Attribute Mutability in Usage Control July 26, 2004, IFIP WG11.3 Jaehong Park, University of Maryland University College Xinwen Zhang, George Mason University.

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Presentation transcript:

Attribute Mutability in Usage Control July 26, 2004, IFIP WG11.3 Jaehong Park, University of Maryland University College Xinwen Zhang, George Mason University Ravi Sandhu, NSD Security and George Mason University

2 Traditional Access Control: Limitations Traditional access control models are not adequate for todays distributed, network- connected digital environment. Authorization only – No obligation or condition based control Decision is made before access – No ongoing control No consumable rights - No mutable attributes Rights are pre-defined and granted to subjects Not for Digital Rights Management (DRM).

3 Usage Control (UCON) UCON is a general purpose, conceptual framework that covers broader perspective than access control UCON model is a unified model that encompasses traditional access control models, DRM and other enhanced access control models from recent literature UCON ABC is a family of core models for Usage Control

4 Usage Control (UCON) Coverage Protection Objectives Sensitive information protection IPR protection Privacy protection Protection Architectures Server-side reference monitor Client-side reference monitor SRM & CRM

5 OM-AM layered Approach Model examples: Access Matrix, Lattice-based model, Role-base access control model UCON ABC core model for usage control

6 UCON ABC Model Components: 3 Decision Factors & 2 Properties Continuity Property Decision can be made during usage for continuous enforcement Mutability Property Attributes can be updated as side-effects of subjects actions

7 UCON preA Model: Pre-Authorization S, O, R, ATT(S), ATT(O) and preA (subjects, objects, rights, subject attributes, object attributes, and pre-authorizations respectively); allowed(s,o,r) preA(ATT(s),ATT(o),r); preUpdate(ATT(s)), preUpdate(ATT(o)), postUpdate(ATT(s)), postUpdate(ATT(o))

8 Attributes in Usage Control Attributes are information or properties associated with subjects or objects E.g., ID, Role, Clearance/classification, membership, credit, etc. Subject Attributes and Object Attributes are used for authorization decision Attributes may have to be updated Immutable Attributes: Attribute updates can be made by administrative actions Mutable Attributes: attributes can be modified as side effects of usage

9 Attribute Management Taxonomy Our Focus

10 Attribute Management: Admin-controlled vs. System-controlled Admin-controlled (Immutable) Updates involve administrative decisions and actions Admin can be security officer, user (self, non- self) System-controlled (Mutable) Updates are made as side effects of users usage on objects. Our focus is here

11 Mutable Attributes Temporary Attributes (stateless) Alive only for a single usage Exist only in mutable attributes E.g., Usage start time, last active time, etc. Persistent Attributes (stateful) Live for multiple usage decisions Exist in both mutable and immutable attributes E.g., Total usage hours, user credit balance, etc. Utilization of temporary attributes is a design decision and can be eliminated in some cases. Temporary subject attributes can be stored as a form of elements of persistent object attributes

12 Mutability Variations Mutability for Exclusive/Inclusive Attributes E.g., Dynamic SOD, Chinese Wall policy Consumable/creditable Attributes E.g., Limited # of Usage, payment, mileage, etc Immediate Revocation To support continuous control throughout usages Obligation Attribute update as a result of obligation fulfillment Dynamic Confinement E.g., High Watermark in MAC

13 Mutability for Exclusive/Inclusive Attributes Object-based DSOD ID is a set of identification number. T is a set of object type name. ROLE is a partially ordered set of role names. uid : S ID, sRole : S 2 ROLE, type : O T prepareId : O ID, issueId : O ID, R : issue; prepare ATT(s) = {uid, sRole}, ATT(o) = {type, prepareId, issueId} allowed(s, o, prepare) type(o) = `check, sRole(s) `purchaseClerk preUpdate(prepareId(o)) : prepareId(o) = uid(s) allowed(s, o, issue) type(o) = `check, sRole(s) `accountClerk, uid(s) prepareId(o) preUpdate(issueId(o)) : issueId(o) = uid(s)

14 Mutability for Consumable/Creditable Attributes Mutability for consumable attributes, limited CD burnings N is a set of natural number, available : O N, ATT(o) : {available} allowed(s, o, burn) available(o) 1 preUpdate(available(o)): available(o) = available(o) - 1

15 Mutability for Immediate Revocation Long-distance call using Pre-paid phonecard N is a set of natural number, value : O N cardBal : S N, allowedT : S N, usageT : S N ATT(s) : {cardBal, allowedT, usageT}, ATT(o) : {value} allowed(s, o, connect) cardBal(s) value(o) stopped(s, o, connect) usageT (s) > allowedT(s) preUpdate(allowedT(s)) : allowedT (s) = cardBal(s)=value(o) onUpdate(usageT (s)) : usageT (s) + 1 postUpdate(cardBal(s)) : cardBal(s) - (usageT(s) × value(o))

16 Mutability for Obligation License agreements for first time users only OBS = S, OBO = {license_agreement}, OB = {agree} registered : S {yes, no}, ATT(s) = {registered} getPreOBL(s, o, r) = (s, license_agreement, agree), if registered(s) =no; Ø, if registered(s) =yes. allowed(s, o, r) preFulfilled(getPreOBL(s, o, r)) preUpdate(registered(s)) : registered(s) = `yes {

17 Mutability for Dynamic Confinement MAC policies with high watermark property L is a lattice of security labels with dominance relation clearance : S L, maxClearance : S L, classification : O L ATT(S) = {clearance, maxClearance}, ATT(O) = {classification} allowed(s, o, read) maxClearance(s) classification(o) preUpdate(clearance(s)) : clearance(s) = LUB(clearance(s), classification(o))

18 Discussion Mutability variations are not mutually exclusive Multiple mutability variations can be used in a single example. Updates can be made on either subject attributes or object attributes In some cases, a policy can be realized by utilizing either subject attributes or object attributes

19 Conclusions and Future Works Consolidated analysis of Attributes and Attribute mutability in a single framework of usage control Temporary and persistent attributes Taxonomy of attribute management Mutable attributes and variations of mutability Mutability with continuity property Future research Attribute management for admin-controlled attribute updates (immutable attributes) Further study on attribute mutability