1. Knowledge and Belief Some fundamental problems

2. Knowledge: a problematic concept “Knowledge” is ambiguous in a number of ways; the term can mean variously: “Knowledge” is ambiguous in a number of ways; the term can mean variously: Acquaintance with something or someone (e.g. “I know Prime Minister Chrétien personally”) Acquaintance with something or someone (e.g. “I know Prime Minister Chrétien personally”) Technique or skill (e.g. “I know how to play guitar”) Technique or skill (e.g. “I know how to play guitar”) Facts or states of affairs (e.g. “I know that there are nine planets”) Facts or states of affairs (e.g. “I know that there are nine planets”) All of these involve beliefs, but in distinct ways Q: is any of these primary? Can any serve as model for the rest? All of these can be considered kinds of knowledge; but kinds can be classed or generated along other dimensions.

3. Classes of things known Dimension 1: source or origin of Dimension 1: source or origin of a) sensation (e.g. dogs, water, storms, herds) b) innate structures or dispositions (e.g. ‘laws of thought’, logical principles) c) reflection or introspection (e.g. emotions, pains, intellectual faculties)

4. More classes Dimension 2: cognitive proximity or closeness Dimension 2: cognitive proximity or closeness a) immediately perceived (e.g. dogs, water, emotions, pains) b) mediately perceived (e.g. self, other minds, gravity, quarks) Dimension 3: cognitive simplicity Dimension 3: cognitive simplicity a) perceptual given (e.g. black, dog-shaped sense-datum) b) inference (e.g. dog)

5. Yet more classes Dimension 4: certainty Dimension 4: certainty a) immediate perception (e.g. dogs, water, self, pains, numbers) b) unobserved entities (e.g. quarks, gravity, mass) c) future things/events (e.g. predictions) d) past things/events (e.g. history) All of these involve evidence for belief, but, again, in different ways (and our confidence that we have knowledge in the various cases varies proportionally with the evidence) All of these involve evidence for belief, but, again, in different ways (and our confidence that we have knowledge in the various cases varies proportionally with the evidence)

6. When is it knowledge? Given these different dimensions, different criteria of knowledge may be appropriate: Given these different dimensions, different criteria of knowledge may be appropriate: dimension 1: source or origin (reliability or purity) dimension 2: cognitive proximity (distance) dimension 3: cognitive simplicity (number of steps) dimension 4: certainty (possibility of doubt) Each criterion aims to produce “true belief”. But this aim, while necessary, is not sufficient. Each criterion aims to produce “true belief”. But this aim, while necessary, is not sufficient.

7. Necessary & Sufficient Conditions A condition is “necessary” when the thing in question can’t be had without it (e.g. “oxygen is necessary for life”); a condition is “sufficient” when the thing in question can be had with this alone (e.g. “oxygen is not sufficient for life”, “a promise is sufficient to create an obligation”) A condition is “necessary” when the thing in question can’t be had without it (e.g. “oxygen is necessary for life”); a condition is “sufficient” when the thing in question can be had with this alone (e.g. “oxygen is not sufficient for life”, “a promise is sufficient to create an obligation”) So, “true belief” is necessary for knowledge, but not sufficient. Why not? Because “true belief” can be accidental. How can accidentally true belief be avoided? So, “true belief” is necessary for knowledge, but not sufficient. Why not? Because “true belief” can be accidental. How can accidentally true belief be avoided?

