Smallpox Phase I Hospital Team Vaccination Seminar North Dakota Department of Health.

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Presentation transcript:

Smallpox Phase I Hospital Team Vaccination Seminar North Dakota Department of Health

Smallpox Overview Terry L. Dwelle, MD, MPHTM State Health Officer North Dakota Department of Health

History 1977 – Last naturally acquired case in Somalia 1977 – Last naturally acquired case in Somalia 1978 – Laboratory-related death at the University of Birmingham, England 1978 – Laboratory-related death at the University of Birmingham, England 1980 – Global eradication certified by the World Health Organization 1980 – Global eradication certified by the World Health Organization Method of eradication – Ring vaccination, not mass vaccination Method of eradication – Ring vaccination, not mass vaccination

Ring Vaccination Concept Isolation of confirmed and suspected cases Isolation of confirmed and suspected cases Identification, vaccination and surveillance of significant contacts of proven cases Identification, vaccination and surveillance of significant contacts of proven cases Vaccination of household contacts of contacts Vaccination of household contacts of contacts Contacts Case Contacts Household Contacts of Contacts

Smallpox – Basic Facts Cause – Variola Virus Cause – Variola Virus Can infect only humans Can infect only humans Transmission – Close face to face (generally within 6 feet) via respiratory droplets of a person who has the disease Transmission – Close face to face (generally within 6 feet) via respiratory droplets of a person who has the disease

Smallpox - Disease Onset is 12 to 14 days after exposure Onset is 12 to 14 days after exposure Days 2 to 3 – High fever, bed-ridden, headache and backache Days 2 to 3 – High fever, bed-ridden, headache and backache Days 4 to 5 – Onset of the rash (small bump – blister – pustule – scab) Days 4 to 5 – Onset of the rash (small bump – blister – pustule – scab) Most infectious during the first week of the rash. No longer infectious once the scabs fall off ( 3 to 4 weeks) Most infectious during the first week of the rash. No longer infectious once the scabs fall off ( 3 to 4 weeks) Death rate is about 30 percent Death rate is about 30 percent

Smallpox

Smallpox Vaccination Live virus vaccine – Vaccinia (this is not the smallpox virus) Live virus vaccine – Vaccinia (this is not the smallpox virus) Highly effective in preventing illness or severe disease if given within 3 to 4 days of definite exposure to smallpox Highly effective in preventing illness or severe disease if given within 3 to 4 days of definite exposure to smallpox

Smallpox Vaccination Skin reactions are an indicator that the vaccine was effective (vaccine “take”) Skin reactions are an indicator that the vaccine was effective (vaccine “take”) 3 to 4 days – Redness and itching 3 to 4 days – Redness and itching 7 to 11 days – Vesicle (blister) develops into a pustule, redness increases 7 to 11 days – Vesicle (blister) develops into a pustule, redness increases 14 to 21 days – Pustule dries, scab forms 14 to 21 days – Pustule dries, scab forms 21 days – Scabs falls off, leaving a permanent scar 21 days – Scabs falls off, leaving a permanent scar Commonly see fever and tender, enlarged lymph nodes Commonly see fever and tender, enlarged lymph nodes

Vaccination – Adverse Reactions Death – 1 / million Death – 1 / million Accidental infection of other body part (i.e. eye) – 1 / 2000 Accidental infection of other body part (i.e. eye) – 1 / 2000 Generalized vaccinia – 1 / 5000 Generalized vaccinia – 1 / 5000 Eczema vaccinatum – 1 / 26,000 Eczema vaccinatum – 1 / 26,000 Post vaccination encephalitis – 1 / 300,000 Post vaccination encephalitis – 1 / 300,000 Progressive vaccinia – 0.83 / million Progressive vaccinia – 0.83 / million

Vaccination Site Progression

Smallpox Surveillance and Diagnosis Larry A. Shireley, MS,MPH State Epidemiologist North Dakota Department of Health

