1. On the Alleged Transparency of Conscious Experience Pete Mandik Assistant Professor of Philosophy Coordinator, Cognitive Science Laboratory William Paterson University, New Jersey USA

2. 2 Primary Goal Present a novel argument against the so-called transparency of conscious experience

3. 3 Secondary Goal Derive, from the failure of transparency, conclusions regarding the nature of conscious experience and its phenomenal character

4. 4 The Transparency Thesis If you have a conscious experience, all that you are conscious of are the objects and features of the objects that the experience is an experience of. Elaborations of Transparency n Introspective access to experience simply looks through experience to the external world n We are never introspectively aware of features of experiences themselves

5. 5 The Transparency Thesis If you have a conscious experience, all that you are conscious of are the objects and features of the objects that the experience is an experience of. Entailments 1. If true, then first-order representationalism is true and higher-order representationalism is false 2. If false, then first-order representationalism is false (however, higher-order representationalism may be either true or false)

6. 6 Spelling out entailment #1 If consciousness experience is transparent, then first-order representationalism is true and higher-order representationalism is false First-order representationalism: phenomenal character is one and the same as the content of (certain) first-order representations and a state may be conscious independently of being represented by any other state (i.e., independently of being the target of higher-order representations). Higher-order representationalism: phenomenal character is one and the same as the content of (certain) higher-order representations and a state is conscious only if it is represented by some other state

7. 7 Spelling out entailment #1 If consciousness experience is transparent, then first-order representationalism is true and higher-order representationalism is false First-order representationalism: phenomenal character is one and the same as the content of (certain) first-order representations and a state may be conscious independently of being represented by any other state (i.e., independently of being the target of higher-order representations). The Transparency Thesis: If you have a conscious experience, all that you are conscious of are features of the objects the experience is an experience of.

8. 8 Spelling out entailment #1 If consciousness experience is transparent, then first-order representationalism is true and higher-order representationalism is false Higher-order representationalism: phenomenal character is one and the same as the content of (certain) higher-order representations and a state is conscious only if it is represented by some other state The Transitivity Thesis: If you have a conscious experience, you must be conscious of the experience The Transparency Thesis: If you have a conscious experience, all that you are conscious of are features of the objects the experience is an experience of.

9. 9 Spelling out entailment #1 If consciousness experience is transparent, then first-order representationalism is true and higher-order representationalism is false Higher-order representationalism: phenomenal character is one and the same as the content of (certain) higher-order representations and a state is conscious only if it is represented by some other state The Transitivity Thesis: If you have a conscious experience, you must be conscious of the experience Higher-order contents must include vehicular properties of their lower order targets If they didnt, then they would have the same contents as their targets and thus not be higher-order. HO content: I am in a state with the content the grass is green FO content: the grass is green

10. 10 Spelling out entailment #2 If conscious experience is not transparent, then first-order representationalism is false (however, higher-order representationalism may be either true or false) If we can be conscious of features of the experiences themselves then phenomenal character is something other than the content of first-order representations Phenomenal character sometimes includes either vehicular properties of experiences or the contents of higher-order representations (note the non-equivalence of these disjuncts) (Higher-order representationalism is true only if phenomenal character always includes the contents of higher-order representations)

11. 11 Argument Against Transparency #1 Attitude discrimination without content divergence: u My memory that I am at a movie on a Tuesday u My intention that I am at a movie on a Tuesday u My perception that I am at a movie on a Tuesday If (first-order) content is all I have introspective access to, then memory, intention, and perception would be indistinguishable.

12. 12 Argument Against Transparency #1 Objection: Perhaps this only shows that memory and intention arent transparent, but perception still is Reply #1: If memory and intention arent transparent, this casts doubt on the transparency of perception

13. 13 Argument Against Transparency #1 Objection: Perhaps this only shows that memory and intention arent transparent, but perception still is Reply #2: A natural reading of the opacity of memory and intention is the mismatch between the time of occurrence of the mental state and its truth conditions, similarly what one has access to in introspecting perception is the time of occurrence of both percept and target time of occurrence is vehicular

14. 14 Argument Against Transparency #2 Introspecting brain states as such (Churchlandish Introspection) 1. Perception is the automatic conceptual exploitation of the natural information carried by sensations about things other than themselves 2. Sensations also carry natural information about themselves 3. The introspection of sensory experience is the automatic conceptual exploitation of the natural information sensations carry about themselves 4. Learning can increase both a persons number of concepts and the ability to apply them automatically 5. This is no less true of neuroscientific concepts.: Brain states may be introspected as such.: We can be conscious of (neurophysiological) vehicular properties of conscious experiences

