less Threat of military intervention Target rich environment (go after something easier) Somali Basin attacks average one hour or longer Less threat of military intervention Fewer available targets Recent piracy events have shown that different pirate teams communicate and coordinate

Piracy Statistics Through 31 March Commodore’s Daily Morning Slide for reference. SECURITY TEAMS ARE AN EFFECTIVE ANTI-PIRACY CAPABILITY

REMAIN VIGILANT AT ALL TIMES Attacks by Time of Day 93% OF ATTACKS OCCUR DURING THE DAY. THERE WAS A SUCCESSFUL NIGHT ATTACK LAST WEEK. REMAIN VIGILANT AT ALL TIMES

Piracy Risk To Shipping March in GOA, 0.51% of vessels have been attacked and less than 0.05% pirated March in Somali Basin, less than 1.4% of vessels have been attacked and less than 0.65% pirated (47% of ships attacked) In February, 0.049% of vessels were pirated in GOA and 0% in the Somali Basin TRENDS SHOW TYPICAL SEASONAL INCREASE IN PIRACY, BUT PROPORTIONALLY INCREASED FROM PREVIOUS YEARS

Total Pirate Attacks SPIKES IN PIRATE ATTACKS BROADLY COINCIDE WITH FAVORABLE WEATHER TRANSITION PERIODS BETWEEN MONSOON SEASONS

Piracy concentrated in “High Risk” box during most of 2008 2008 GOA Piracy Events Piracy concentrated in “High Risk” box during most of 2008

Piracy evenly distributed across GOA in 2009 2009 GOA Piracy Events Piracy evenly distributed across GOA in 2009

Most open ocean piracy events in 2008 were inside 400nm 2008 Somali Basin Piracy 400nm Most open ocean piracy events in 2008 were inside 400nm

2009 Somali Basin Piracy 400nm In 2009, pirates have increased open ocean activity and followed vessels out to 600+ nm

Campaign Results – 243 Days Campaign start – 22 AUG 08, 17 vessels currently pirated Average Monthly Assets in CP Campaign 10 10 12 12 12 18 12 16 International Response 320 pirates encountered: 175 released 133 turned over for prosecution 8 killed 17 pending Pirate vessels destroyed: 24 Pirate vessels confiscated: 12 Weapons confiscated: 162 small arms, 30 RPG launchers, 61 RPG projectiles Other paraphernalia confiscated : 28 ladders 9 GPS 23 phones UNCLASSIFIED

INDUSTRY MUST PRO-ACTIVELY PROTECT ITSELF What Does it all Mean? Piracy has increased in the Somali Basin Spring and fall seasonal monsoon predicted this Piracy is further off the coast of Somalia than in previous years Merchant shipping has heeded advice to transit further east Pirates have adapted tactics to pursue targets at a greater distance Pirates in GOA are still very active Learning to find the easy targets Learning to coordinate in effort to counter effects of Naval presence Current maritime force cannot defeat pirates alone Avg number of ships per day is 15-17 units available to patrol high risk areas IRTC is a 480 x 12 mile corridor = 5760 sq miles of open sea Does not account for the whole of the Gulf of Aden (~100,000 sq miles) Somali Basin is a 1000 nm coast out to 600 miles = 600,000 sq miles of open sea Traffic in Somali Basin does not follow a predictable route Somali Basin is not as well suited as GOA for a transit corridor to manage traffic Capture, imprisonment and death are not deterring pirates Expect piracy attacks to remain effective in Somali Basin until SW monsoon season begins in June INDUSTRY MUST PRO-ACTIVELY PROTECT ITSELF

Countering Piracy - Military Aspects What we do now Coordination / Deconfliction / Working together CMF, EUNAVFOR, NATO, Malaysia, Russia, China, India, Japan Current naval actions Presence / deterrence / disruption / suppression of pirate activity Intervening against pirate attacks in progress Boarding suspected pirate vessels when encountered Interdicting motherships Collecting information to better understand piracy Pattern-of-Life Providing warning to commercial shipping of potential pirate locations Group transit plan for commercial shipping Surveillance / communications support after ships have been taken Providing piracy data and best practice recommendations to industry

Challenges and Opportunities There is significant military presence in the region (CMF, NATO, EU, National), presenting... National tasking makes inefficient use of limited assets Navies answer to individual national authorities with varying rules of engagement (ROE) NATO, EU, CMF, and other forces have independent chains-of-command Incompatible communications hamper coordination efforts Knowledge of piracy pattern-of-life is still in development – military assets focused on deterrence / disruption of pirates rather than intelligence collection CMF hosts monthly coordination meetings with representatives of most participating navies – membership is growing CTF 151 coordinates warship positioning with other maritime participants to maximize effectiveness of limited assets CMF provides logistics and/or communications services to 20 countries engaged in counter piracy ops Includes fuel, CENTRIXS secure computer network, and development of unclassified common operational picture (COP) Challenges … and Opportunities UNCLASSIFIED

