HiRadMat hearing session: safety file HiRadMat Hearing session CERN, July 27, 2011 Outline  Safety file Descriptive part Hazard inventory  Demonstrative part  Operational part  Feedbacks  Other recommendations from safety review S. Evrard – EN/MEF EDMS No:

Demonstrative part 2 IdHazardsRisks Organisational measures Technical measures Personal measures 1.TNC is a high radiation area. Contaminated dust in TNC (from destructive work in TNC radioactive area) External exposure Internal exposure Environment exposure - SPS access procedure in controlled area (EDMS ) -Safety code F - Radiation Safety Manual - RP supervision -A6 - The two-person rule of working -ALARA principles - Access system and RP veto for PPG6907 door. - Hand foot monitor control in BA7. -Ventilation system. - Alara oriented design of the facility. - Ramses system - Individual protective equipment IPE (safety shoes, auto-saving mask, helmet) - Individual and operational dosimeters - Overshoes - Depending on the nature of the work : -gloves if object handling in TNC -overall clothes + individual breathing mask if "destructive" work 2.Moving crane and moving PPG6907 door Collision with people or equipment Door opening procedure on crane control panel Switch : if door closed, crane will stay off Manual door opening IPE 3.Moving crane and lifting loads Collision with people or equipment -Overhead crane handling procedure (EDMS ) - Handling by qualified overhead crane drivers - Safety Regulation on mechanical equipment (SR-M) Slow motion handling and safety perimeter IPE

Demonstrative part 3 IdHazardsRisks Organisational measures Technical measures Personal measures 4.Moving crane and lifting loads in radioactive area Collision with people or equipment External exposure Internal exposure See point 1. and 3.See points 1. and 3. Handling of crane remotely See point 1. and 3. 5.Electrical installation and equipments Fire Electrocution Safety inspections - installation acceptance + periodic inspections Electrical equipment under norms : C1 - Electrical safety code + IS23 and IS41 Fire detection Extinguishing means (see EDMS ) IPE + see point 1. 6.Material (hooks or tools) used in TNC, exposed to contaminated dust Internal exposureDedicated RP training (EDMS ) Radiological control from RP technician See point Activated shielding when patrolling TNC External exposureHiRadMat patrol procedure EDMS See Point 1. See point Working at heights when patrol PEE7 FallHiRadMat patrol procedure EDMS Red phones available Modifications improving safety in B.846 (EDMS ) See point 1.

Demonstrative part 4 IdHazardsRisks Organisational measures Technical measures Personal measures 9. Work near radioactive dump External exposureSee point 1. Collimator and TED exchange procedure Gaz and vacuum pump connection procedure Gaz and vacuum pump disconnection procedure Collimator and TED have been design to minimize dose exposure to personnel See point Radioactive water from dump cooling circuit Environment pollution Internal exposure Collimator and TED exchange procedure Circuit filling alarm monitoring system available Ramses system IPE + see point Radioactive condensate water from air dehumidification in TNC Environment pollution Internal exposure Condensate water evacuation procedure Full tank alarm monitoring system available Ramses system IPE + see point Lifting heavy hooks (13kg) Collision with people or equipment Overhead crane handling procedure (EDMS ) - Handling by qualified overhead crane drivers Safety perimeter IPE 13. Contaminated air filter and bags in ventilation system Internal exposureReplacement of polluted absolute filters procedure (EDMS ) Handling by 2 qualified operators (EN/CV) in contaminated filters exchange Safety perimeterIPE Taped gloves Combinaison and protection mask P3

Demonstrative part 5 IdHazardsRisks Organisational measures Technical measures Personal measures 14. Moving material lift in PA7 Collision with people or equipment Use of material lift by qualified personnel from transport EN/HE or subcontractor Material lift under veto RP IPE 15. TT66 beam line - Electromagnetic fields Collision with equipment IS 36 – safety rule for the use of static magnetic fields at CERN (EDMS ) Access forbidden by access interlock (EDMS ) 16. TT66 beam line - Vacuum Internal exposureMechanical analysis (EDMS ) Beam size measurement by BTV + additional C-C plate (see section 4) S. Evrard – Hearing session 2011, July 27 Main risks assessed:  Radiation  Beam  Vacuum  Fire  Environment  Decommissioning

Risk Management Example 6 Stray radiation (external exposure)  Design stage:  Fluka simulations  CV and Ramses design  Dedicated handling means (lifting jig and eyes)  Prefabricated structure (easily removable)  Activated material management plan  Maintenance plan (reduced time in TNC)  Organizational measures  Frequent radiation survey of TNC tunnel  Dedicated RP training  ALARA, JOLI & DIMR preparation with all stakeholders  On-site close RP monitoring  Technical measures  Access, ventilation and RP sectorization  Ventilation system  Ramses monitoring system  Remote controlled PR532 crane  Personal measures  IPE, dosimeters, … S. Evrard – Hearing session 2011, July 27 Airborne contamination decrease Equipment remote handlingAbsolute Filter exchange

Operation part 7  This part of the HiRadMat Safety File is an inventory of all operational documents needed in order to optimize the exploitation of the project HiRadMat especially in terms of safety.  These operational documents are of three kinds:  Information note  Operational instructions and procedures  Control and test reports S. Evrard – Hearing session 2011, July 27

