Justine Hastings, Yale University and NBER Jeffrey Weinstein, Yale University Information, School Choice, and Academic Achievement: Evidence from Two Experiments

When all students … are provided high-quality educational options, and when parents receive enough information to make intelligent choices among those options, public school choice can increase both equity and quality in education. - - Dept. of Ed. NCLB Public School Choice Guide

Overview Investigate the role of information costs on school choice  Low implicit weight for academics among low-income, low- achieving students  lower academic gains, lower pressure to improve (Hastings, Kane, Staiger (2006a,b))  Low implicit weights from intrinsically low value  Low implicit weights from high information costs (Bertrand et al. (2006), Duflo et al. (2006), McFadden (2006), Winter et al. (2006)). Analyze data two experiments to test if simplified information on academics  more parents choosing better schools, better schools result in academic gains  2004 implementation of NCLB in Charlotte-Mecklenburg School District (CMS)  Field experiment in transparent information in CMS school choice plan

Brief History of CMS School Choice Plan 2001 Court ordered cessation of race-based bussing, Spring 2002 moved to District-wide school choice school year, all parents required to submit up to 3 choices, given a guaranteed seat at a nearby ‘home’ school Substantial redistricting in first year High compliance rate – 90 – 95% compliance Each subsequent year, only rising grades, students who want to change, redistricted schools need to apply Assignment to oversubscribed schools by lottery with priorities, typically to give high-poverty under-achieving students priority to go to low-poverty high-performing schools Information:  100+ page choice book with self-written school descriptions  Family application center  Extensive website offers objective information with search  Information on capacity utilization in and choice books

2004 NCLB School Choice NCLB  0405 school year, NCLB school choice provision implemented: schools that failed to make AYP and had Title 1 status for 2 years in a row  Provide notification and alphabetized spreadsheet printout of % proficient at every school in the district Spring 2004, parents submit choices for schools for school year. June 2004, Title 1 Improving schools identified and parents of children slated to attend those schools had to be resent choice forms.  Included NCLB-mandated information on academic performance at schools in the district Compare Spring and June choices:  Fraction of parents choosing non-guaranteed schools increases significantly by 5% off a base of 11%  Parents chose significantly higher scoring schools  Respondents chose schools that were 0.5 standard deviations higher in test scores.

Changes in Choices from 2004 NCLB

Distribution of Gains in Score of School Chosen: 2004 NCLB Natural Experiment Note: We use the Epanechnikov kernel and the optimal width as computed by default in Stata.

: Details of Field Experiment Provide simplified information on test scores, test scores and odds of admission Limit on non-NCLB schools to those serving lower income neighborhoods Randomization at school-choice zone level, NCLB schools and non- NCLB schools Limit on number of students  6,328 non-NCLB students in 46 school-zones (39 schools)  10,134 NCLB students in 31 school-zones (19 schools) Forms were specialized for each child’s choice set Scores were created from latest year test score information, rescaled to look like a grade Odds of admission based on prior year admission, incorporating priority groups Attached to and distributed with choice forms.

Aggregated Field Experiment Results

Distribution of Gains in Score of School Chosen: Received Information vs. Control Group Note: We use the Epanechnikov kernel and the optimal width as computed by default in Stata.

Impact on Student Outcomes Use random variation in test score of school attended generated by these two experiments as instruments to examine if attending high-test score school increases own test scores Field experiment: use received information and interactions with baseline characteristics as instrument. For 2004 NCLB natural experiment: use lottery assignment to chosen schools and interaction with score of school chosen as instrument.

IV Results for Field Experiment

IV Results for 2004 NCLB Natural Experiment

Impact on Student Outcomes Impact similar to that experience by highest preference- for-academic types in Hastings et al 2006b. Equivalent to moving from lower quartile teacher to top quartile teacher Implies relatively small information costs have very large financial implications (Madrian and Shea (2001), Duflo et al. (2006), Choi et al. (2007)). Small policy change can correct this.

Provision of Transparent Information Who has the incentive to provide information in public sector? (Gavazza and Lizzerri (2007)).  Private sector unraveling principle – good firms always advertise  Public sector unraveling principle doesn’t hold – good schools may only want informed parents.