Introduction to Rational Choice Theory H. Stobbs, MFA Political Science 200: Liberal Democracy in America

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The Problem of Political Science Problem: Whereas economics has the “science of choice” and sociology has been called “the science of no choice at all,” political science has no characteristic scientific approach to call its own. Solution: Borrow from other scientific fields.

Origins In the 1940’s and 50’s many scholars began seeking a genuinely scientific basis for political science – they looked admiringly upon the fields of sociology and psychology and began to adopt behavioral methods that focused on questions about political psychology and political sociology

Origins In the 1970’s many scholars grew dissatisfied with these non-rational approaches. They began to look to more concrete disciplines like operations research and economics theory (Such as Hotelling’s Law on Minimal Differentiation and its opposing Product Differentiation Model) and for models to restore rationality to the field of political science.

Origins This caused a backlash on the part of the behavioralists as well as historically- and philosophically-focused scholars who complained, as Morris P. Fiorina writes, about “ the reduction of political man and woman to atomistic calculators, and the capture of the research agenda by applied mathematicians and ‘economic imperialists’.”

Origins In the early “aughts” scholars concerned that a biological approach had been overlooked began to push the field toward biopolitics, which examines how genetic and physiological tendencies are related to political behavior.

Mayhew’s Approach David Mayhew is one of many political scientists who have adopted “Rational Choice theory” and its variants economic theory and public choice theory. The most important commonality of these three variants is that they focus on behavior. Mayhew aligns himself more closely with economics than with sociology.

Variants within Variants Decision theory centers on cost-benefit calculations that individuals make without reference to anyone else’s plans Game theory analyzes how people make choices based on what they expect other individuals to do.

General Assumption Individuals choose the best option according to their preferences and the constraints they face

Most Models Based in Methodological Individualism Assumes that social situations or collective behaviors are the result of individual actions

The Basic Idea Patterns of behavior in society reflect choices made by individuals as they try to maximize benefits and minimize costs By “rationality,” we mean wanting more rather than less of a good

Say, Olly, How many social scientists does it take to screw in a light bulb?

Why, none, Stan! Social scientists don’t change light bulbs… they search for the root cause of why the bulb burned out in the first place!

Two Assumptions about Individual Preferences Completeness: All actions can be ranked in an order of preference; indifference between two or more alternatives is possible Transitivity: If action a1 is preferred to action a2 and action a2 is preferred to a3, then a1 is preferred to a3.

Forms That Preference may Take Strict Preference: When an individual prefers a1 to a2, but not a2 to a1 Weak Preference: When an individual has a preference for at least a1 (similar to the ≤ operator) Indifference: When an individual does not prefer a1 to a2 or a2 to a1

Other Assumptions An individual has full or perfect information about what will happen under any choice made (in more advanced models, a probability value is assigned) An individual has cognitive ability and time to weigh every choice against every other choice (More advanced models rely on bounded rationality)

Utility Maximization Payoff Function (u): u (a;) > u (a;) u (Sara) > u (Roger) > u (abstain)

Say, Frick, How many political scientists does it take to change a light bulb? Just one, Frack… but it's not the light bulb that needs changing - it's the system!

Mayhew and Rational Choice Mayhew follows on work by economists Anthony Down and Mancur Olson, as well as political scientist Richard Fenno Fenno’s findings: House committee members pursued three principal goals – reelection, influence within the House, and good public policy.

Rational Choice Theory: It Has Its Critics Green & Shapiro: Pathology of Rational Choice Theory (1994); Schram & Caterino (2006) – some basic criticisms include: Weak methods Limited contributions to political science Methodological pluralism versus strict adherence to natural science methods Too reliant on social science Not reliant enough on historical analysis Doesn’t account sufficiently for culture

My Own Two Cents Everybody’s right, and nobody’s wrong. Don’t get hung up on turf. Use the best and lose the rest.

Bibliography Fiorina, Morris P. Fiorina. “When Stakes Are High, Rationality Kicks In.” Article on-line. Accessed 12 January 2008 from http://phoenix.liu.edu/~uroy/eco54/histlist/pol-sci-rational.htm. Jacobson, Gary. The politics of Congressional elections, 6th ed. New York: Pearson, 2004. Accessed 20 Aug 2012 from http://wikisum.com/w/Jacobson:_The_politics_of_Congressional_elections. Mayhew, David R. Congress: The Electoral Connection, Second Ed. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004. Shapiro, Ian. “A Model That Pretends to Explain Everything.” Accessed 12 January 2008 from http://phoenix.liu.edu/~uroy/eco54/histlist/pol-sci-rational.htm.