Agency, Resistance and Regional Disunity Negotiating an Economic Partnership Agreement between the EU and Southern Africa Peg Murray-Evans University of York

Puzzle: The outcome of the EPA in Southern Africa Resistance to externally imposed EU liberalisation agenda for an extended period Agreement eventually reached following EU concessions on a number of key issues – But, some Southern African countries had initially been willing to sign up to a more comprehensive liberalisation agenda. Not just a straightforward story of African resistance…

African Agency in Trade Negotiations Increasing focus on African agency in a number of arenas, including international trade negotiations. Literature on African agency in trade highlights resistance to externally imposed liberalisation via ‘discursive contestation’ Two extensions of this literature: – Considerable differentiation in negotiating positions of African countries – Intra-regional politics may play a central role in negotiations with external partners

Background to the EPA Negotiations EU offered unilateral trade preferences to ACP countries from 1975 under Lomé Convention Lomé to be replaced with inter-regional, reciprocal trade agreements by end 2007 – EU preference for ‘comprehensive’ agreements Choice for ACP countries: – sign an agreement on trade in goods or risk downgrade to inferior preference schemes? – Sign an agreement on ‘comprehensive’ agenda?

SADC-Minus: A Region Divided CountriesNegotiating Position EPA Enthusiasts Botswana Lesotho Mozambique Swaziland Saw potential trade benefits of ‘comprehensive’ EPAs in terms of ‘locking in’ regulatory reform and attracting inward investment Strong desire to lessen economic dependence on South Africa EPA Sceptics Angola Namibia South Africa Saw EPAs as a trade off between ‘policy space’ and access to the EU market Rejected EU claims trade liberalisation and regulatory harmonisation would have development benefits Closer political relations with South Africa

SADC-Minus agrees an EPA After 2009, South African negotiators issued threats to regional partners At the same time, South African negotiators deployed discursive challenges to the EU’s comprehensive trade agenda Final agreement reflects EU concessions to the South African position and is less ambitious than the ‘enthusiasts’ had hoped

Conclusions SADC-Minus EPA was not the result of a straightforward compromise between European imposition and African resistance. Rather, reflects a set of differentiated responses to the choice set on offer under the EPAs and the strategic interactions and power plays between African regional partners Coercive pressures from external actors are mediated by both the interpretations of African agents and the regional context in which they are placed