8. Internal vs. External Conditions If we decide that what is needed is that the knower should be aware (or even know) that they know, in some sense or other, we are asking for an internal condition for knowledge (e.g. Descartes’ indubitability) -- such things might be: justification, warranted assertability If we decide that what is needed is that the knower should be aware (or even know) that they know, in some sense or other, we are asking for an internal condition for knowledge (e.g. Descartes’ indubitability) -- such things might be: justification, warranted assertability If we decide that all that is needed is that the person have the belief by some reliable means or that there be no conditions which defeat the claim that knowledge is present (even if the knower themselves is not aware of this fact,) we are asking for an external condition -- such things might be: a certain causal connection, a certain methodology If we decide that all that is needed is that the person have the belief by some reliable means or that there be no conditions which defeat the claim that knowledge is present (even if the knower themselves is not aware of this fact,) we are asking for an external condition -- such things might be: a certain causal connection, a certain methodology

9. Knowledge as true, justified belief A justification would be some sort of ‘story’ which would show that the knower was correct to say that their belief was true (note that this might fall short of the belief’s actually being true -- she could be mistaken, & yet we might still be inclined to say that she ‘knows’) A justification would be some sort of ‘story’ which would show that the knower was correct to say that their belief was true (note that this might fall short of the belief’s actually being true -- she could be mistaken, & yet we might still be inclined to say that she ‘knows’) In the ideal case, a justification would show that the belief was, in fact, true, and the justification would be had by the knower. In the ideal case, a justification would show that the belief was, in fact, true, and the justification would be had by the knower.

10. The ideal case defeated Imagine that you and some other person, Smith, are applying for the same job and that you have good reason to believe (a justification, notice) the conjunctive proposition (a) “Smith is the person who will get the job and there are ten coins in Smith’s pocket.” You therefore also (and with equally good reason) believe (b) “There are ten coins in the pocket of the person who will get the job.” You know this because you know that (b) is entailed by (a). But now suppose that, unknown to you at the time, you will get the job and you happen to have ten coins in your pocket. Though (a) is false, (b) is true; and you are justified in believing (b). In virtue of believing (b) you have justified true belief. Yet we would not wish to say that you know that there are ten coins in the pocket of the person who will get the job. For you don’t know that you will get the job, nor that you have ten coins in your pocket. (this case is due to E. Gettier in a 1963 paper) Imagine that you and some other person, Smith, are applying for the same job and that you have good reason to believe (a justification, notice) the conjunctive proposition (a) “Smith is the person who will get the job and there are ten coins in Smith’s pocket.” You therefore also (and with equally good reason) believe (b) “There are ten coins in the pocket of the person who will get the job.” You know this because you know that (b) is entailed by (a). But now suppose that, unknown to you at the time, you will get the job and you happen to have ten coins in your pocket. Though (a) is false, (b) is true; and you are justified in believing (b). In virtue of believing (b) you have justified true belief. Yet we would not wish to say that you know that there are ten coins in the pocket of the person who will get the job. For you don’t know that you will get the job, nor that you have ten coins in your pocket. (this case is due to E. Gettier in a 1963 paper) Isn’t it possible to defeat all ideal cases in this way? Therefore, what does one need in addition to justification? Relevant justification? (the justification is evidentially related to the state of affairs that makes the belief true) Isn’t it possible to defeat all ideal cases in this way? Therefore, what does one need in addition to justification? Relevant justification? (the justification is evidentially related to the state of affairs that makes the belief true)

11. Why does the ideal case go wrong? The intuition which drives the ‘true justified belief’ notion of knowledge was: that the knower him/herself has to be aware that the belief is true of likely to be true & “justification” is supposed to provide this; it is the ‘good reason’ for believing. The intuition which drives the ‘true justified belief’ notion of knowledge was: that the knower him/herself has to be aware that the belief is true of likely to be true & “justification” is supposed to provide this; it is the ‘good reason’ for believing. But what if this intuition is misplaced? What if all that is required is that the belief is in fact true or likely to be true, and the putative knower have gotten the belief in a way which connects up, in a non- accidental way, with the ‘facts’ which the belief is about? But what if this intuition is misplaced? What if all that is required is that the belief is in fact true or likely to be true, and the putative knower have gotten the belief in a way which connects up, in a non- accidental way, with the ‘facts’ which the belief is about?