15. 15 1. Perception is the automatic conceptual exploitation of the natural information carried by sensations about things other than themselves The natural information carried by our sensations determines what we can perceive Conceptual exploitation of natural information determines what we do perceive (compare a person who doesnt see a fly because of poor eyesight to a person with excellent eyesight who hasnt noticed the fly) The automatic conceptual exploitation of natural information determines what we do perceive without (conscious) inference The non-automatic conceptual exploitation of natural information determines what we consciously infer without perceiving it (compare special-effects experts and novices observing realistic special effects)

16. 16 2. Sensations also carry natural information about themselves A sufficient condition for natural information: If (X if and only if Y) then X carries natural info that Y. This is neutral with respect to whether or not X=Y

17. 17 3. The introspection of sensory experience is the automatic conceptual exploitation of the natural information sensations carry about themselves Exteroceptive ThermometerIntrospective Thermometer (no weirder than clocks!)

18. 18 4. Learning can increase both a persons number of concepts and the ability to apply them automatically The western sky reddening as the Sun sets The wavelength distribution of incoming solar radiation shifting towards the longer wavelengths (about 0.7 X 10 -6m ) as the shorter wavelengths are increasingly scattered away from the lengthening atmospheric path they must take as terrestrial rotation turns us slowly away from their source (no weirder than wine-tasting!)

19. 19 5. This is no less true of neuroscientific concepts Suppose that I know that the visual perception of motion always involves the neural activity in area V5/MT, then with a little practice… Just as I can automatically apply the concept of motion to the things I see… …I can automatically apply the concept of activity in area V5/MT to the experience of motion

20. 20 5. This is no less true of neuroscientific concepts.: Brain states may be introspected as such.: We can be conscious of (neurophysiological) vehicular properties of conscious experiences Thus, contra the transparency thesis, introspecting our experiences only as representing features of the external world is optional One may instead augment ones conceptual repertoire with neuroscience and introspect vehicular properties of experiences

21. 21 Objections/Replies Objection #1: Presupposes identity theory (as opposed to functionalism or anomalous monism) Reply: The multiple realizability of mousetraps doesnt rule out the perception of a mousetrap realization, so the multiple realizability of experiences wouldnt rule out the introspection of one of their neural realizations

22. 22 Objections/Replies Objection #2: Presupposes physicalism (as opposed to Cartesian soul mechanics or a completed Chalmersian kinematics of qualia) Reply: The essential features of the argument can be restated by replacing a neuroscientific theory with a dualistic theory (if there were such a thing) and vehicular properties of experience will still be introspectible.

23. 23 Spelling out entailment #2 If conscious experience is not transparent, then first-order representationalism is false (however, higher-order representationalism may be either true or false) If we can be conscious of features of the experiences themselves then phenomenal character is something other than the content of first-order representations Phenomenal character sometimes includes either vehicular properties of experiences or the contents of higher- order representations (Higher-order representationalism is true only if phenomenal character always includes the contents of higher-order representations)

24. 24 Does phenomenal character ever include vehicular properties of experiences? If so, then representationalism is false, since something other than representational content is included in phenomenal character. If so, this isnt shown by the argument for Churchlandish introspection (quite the contrary…) Consider an analogy to the direct and accurate perception of external objects: u Even when an object is directly and accurately perceived, neither an unrepresented aspect of the object nor the object itself enters into the perception u Thus, even when an experience is directly and accurately introspected, neither an unrepresented aspect of the experience nor the experience itself enters into the introspection (this would be true on even the strongest versions of externalism about content, since they are all about content)

25. 25 Phenomenal character never includes vehicular properties of experiences. Representationalism: Phenomenal character is always some first-order or higher-order representational content and a conscious state is always some first- order or higher-order representation Neutral with respect to higher-order representationalism (Higher-order representationalism HO-reps are always involved in conscious states and phenomenal character)

26. 26 CONCLUSIONS/SUMMARY Churchlandish introspection Failure of transparency Failure of transparency Failure of first- order representationalism Churchlandish introspection Representationalism still stands Representationalism is neutral with respect to higher-order representationalism

27. 27 THE END