Cyber-Identity, Authority and Trust in an Uncertain World

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Presentation transcript:

Cyber-Identity, Authority and Trust in an Uncertain World Prof. Ravi Sandhu Laboratory for Information Security Technology George Mason University www.list.gmu.edu sandhu@gmu.edu

Outline Perspective on security Role Based Access Control (RBAC) Objective Model-Architecture Mechanism (OM-AM) Framework Usage Control (UCON)

Security Conundrum Nobody knows WHAT security is Some of us do know HOW to implement pieces of it Result: hammers in search of nails

Security Confusion USAGE purpose INTEGRITY modification AVAILABILITY electronic commerce, electronic business DRM, client-side controls INTEGRITY modification AVAILABILITY access CONFIDENTIALITY disclosure

Success is largely unrecognized by the security community Security Successes On-line banking On-line trading Automatic teller machines (ATMs) GSM phones Set-top boxes ……………………. Success is largely unrecognized by the security community

Business models dominate Good enough security Real-world users Security geeks SECURE EASY end users operations staff help desk whose security perception or reality of security System owner Business models dominate security models COST system solution operational cost opportunity cost cost of fraud

Good enough security COST L M H Entrepreneurial mindset H 1 2 3 Academic mindset R I S K 2 3 4 M L 3 4 5

RBAC96 model (Currently foundation of a NIST/ANSI/ISO standard) ROLE HIERARCHIES USER-ROLE ASSIGNMENT PERMISSIONS-ROLE ASSIGNMENT USERS ROLES PERMISSIONS ... SESSIONS CONSTRAINTS

Fundamental Theorem of RBAC RBAC can be configured to do MAC MAC is Mandatory Access Control as defined in the Orange Book RBAC can be configured to do DAC DAC is Discretionary Access Control as defined in the Orange Book RBAC is policy neutral

THE OM-AM WAY A What? s u Objectives r Model a n Architecture c Mechanism How?

OM-AM AND MANDATORY ACCESS CONTROL (MAC) u r a n c e What? How? No information leakage Lattices (Bell-LaPadula) Security kernel Security labels

OM-AM AND DISCRETIONARY ACCESS CONTROL (DAC) u r a n c e What? How? Owner-based discretion numerous ACLs, Capabilities, etc

OM-AM AND ROLE-BASED ACCESS CONTROL (RBAC) u r a n c e What? How? Objective neutral RBAC96, ARBAC97, etc. user-pull, server-pull, etc. certificates, tickets, PACs, etc.

RBAC96 Model ... ROLES USER-ROLE ASSIGNMENT PERMISSIONS-ROLE USERS SESSIONS ROLE HIERARCHIES CONSTRAINTS This is a somewhat busy slide It shows a bird’s eye view of RBAC There are many details that need to be debated and filled in Some of these will be discussed in the subsequent panel For our purpose the bird’s eye view will suffice

Server-Pull Architecture Client Server User-role Authorization Server

User-Pull Architecture Client Server User-role Authorization Server

Proxy-Based Architecture Client Proxy Server Server User-role Authorization Server

Usage Control (UCON) Coverage Protection Objectives Sensitive information protection IPR protection Privacy protection Protection Architectures Server-side reference monitor Client-side reference monitor SRM & CRM

Core UCON (Usage Control) Models ongoing N/A Continuity Decision can be made during usage for continuous enforcement Mutability Attributes can be updated as side-effects of subjects’ actions

Examples Long-distance phone (pre-authorization with post-update) Pre-paid phone card (ongoing-authorization with ongoing-update) Pay-per-view (pre-authorization with pre-updates) Click Ad within every 30 minutes (ongoing-obligation with ongoing-updates) Business Hour (pre-/ongoing-condition)

Good enough security COST Entrepreneurial Mindset 80% problem soft, informal ordinary consumers L M H Academic Mindset 120% problem hard, informal techno-geeks H 1 2 3 R I S K 2 3 4 M L 3 4 5