Counter-Piracy Information Sharing / Coordination CTF 151 has assumed the role of tactically de-conflicting warships in GOA CMF UKMTO / MARLO Communications Hub INDEPENDENT NAVIES (RUS, CHN, MAL, IND, JPN) EUNAVFOR (MSC-HOA, FEXWEB) MERCHANT / CIVILIAN SHIPPING SHARED AWARENESS AND DE-CONFLICTION TALKS ARE KEY TO COORDINATED EFFORT

Military Coordination/Synchronization CMF conducts monthly Shared Awareness and De-confliction (SHADE) meeting in Bahrain Over 20 nations participate EU and NATO participate Developing shared UNCLAS picture Developing shared UNCLAS database Refining positioning of assets in the IRTC Synchronized CMF, EU and NATO operations Includes industry reps 30 nations participating in or planning to conduct counter piracy operations CTF-151 lead in tactical coordination/de-confliction/synchronization UKMTO (Dubai) and MARLO (Bahrain) link navies with industry UNCLASSIFIED

Countering Piracy – Military Challenges What limits our ability to respond Navies answer to individual national authorities Collective political will to take aggressive military action is needed Rules of engagement vary between Navies No unified political body under which to consolidate military effort NATO, EU, & CMF and other forces each have an independent chain of command Although a challenge, it is opening new avenues for military coordination between nations (SHADE, daily coordination between Task Forces) This is a law enforcement operation Does not fall under the law of armed conflict Limits military options for the use of force Strict rules of evidence for prosecuting pirates Legal options are limited Few countries willing to prosecute pirates captured by Naval forces Limited military assets to cover a vast area National tasking takes precedent over coalition tasking Shared Awareness and Deconfliction meeting held monthly First military coordination between US and Russia First military coordination between US and China Development of an unclassified Shared Awareness and Deconfliction tool for all nations involved in counter-piracy to use. Because it is a law enforcement operation, use of force is limited mainly to self-defense. You cannot shoot pirates after they have broken off the attack. Convoy escort – two ships escorting 10 ships (nations who escort believe this is the most they can support at one time), assume two days to transit, 70/ships per day transit GOA. That is 28 ships dedicated just to escort in the GOA – what about Somali Basin. THIS PROBLEM CANNOT BE SOLVED BY NAVAL FORCES ALONE

Recommended Risk Mitigation Process Conduct thorough piracy threat assessment If at all possible, avoid transit through areas with pirate threat If avoidance of piracy area is not possible… Conduct timely and deliberate self-assessment to determine risk to vessel Consider vulnerability factors such as vessel speed, low points of access, and time of exposure in piracy areas Consider self-protection options to mitigate risk Cost-benefit analysis will determine level of acceptable risk Benefits of conducting safe transit must outweigh the cost of implementing protective measures If costs outweigh the benefits (profits), ships are likely to seek naval escort Ships must re-evaluate risk and decide to accept one of the following… Cost of re-routing Cost of sufficient protective measures Risk of piracy Industry must submit request for escort / protection to UKMTO

Vessel Risk Assessment High Risk Slow Self Protection measures reduce the risk Enhanced lookout Physical measure taken on board the vessel (e.g. barbed wire, rigged fire hoses, etc.) Trained, unarmed security team on board Exposure Time in High Risk Zone Speed Fast Trained armed security teams nearly eliminate the risk Low Risk Complexity High Lowest Point of Access Low UNCLASSIFIED

Industry Best Practices Passive defense measures Comprehensive security plan to include a risk assessment Remove external ladders Lookouts at all times Speed and maneuver: speed up and take evasive action if pirates approach Limited lighting Register with Maritime Security Center Horn of Africa (MSCHOA) Stay in communication with MSCHOA, UK Maritime Trade Organization (UKMTO), and/or Maritime Liaison Office (MARLO) Routing – avoid high-risk areas if possible Participate in group transits Active defense measures Secure hatches, limit access to crew and control spaces Rig fire hoses Rig barriers such as barbed wire, fencing, etc., especially in low access areas Non lethal measures such as LRAD, flares, etc Professional security teams capable of repelling pirate attacks Bottom Line: Do not allow yourselves to become easy targets UNCLASSIFIED

Summary THE SOLUTION TO PIRACY IS STABILITY IN SOMALIA Combined Maritime Forces / International Navies have taken action Maritime Security Patrol Area and World Food Program escorts Deter, disrupt, capture, and destroy pirate equipment Coordinate, de-conflict, share intelligence / information Provide best practices to shipping industry Communications support to pirated vessels during negotiations Suspected pirates have been captured by DK, US, UK and EU forces Suspected Pirates taken by DK handed over to the Flag state of the attacked vessel Suspected Pirates taken by UK, US and EU have been handed over to Kenya per MOUs These actions alone will not solve the problem More aggressive naval actions will not succeed until other elements put in place Patrol area is enormous; requires coordinated tasking of naval assets from all countries Shipping industry must follow recommended best practices Shipping industry should consider embarking security detachments Additional airborne reconnaissance required to increase probability of encounter Retaking pirated ships involves high risk to the lives of hostages There is currently no mandate for military action ashore against pirate bases THE SOLUTION TO PIRACY IS STABILITY IN SOMALIA UNTIL THEN, INDUSTRY MUST PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE

Counter-Piracy Global Maritime Partnerships Questions?