“Atypical” Rash Illnesses Early Detection

Rash Illnesses Rule Out Chickenpox (Varicella) Rule Out Chickenpox (Varicella)  Reporting of hospitalized patients  Consultation  Infectious Disease Physicians  Dermatologists Consultation/Confirmation Consultation/Confirmation  Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

Laboratory ND Public Health Laboratory ND Public Health Laboratory  “Rule in Varicella”  DFA  Real time PCR  Pan-Orthopox  Real time PCR  Vaccinia - Non-variola E9L  Real time PCR Variola Variola  Centers for Disease Control and Prevention  Regional Laboratories

Syndromic Surveillance Emergency Room Emergency Room Regional Ask-A-Nurse Regional Ask-A-Nurse Others Others  Ambulance “Runs”  Pharmaceutical Sales

Case Investigation Ring Vaccination Ring Vaccination Case Contact to Case Contact to Contact

Smallpox Plan Overview Tim Wiedrich, Director Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response North Dakota Department of Health

Smallpox Plan Categories Pre-event Pre-event  Phase I  Initial Responders  Public Health  Hospital  About 2,000

Smallpox Plan Categories Pre-event Pre-event  Phase II  All Responders  Public Health  Hospital  Clinic/Physician  Public Safety Law enforcementLaw enforcement FireFire EMSEMS

Smallpox Plan Categories Pre-event Pre-event  Phase III  Public

Smallpox Plan Categories Post-event Post-event  Ring vaccination  Mass vaccination

Bioterrorism Regional Planning Areas North East North East CentralNorth West CentralNorth West South West South West Central South East Central South East

Public Health Regional Resources Lead Public Health Units Lead Public Health Units Bioterrorism Directors Bioterrorism Directors Field Epidemiologists Field Epidemiologists Medical Consultants Medical Consultants Public Information Officers Public Information Officers

Phase I Pre-event Vaccination Clinics State Responsibilities  Receipt and delivery of vaccine  Establishment of regional consultants  Data registration  Training  Public education Regional and Local Responsibilities  Identification of public & hospital response teams  Clinic Planning  Site selections  Supply acquisitions  Staffing  Schedule planning  Supervision and evaluation

Healthcare Response Teams Brenda Vossler, RN, CIC Bioterrorism Hospital Coordinator North Dakota Department of Health

Purpose of a Healthcare Team Provide for the safety of healthcare workers Provide for the safety of healthcare workers Provide immediate quality care to smallpox patients Provide immediate quality care to smallpox patients

Selecting Your Healthcare Team Consider the services you provide. Consider the services you provide. Consider workloads, schedules and vacations. Consider workloads, schedules and vacations. Select enough team members to provide care 24/7 for 7-10 days. Select enough team members to provide care 24/7 for 7-10 days. Select staff willing to participate. Vaccination is voluntary. Select staff willing to participate. Vaccination is voluntary.

Composition of Healthcare Team ER staff—MDs, RNs, EMTs, Receptionist ER staff—MDs, RNs, EMTs, Receptionist ICU staff—MDs, RNs, ICU staff—MDs, RNs, Medical unit staff—MDs, RNs Medical unit staff—MDs, RNs Medical Specialists Medical Specialists Infection Control Infection Control Respiratory Therapy Respiratory Therapy Radiology Techs Radiology Techs Phlebotomy Phlebotomy Security Security Housekeeping Housekeeping Laundry Laundry

Educate Team Members and other Hospital Staff Smallpox disease Smallpox disease Vaccine Vaccine Vaccine contraindications Vaccine contraindications Normal “take” Normal “take” Adverse reactions Adverse reactions Resources available at Resources available at

Screen for Contraindications Immunosuppression for any reason Immunosuppression for any reason Eczema or atopic dermatitis or history Eczema or atopic dermatitis or history Pregnancy or breast feeding Pregnancy or breast feeding Household members with above contraindications Household members with above contraindications Allergic reaction to previous vaccination or vaccine ingredients Allergic reaction to previous vaccination or vaccine ingredients Moderate or severe illness Moderate or severe illness Persons less than 18 years of age Persons less than 18 years of age

Post-vaccination Site Care Cover with gauze and semi-permeable dressing. Cover with gauze and semi-permeable dressing. Change dressing every 2-3 days and as needed. Change dressing every 2-3 days and as needed. Evaluator to observe site daily prior to clinical assignment. Evaluator to observe site daily prior to clinical assignment. Excessive drainage may exclude staff from clinical assignment. Excessive drainage may exclude staff from clinical assignment.

