Environmental Problems and Cooperation Dilemmas

The Basic Dilemma Environmental problems: global/transnational Decision making: vested in nation states How do we deal with the mismatch in the scales of environmental and decision-making systems?

Types of Cooperation Dilemmas Tragedy of the commons (Garrett Hardin 1968). Common resources: – non-excludable (cannot exclude additional users) – subtractable (use by one actor reduces availability to others) – individual utility of each additional use greater than the disutility of overuse, which is shared by all. Strong incentives to overuse.

Tragedy of the Commons “Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush…” (Hardin 1968, p. 41)

Commons Examples?

Tragedy of the Commons Is it inevitable? – Hardin: yes, logic compelling, look at other examples. – Buck: no, communities had rules to manage the commons, decline resulted not from unlimited access, but from industrial revolution, improved agrarian practices, agrarian reform, inequality. What do you think?

The Role of Institutions: Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons (1990) Principles of institutional design. – Rules are devised and managed by resource users. – Compliance with rules is easy to monitor. – Rules are enforceable. – Sanctions are graduated. – Adjudication is available at low cost. – Monitors and other officials are accountable to users. – Institutions to regulate a given common-pool resource may need to be devised at multiple levels. – Procedures exist for revising rules.

The Ozone Shield -In September 2000, the Antarctic ozone hole was the largest ever recorded -- measuring at approximately 11 million square miles, roughly three times the size of the US -Strong cooperation: industrialized countries all but eliminated the use and production of ODS -Ozone hole shrunk somewhat for the first time in 2002 and 2003.

Climate Change No binding international commitment to reduce GHG HGH accumulations goes on at an unprecedented rate EU countries adopted GHG reduction policies

Externalities Activity within one state affects the environment in other states Examples?

The Amazon

Shared Resources Resources that extend across the jurisdiction of several states Examples?

The Aral Sea

Linked Issues When environmental regimes have unintended consequence on other issues and vise versa. Examples?

Solutions Privatization (Hardin) Government regulation/ “mutually agreed coercion.” (Hardin) Institutions and social capital (Buck, Ostrom) Are these feasible in international relations?

The Role of Institutions: Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons (1990) Principles of institutional design. – Rules are devised and managed by resource users. – Compliance with rules is easy to monitor. – Rules are enforceable. – Sanctions are graduated. – Adjudication is available at low cost. – Monitors and other officials are accountable to users. – Institutions to regulate a given common-pool resource may need to be devised at multiple levels. – Procedures exist for revising rules.

But in IR: Anarchical system: no world government No adjudication Compliance and monitoring voluntary Weak weakly developed common values

Cooperation Coordination of polices, rules, and norms by national governments. International regimes: governance without government (Oran Young, John Ruggie)

Conditions for Cooperation Repeated interaction Hegemonic power Institutions: information sharing, lower transaction cost, credible commitments Socialization Transnational advocacy coalitions and networks Domestic interest

Instruments: Framework convention. – Set of principles, norms, goals and mechanisms for cooperation, but no major obligations. Protocol – Specific obligations (most intense negotiations) Implementation provisions. – Reporting; monitoring (rare); trade sanctions (rare); assistance. Norms (soft rules) Voluntary codes of conduct Public-private partnerships