1. Dante Contreras Sebastián Bustos Paulina Sepúlveda
When schools are the ones that choose: the effect of screening in Chile
Dante Contreras Sebastián Bustos Paulina Sepúlveda
June 2007

2. Contribution of the paper
This study provides evidence on the use of student selection mechanisms applied by private subsidized schools in a competitive context  This study examines the effects of this practice on the results’ gap between private and public schools and its impact on academic performance.
Two main results:
We present evidence indicating that student selection is a widespread practice among private subsidized schools.
After controlling for a series of selection criteria  there are no differences in results between public and voucher schools.

3. Motivation Chile  voucher scheme nationwide system Since early 80s
Assumption: consumers (families) choose schools for their children.
Parental choice  quality [increasing quality]
Increase opportunity set for families  free choice context.

4. The Chilean Education Market Design…
Public schools are obligated to accept all students.
Private subsidized schools can select students according with their educational objectives.
Most of the PS schools are for profits.
Same voucher.
So what is going to happen under such conditions
PS schools have incentives to select students  the less expensive to educate.

5. Given the market design…

6. Epple y Romano, AER, 1998
Show that schools will choose the highest ability students from the highest income families.
This is because less capable students imply higher educational costs
They require greater resources than higher ability students to achieve the same results.
Teachers must also spend more time with students with learning difficulties, thus negatively affecting the other students.
If the objective of voucher for profit schools is to maximize profits, then student selection is an easy and economical method for attaining those goals and improving academic results.
Direct Effects
Indirect effects  peers [ Zimmer and Toma, 2000, McEwan 2001, 2003, Sacerdote 2001]

7. Evidence in Chile
This is not the first paper to compare private and public school achievement:
Aggregate school level data (e.g., Bravo et al. 1999, Mizala and Romaguera 2000)
Student level data that attempts to control for selection bias (e.g. Anand et al., 2006: Contreras 2000, Sapelli and Vial, 2002; McEwan, 2001).
After controlling for selection bias and peer effects, the evidence [for Chile] indicates that the gap between public and private subsidized schools is positive and small.

8. Background information required by schools

9. Selection categories own elaboration based on parental reports
Note: A dummy variable is defined for each of these selection criteria, which takes the value of 1 if the school applies selection criteria and 0 if otherwise. we consider that a school used a given type of selection if more than 50% of the responses were affirmative for each selection category

10. Schools’ student screening

12. In summary … The selection strategy used by Chilean voucher schools
is consistent with the theory. [Epple and Romano]
Private subsidized schools commonly use selection mechanisms  the most recurrent:
Student ability
Family income
Why?  reduce educational costs + achieve better results.
The evidence indicates  Active selection made by voucher schools.

13. Selection in the other way around…
Parents “want” to be selected?
Parent prefers schools which performs this kind of selection?
If so  school may be reacting to parental preferences
What we do know about parental choice?
Parental choice not correlated with educational achievement. [Elacqua et., al.,JPAM]
Main reasons behind school choice by families is the proximity to the home or workplace.
Parents do not have the necessary information to compare the quality of schools.
Be careful with the “causality” interpretation, but at least the parental choice according to quality of education is not operating.

14. Effects of selection on educational achievement
Direct Effect: screening [Hsie + Urquiola, JPUBE, 2006]
Indirect Effect  better peers through the selection process.
The indirect effect correspond to the benefit of attending a school where the socio-economic profile of students is higher than of schools without selection.

15. Data and methodology Individual data: SIMCE 2005 [fourth grade]
Parents answer how their children were selected into the school (S = 1 if more than 50% respond affirmatively).
Production function approach.
OLS and IV estimates [similar models, data and empirical strategies  new control variables]
IV strategy
School choice = F (parental education, family income, other hh characteristics, school availability density - previously used in literature)

16. The model …

17. Quantifying the Effects: Direct and Indirect Effects of Student Selection
Peers differences

18. Impact – Math test points
Statistical significant
coef./ inconditional stand. deviation

19. Direct effect
Indirect effect

20. The results doesn’t change when we use IV to control the parents school selection bias

22. Conclusions
The evidence indicates that the different selection methods are widely used by voucher schools, and especially in schools with high socio-economic profiles.
Student ability selection is the most frequently used, and produces the greatest effects on subsequent academic results.
Selection of students is an important issue  student discrimination using public resources.
The results by OLS and IV indicate that, after controlling for family and school characteristics and student selection criteria, the public-private gap shown in earlier studies drops to zero after controlling for the selection criteria used.
This evidence also helps to understand the segregation in the Chilean educational system.