Operation part 8 QuestionProcedureEDMS How to get access authorized to the HiRadMat facility ? Preparatory steps to take before accessing to HiRadMat How to get access to HiRadMatAccess procedure How to escape from the facility ?Escape procedure How to patrol the facility ?Patrol procedure How to deal with activated material ? Activated material management procedure How to handle alarms from HRM ?Alarm management procedure How to maintain the facility ?Maintenance plan How to deal with incidents ?Faulty situation and incident analysis How to manage fire risk ?Fire prevention and fire risk management S. Evrard – Hearing session 2011, July 27

Feedback part 9  This part of the HiRadMat Safety File is an inventory of all feedbacks, mishap reports as well as experience gained reports which are very important to take into account in order to optimize the exploitation of the HiRadMat facility especially in terms of safety. DocumentEDMS # REX T9 modification Comments on May 2011 TS (safety coordination) Incident Sectorization gate PPG S. Evrard – Hearing session 2011, July 27

EDMS approval process status 10 DocumentEDMSStatusDeadline Safety file – descriptive part Under Approval20/07 Safety file – Hazard inventory Draft for discussion02/08 Safety file – demonstrative part Engineering Check03/08 Preparatory steps to take before accessing to HiRadMat In Work Personnel access to HiRadMat In Work Escape procedure Under Approval20/07 Patrol procedure Under Approval20/07 Activated material management procedure Under Approval26/07 Alarm management procedure Under Approval20/07 Maintenance plan In Work Faulty situation and incident analysis Under Approval25/07 Fire prevention and fire risk management Under Approval30/07 S. Evrard – Hearing session 2011, July 27

Other recommendations from safety review S. Evrard – Hearing session 2011, July  RISK ASSESSMENT  CABLES = THE MAIN HAZARD  PREVENTION MEASURES IN PLACE (FIRE DETECTION, EXTINGUISHING MEANS, AIR TIGHTENING CAMPAIGN)  FIRE IN THE HIRADMAT FACILITY – OPERATION MODE  Operation mode means that the situation is under control: all the doors are closed in the facility and nobody is present underground, i.e. no human life in stake.  FIRE IN THE HIRADMAT FACILITY – SHUTDOWN MODE  Shutdown mode means that the situation is not under control: all the doors could be or are open in the facility and people are present underground, i.e. human lives are at stake.  FIRE IN THE SPS  A fire in the SPS could than affect the HiRadMat facility. Therefore it is proposed to equip the door PPG 6905 (separating TCC6 and TJ7) with lock springs in order to ensure that the door is closed at all times and thus prevents smoke to enter into the HiRadMat facility area.  COLD SMOKE EXTRACTION Risk and incidents with fire

Other recommendations from safety review S. Evrard – Hearing session 2011, July  Two escape ways are considered depending on where the event causing the evacuation is triggered. The recommended way is passing through TJ7, then TA7, PA7 and return to the surface via the BA7 access point via the staircases. If someone is blocked in TNC and cannot escape using this recommended way, an alternative way is in place via the B.846 shaft. Escape ways to be defined

Other recommendations from safety review S. Evrard – Hearing session 2011, July B.846 shaft safety assessment as escape way End of HIRADMAT experiment - AUG (clear visible next to the escape door) - Red telephone (clear visible next to the escape door) Halfway ladder escape pit -Anker points (2 points, one of 35 kN above the shaft and one of 10 kN above the ladder) - Possibility to remove fence - Possibility to close the hole to stairs Bottom escape pit -Red telephone at the bottom of the pit (separated from HIRADMAT experiment), with direct contact to fire brigade - Entrance door, which can be opened in emergency without key. - (to discuss) Sign that explains that before the use of this shaft the FB must be informed and contact with FB is mandatory once the top has been reached. If desired FB can secure ascension. Top escape pit -The yellow balk under the plafond can be used as anker point, if it can bear a load of 35 kN. (if this is not the case, 2 points should be constructed as the point halfway the pit. -Red telephone with direct contact to fire brigade (in function) -Door to exit, which can’t be locked by keys  2 visits on-site with FB  FB safety assessment  Modifications in progress (deadline = september)

Other recommendations from safety review S. Evrard – Hearing session 2011, July  SPS sector 6&7  Seal on PPG710  B.846 shaft patrolled only if seal broken or patrol box dropped Search procedure

Other recommendations from safety review S. Evrard – Hearing session 2011, July  The various incidents and faulty situations that can occur in operating the HiRadMat facility have been identified and are listed here below:  Vacuum window failure  Beam loss incident  Ventilation failure  PR532 crane failure  Contamination spread around the test bed Abnormal conditions and accident scenarios

Other recommendations from safety review S. Evrard – Hearing session 2011, July  Access to BA7/TA7, TJ7, TCC6 tunnels  17 steps or actions identified involving user, CCC operator, RP technician before access is granted  Access to BA7/material shaft  idem  Access to BA7/TNC tunnels  Idem + work notification and DIMR  Checklist for End of Access in HiRadMat Define access conditions

Outcome S. Evrard – Hearing session 2011, July  Thanks to the fruitful collaboration of many of you, a complete set of safety documents is ready for approval  It is not only safety documentation but some hardware modifications were implemented and communication among safety stakeholders is improved (CCC operators, Fire Brigade,…)  Ways of improvement:  Information is somehow fragmented  one single user document needed  Demonstrative part to be more specific  Safety file will evolve in the course of the facility operation Safety file