Phenomenal Indeterminacy and the Bounds of Cognition Brian Fiala April 28th, 2007 University of Arizona.

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Phenomenal Indeterminacy and the Bounds of Cognition Brian Fiala April 28th, 2007 University of Arizona

Overview (1) Sense-datum theory & the speckled hen (2) The argument from indeterminacy (3) Generalizing the argument (4) Resisting the argument

Overview (1) Sense-datum theory & the speckled hen (2) The argument from indeterminacy (3) Generalizing the argument (4) Resisting the argument

Sense-datum theory  Acts of sensing involve a relation between a subject and a mental object (a sense-datum).  Sense-data exist only when sensed. There are no unsensed sense-data.  There is no appearance/reality distinction with respect to sense-data and their properties.

The Problem of the Speckled Hen Let us consider the visual sense-datum which is yielded by a single glance at a speckled hen. The datum may be said to “comprise” many speckles. But what of the question of the number of speckles? If we judge that there are forty-eight, it would seem, at first consideration at least, that we might very well best mistaken.  Chisholm (1942)

The Speckled Hen (cont…)  Chisholm is pointing out that there is no number n of which one can say with complete certainty, “My sense-datum comprises n speckles.”  Judgments about sense-data are not basic judgments (rather, they are inferential).  Such judgments are fallible.  Inferences about sense-data are defeasible.

Overview (1) Sense-datum theory & the speckled hen (2) The argument from indeterminacy (3) Generalizing the argument (4) Resisting the argument

Indeterminacy is in the head  There is no indeterminacy in the world.  Instead, indeterminacy is a feature of representations of the world.  Here I’ll suppose the above two theses.  Not everyone will accept the suppositions.  Still, many will accept the suppositions.  Both are intuitively plausible.

Indeterminacy is in the head  Our concepts mountain and foothill are indeterminate with respect to some objects  Yet the fundamental physical structure of mountains and foothills is fully determinate

Phenomenal knowledge thesis PK (PK) If a subject S is sensing a sense-datum D, and if P is a phenomenal property, then S is in a position to know whether D determinately instantiates P.

Argument From Indeterminacy (P1) If D is a sense-datum for S and D determinately comprises 48 speckles, then S is in a position to know that D comprises 48 speckles. (P2) S is not in a position to know that D determinately comprises 48 speckles. (C1) It’s not the case that D determinately comprises 48 speckles. (P1, P2, modus tollens)

Overview (1) Sense-datum theory & the speckled hen (2) The argument from indeterminacy (3) Generalizing the argument (4) Resisting the argument

Generalized PK thesis (PK*) If a subject S undergoes a conscious experience E, and if P is a phenomenal property, then S is in a position to know whether E determinately instantiates P.

Why is PK* an Attractive Thesis?  Experience is immediate.  Experience is self-presenting.  There are no illusions with respect to the properties of one’s experience. That is, one can’t be mistaken about what it’s like to have an experience (cf. Kripke on “fool’s pain”).

HO-Representationalism and PK*  Higher-order representationalism  Conscious mental states (experiences) are states that the subject is aware of. Consciousness entails awareness.  A mental state M is a conscious experience iff there is a mental state M* that (appropriately) represents M. M* M M

HO-Representationalism and PK*  We can individuate mental states such that there is a 1-1 correspondence between phenomenal properties and mental states  HOTs are normally available for behavior guidance (including rational behavior)

HO-Representationalism and PK*

Overview (1) Sense-datum theory & the speckled hen (2) The argument from indeterminacy (3) Generalizing the argument (4) Resisting the argument

Sperling’s ‘Matrix’ (1960) TIV XLS BAW F E T

Sperling Experiments ≈15-500ms TIV XLS BAW F E T S reports letters Tone:  High  Medium  Low or Full report Blank display and No mask

Sperling Experiments (cont…)  “[T]he subjective image or sensation induced by the light flash outlasts the physical stimulus at least until the tone is heard. The stimulus information is thus ``stored’’ for a fraction of a second as a persisting image…  As the visual image fades, its legibility (information content) decreases, and consequentially the accuracy of reports based upon it decreases.” Sperling (1960: 20)

Rejecting PK*  The information carried by an experience may be highly determinate (and complex).  But it takes time to extract that information.  If the info is sufficiently complex (e.g. the property 48-speckled-ness), the subject may not have sufficient time to extract it.  It doesn’t follow that the property was not determinately present in the sensation.

THE END  THE END THE END  THE END THE END  THE END