12. External conditions Reliable indicator: a belief is an instance of knowledge, or is justified, if the belief is a reliable indication of some fact or state of affairs Reliable indicator: a belief is an instance of knowledge, or is justified, if the belief is a reliable indication of some fact or state of affairs Reliable process: a belief is an instance of knowledge if the belief is the result of a reliable belief-forming process Reliable process: a belief is an instance of knowledge if the belief is the result of a reliable belief-forming process The intuition here is that there is or should be some kind of causal connection between the belief and what it describes (supplemented perhaps by a 2nd order procedure or process which “saves the truth” of beliefs acquired in some causal way) The intuition here is that there is or should be some kind of causal connection between the belief and what it describes (supplemented perhaps by a 2nd order procedure or process which “saves the truth” of beliefs acquired in some causal way)

13. What are these reliable indicators or processes? Perception….wait a minute! Isn’t this just to restore the things we rejected a moment ago? No. Think of this difference: if I ask “how do I know that there is a power point slide before me?” (apologies to Shakespeare), I might answer “because I see it” Now, is “perceiving a ‘power pointy slidy thing’” a good reason for believing that there is a slide there? Well, it might not be, I could, as Descartes has taught us, be deceived. On the other hand, is the having of a slide-perception a reliable indicator of a slide -- more often than not, when I have perceptions are there objects to those perceptions? Or is perception a reliable process for forming beliefs? The answers to these questions might very well be “yes.” Perception….wait a minute! Isn’t this just to restore the things we rejected a moment ago? No. Think of this difference: if I ask “how do I know that there is a power point slide before me?” (apologies to Shakespeare), I might answer “because I see it” Now, is “perceiving a ‘power pointy slidy thing’” a good reason for believing that there is a slide there? Well, it might not be, I could, as Descartes has taught us, be deceived. On the other hand, is the having of a slide-perception a reliable indicator of a slide -- more often than not, when I have perceptions are there objects to those perceptions? Or is perception a reliable process for forming beliefs? The answers to these questions might very well be “yes.” Other reliable indicators or processes: reasoning (at least, as a procedure which “saves the truth”), experimental results Other reliable indicators or processes: reasoning (at least, as a procedure which “saves the truth”), experimental results

14. Examples of un-reliable indicators or processes Authority: belief formed according to or on the basis of trust in the reliability of persons according to status are no more likely to be true than false Authority: belief formed according to or on the basis of trust in the reliability of persons according to status are no more likely to be true than false Intuition: if beliefs acquired by intuition reliably tracked the truth, it would be rational to accept intuition as a process. Is it reliable? Intuition: if beliefs acquired by intuition reliably tracked the truth, it would be rational to accept intuition as a process. Is it reliable? ESP: is there any evidence to show that there are even beliefs acquired in this way? (as opposed to, say, “feeling right”) ESP: is there any evidence to show that there are even beliefs acquired in this way? (as opposed to, say, “feeling right”) Pseudo-science: non-standard or deviant ‘methods’ (e.g. dianetics, astrology, homeopathy) Pseudo-science: non-standard or deviant ‘methods’ (e.g. dianetics, astrology, homeopathy) Heresay/testimony/anecdote: what’s the problem here? Heresay/testimony/anecdote: what’s the problem here?

15. Some lessons Belief & knowledge are distinct on the basis of truth plus something else (but whatever that something else is, it is always a surety condition, which avoids accidental truth & makes belief ‘rational’) -- good reasons, the best available evidence, reliable processes, etc. Belief & knowledge are distinct on the basis of truth plus something else (but whatever that something else is, it is always a surety condition, which avoids accidental truth & makes belief ‘rational’) -- good reasons, the best available evidence, reliable processes, etc. Knowers have ‘intellectual obligations’ (just as they do moral or legal ones): since one is free to believe or not, one’s responsibility is to believe only on a rational and impartial basis (remember this later) Knowers have ‘intellectual obligations’ (just as they do moral or legal ones): since one is free to believe or not, one’s responsibility is to believe only on a rational and impartial basis (remember this later)