Ethiopia Productive Social Safety Net. Program description This program aims to provide –Predictable, multi-year assistance to –chronically the food insecure.

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Presentation transcript:

Ethiopia Productive Social Safety Net

Program description This program aims to provide –Predictable, multi-year assistance to –chronically the food insecure population, and –partially converts existing aid from food-for-work to cash-for-work. It’s large - $5 billion over 5 years. There are other programs – food security program, resettlement, etc. –Eligibility for these programs is typically not the same as for the PSSN.

Questions Targeting efficiency –How do actual recipients compare with intended recipients? Impact on household outcomes –consumption, –Incomes/poverty status – short-run and long-run, –assets, –non-farm income, –human capital (anthropometric measures, and other health outcomes)? Impact on market development – grain markets, insurance markets, etc.? Impact on community level decisions on types and quality of public works – is there more or less capture?

Attribution To what extent can outcomes be attributed to different components of the project? –the switch to cash; –the switch to predictable household consumption; –the switch to predictable kebele and/or woreda budgets; –the increase in level of resources?

Eligibility: woredas/individuals Each woreda is determined to be eligible for the program if, in each of the previous three years, it received food aid Program is intended for those individuals who are chronically food insecure –Average annual income over last three years < 9 months’ consumption –In practice, these are the ones that have “always received food aid”

Kebele Kebele are sub-woreda level communities These are also designated eligible or not, based on continued (3 years) previous receipt of food aid.

Region r Woreda w Kebele k Household h Food insecure Food secure Woreda level Kebele level Household level

Coverage Program operates in four regions of Ethiopia 192 woredas participate There are lots (?) of woredas in these regions that are not eligible Eligibility is determined once and for all –No-one allowed in later (or out?!)

Transfer Transfer (in cash or kind) is –At least three months’ food equivalent, and –Enough to get up to 12 months’ food Able-bodied people required to work –Ability determined by kebele –Labor supplied in the off-season to reduce opportunity cost Woreda chooses whether to use cash, food, or a combination of both –It can vary by kebele within a woreda

Public works Choices of projects (and assessment of ability) are made at the Kebele level by the “Food Security Task Force” –Includes Kebele administrator and others Extra funds are available for non-wage costs (20%)

Spillovers could be important Local public works could benefit non- participants in the same kebele Market development could benefit people in non-participating kebele

Identifying household impacts Within each kebele, compare participants and non-participants –Use discontinuity at 9 months to identify impact of receipt of transfer –Or use 9 month dummy as instrument for transfer

Identifying kebele/woreda impacts Indicator variables: –Household outcomes or –Kebele/woreda level outcomes quality and type of public goods (kebele) price volatility/dispersion measures (woredas) Observables –Match on rainfall (current and past), population? Unobservables –Use number of years of past food aid receipt as instrument?

Other questions Incentive effects –Labor supply – eligible individuals choose how much to work –So what is the net transfer received? Leakage –Does cash disappear more than food? –In general, what determines a woreda’s choice of food versus cash?