More 20 th Century Theories of Mind Eliminative Materialism: we should replace terms like “thought” with purely material expressions Paul Churchland ( ) Functionalism: mental states are “types” of patterned associations of sensory stimuli and behaviors; these associations are not tied to particular “tokens” of anatomical mechanism Jerry Fodor ( )

Minds and Machines Epiphenomenalism: “conscious” activity is simply the result of physical organization Thomas Huxley ( ) Objection against all metaphysical attempts to describe mind: to say that a being thinks or feels pain is not to describe anything; it merely reveals how we speak (which is linked to a network of other beliefs) Ludwig Wittgenstein ( )

Materialist Accounts of Mind: Problems Subjectivity: the experience of thinking and having a point of view seems not to be captured in materialist accounts –Mental activity (e.g., consciousness) does not have physical properties (e.g., location). Even if mental activity is correlated with physical activity, that does not prove they are identical Intentionality: consciousness is always “of” or “about” things (even things that don’t exist); physical objects/events lack such intentionality