Administrative Leave and Sick Leave CDC recommendations do not require administrative leave. CDC recommendations do not require administrative leave. Vaccinated staff may be physically unable to work for several days. Vaccinated staff may be physically unable to work for several days. Hospitals must decided what their policy will be. Hospitals must decided what their policy will be. Worker’s compensation will cover adverse effects and absence > 5 days. Worker’s compensation will cover adverse effects and absence > 5 days.

References ND Department of Health website at Select “Health Care Institutions”. ND Department of Health website at Select “Health Care Institutions”. CDC website at CDC website at Regional bioterrorism directors. Regional bioterrorism directors. State bioterrorism office State bioterrorism office

Smallpox Communications Loreeta Leer Frank Public Information Officer North Dakota Department of Health

Emergency Communication Response The NDDoH Office of Public Information supports state and local public health officials in their efforts to protect the public in the event of a public health emergency

Objectives To provide the public and the media access to accurate, consistent, comprehensive and timely information To provide the public and the media access to accurate, consistent, comprehensive and timely information To minimize, as much as possible, public panic and fears To minimize, as much as possible, public panic and fears To coordinate public information response with other local, state and federal partners To coordinate public information response with other local, state and federal partners

Guiding Principle The public will need information that will help them minimize their risk

Not Business as Usual A public health emergency:  Triggers a level of public interest and media inquiry that requires a response beyond normal operations and resources.  Requires a significant diversion of department staff from regular duties.

Recent Events Anthrax concerns ~ 2001 Anthrax concerns ~ 2001 West Nile virus ~ 2002 West Nile virus ~ 2002

Smallpox Communication Plan Within 30 minutes of notification of a smallpox case: All media calls to NDDoH routed to Office of Public Information All media calls to NDDoH routed to Office of Public Information

Smallpox Communication Plan State health officer or designee will act as official spokesperson for the department State health officer or designee will act as official spokesperson for the department News conference held as soon as possible News conference held as soon as possible Any subsequent news conferences held at consistent, central location Any subsequent news conferences held at consistent, central location

Smallpox Communication Plan Regular briefings held as warranted Regular briefings held as warranted If few new details, then news releases and news conferences as necessary If few new details, then news releases and news conferences as necessary Updates posted to NDDoH website at least daily Updates posted to NDDoH website at least daily Public health experts will be available for interviews with media Public health experts will be available for interviews with media

Confidentiality Issues By law, NDDoH cannot release patient- identifying information By law, NDDoH cannot release patient- identifying information  Ex. – West Nile virus

Confidentiality Issues During smallpox event, confidentiality issues will be balanced with public safety During smallpox event, confidentiality issues will be balanced with public safety  Smallpox cases will be identified by county  Condition of cases will be described  Name, age and gender not released

Emergencies Are Media Events Emergency response would be hampered if media not involved Emergency response would be hampered if media not involved  People rely on media for up-to-date information during an emergency  Media relay important protective actions for the public  Media know how to reach their audiences and what their audiences need

Public Health’s Goal in Emergency Response To efficiently and effectively reduce and prevent illness, injury and death and to return individuals and communities to normal

Contact Information Loreeta Leer Frank, public information officer Patience Hurley, public information coordinator

Questions? During this Live program Call or Send Following the Live Program Call or Send to North Dakota Department of Health

Smallpox Phase I Hospital Team Vaccination Seminar North Dakota Department of Health