Conclusions and Review Last time:how do American parties compare to parties in other representative democracies? Today: review session a note: I will hold office hours Monday, 2-3 pm

Irresponsible parties and responsible politics? Can a political system that lacks Westminster-style institutional attributes nonetheless produce good policy outcomes? –“good” here refers to constraints on the deadweight losses of redistribution If the presidency is an “encompassing institution,” the president will be motivated to minimize deadweight losses from public policy, all else constant –president’s veto threat can drag down spending –but tax policies with distributional consequences are harder to defeat Group lobbying costs detract directly from the value of redistributive benefits received –is there an equilibrium in “rent seeking” political competition?

Overview I The study of political parties in the U.S. usually is partitioned into parties as organizations; parties in the electorate; and party in government –as organizations: American parties today are very decentralized compared to parties in many other representative democracies –in the electorate: Party identification remains the strongest single predictor of vote choice, but ticket- splitting, roll-off (down-ticket) and drop-off (midterms) are common –in government: party discipline is weak in US relative to many other representative democracies

Overview II Why parties? Functional explanations for their existence and persistence –tool for collective action for citizen with correlated preferences (compare to interest groups) –brandname signalling value to voters gives party candidates a competitive advantage –coalitional agreements help office-holders gain and maintain policy benefits

Overview III Rules of the game and environmental conditions shape parties –electoral systems can encourage or discourage party label development, candidate homogeneity/heterogeneity, and policy cohesion –constitutional structures likewise shape parties and party competition –the nature of the economy can affect incentives for class-based vs. group-based parties (Stolper- Samuelson vs. Ricardo-Viner) –ethnic, linguistic or religious cleavages likewise can affect incentives for class-based vs. group-based parties