Page 1 © 2013, ITER Organization PURESAFE Final Conference, CERN Geneva (CH), January 2015 Page 1 © 2013, ITER Organization Maintenance & Remote Handling at ITER Presented by A.Tesini ITER Organization Route de Vinon sur Verdon – St Paul Lez Durance – France Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed herein do not necessarily reflect those of the ITER Organization

Page 2 © 2013, ITER Organization Page 2 PURESAFE Final Conference, CERN Geneva (CH), January 2015 Contents ITER maintenance basics ITER maintenance – Regulatory Context Why Remote Handling ITER Baseline Remote Handling Equipment

Page 3 © 2013, ITER Organization Page 3 PURESAFE Final Conference, CERN Geneva (CH), January 2015 The ITER Project The ITER Machine

Page 4 © 2013, ITER Organization Page 4 PURESAFE Final Conference, CERN Geneva (CH), January 2015 ITER Magnet System ITER Vacuum Vessel and Ports System ITER Shield Blanket System

Page 5 © 2013, ITER Organization Page 5 PURESAFE Final Conference, CERN Geneva (CH), January 2015 ITER Site Layout – Concept Phase ITER Site – Construction Phase (2013)

Page 6 © 2013, ITER Organization Page 6 PURESAFE Final Conference, CERN Geneva (CH), January

Page 7 © 2013, ITER Organization Page 7 PURESAFE Final Conference, CERN Geneva (CH), January 2015 I ITER MAINTENANCE FACT & FIGURES 180 hectars ITER site surface in St Paul les Durance, South of France 2.5 million m3 of earth moved for the excavation 100,000 km of Niobium 3 Tin superconducting strands for toroidal field magnets 23,000 tons total mass 840 m3 plasma volume 360 tons each toroidal field coil 5000 people at peak construction time 104 km of road transport for large components (max 900 tons, H 10.6 m or W 9 m or L 33 m) 400,000 tons resting on the tokamak seismic isolation pit 13 billion euros

Page 8 © 2013, ITER Organization Page 8 PURESAFE Final Conference, CERN Geneva (CH), January 2015

Page 9 © 2013, ITER Organization Page 9 PURESAFE Final Conference, CERN Geneva (CH), January 2015 ITER Maintenance Basics

Page 10 © 2013, ITER Organization Page 10 PURESAFE Final Conference, CERN Geneva (CH), January establish and implement a regulatory program consisting of policies, processes and procedures that provide direction for maintaining structures, systems and component of the ITER plant. When incorporated into the ITER licence or other legally enforceable instrument, the above regulatory program becomes a legal requirement. 2.define and follow a systematic approach to identify which maintenance activities are to be performed, on which structures, systems and components (SSCs), and at what intervals. The type and frequency of maintenance activity applied to each SSC is proportional to the its importance to safety (safety class), design function and required performance. 3.demonstrate that the maintenance strategy has a prioritization criteria and methodology, which are applied to the work management, to take into account the key licensing basis requirements: safety analysis, regulatory requirements, ALARA and codes and standards ITER MAINTENANCE WBS MISSION STATEMENT (ref. Policy for the ITER Plant Maintenance ) Policy for the ITER Plant Maintenance

Page 11 © 2013, ITER Organization Page 11 PURESAFE Final Conference, CERN Geneva (CH), January 2015

Page 12 © 2013, ITER Organization Page 12 PURESAFE Final Conference, CERN Geneva (CH), January 2015 Plant availability objectives RAMI analysis results Maintenance requirements Radiation level Remote Handling Hands-on maintenance Perform maintenance & upgrades [ref. PR289-I, PR307-I] Balance Risk and Cost Provide maintenance in radiation environment Fit the required maintenance with capacity of the maintenance system (equipment and space) [continued] Limit the impact on performance or safety Design efficient maintenance solutions ITER MAINTENANCE PROJECT REQUIREMENTS Ensure/demonstrate maintainability

Page 13 © 2013, ITER Organization Page 13 PURESAFE Final Conference, CERN Geneva (CH), January Balance Risk and Cost The project policy regarding maintenance provision is to balance risk and cost by assigning a RH classification for maintenance tasks according to the likelihood or the need of them having to be carried out at regular intervals, and to define the level of provision to be made for each classification. [PR1075-I] 2.Provide Maintenance in radiation environment Provisions for remote maintenance shall be made for all environments where hands-on maintenance would result in ITER administrative limits (<100 μSv/h) being exceeded. [PR1073-R]. 3.Fit maintenance with capacity of RH system (equipment and space) Unscheduled maintenance tasks (failures that did not require a scheduled shutdown or system upgrades) shall be performed during the remaining available time of a scheduled shutdown. The number of unscheduled tasks performed will depend on the time required to perform each task, their priority, and the possibility to carry out parallel remote handling operations. [PR1084-R] ITER MAINTENANCE PROJECT REQUIREMENTS

Page 14 © 2013, ITER Organization Page 14 PURESAFE Final Conference, CERN Geneva (CH), January Ensure/demonstrate maintainability Maintenance plans shall be developed for all scheduled maintenance and for all credible maintenance scenarios with a probability of occurrence greater than 10-6, over the 20-year life of ITER, and maintenance procedures and tools shall be provided for maintenance scenarios with a probability exceeding 10-1 over the 20-year life of ITER [PR1016-R] 5.Avoid impact on performance or safety The objective of maintainability is to develop equipment and systems which can be maintained in the least time, at the least cost, with a minimum expenditure of support resources, without adversely affecting the item’s performance or/and its safety characteristics. [PR998-I] 6.Design efficient maintenance solutions The maintainability shall ensure the minimum time to recognize, isolate and correct a malfunction, to understand and apply technical procedure for the maintenance technicians, to gain access to faulty items, to repair or replace faulty items and to test and verify accuracy and adequacy of maintenance actions. In addition, the maintainability shall require the lowest amount possible of required facilities, tools, tests, support requirements and maintenance staff training to enable the fulfilment of maintenance requests. [PR1001-I] ITER MAINTENANCE PROJECT REQUIREMENTS

Page 15 © 2013, ITER Organization Page 15 PURESAFE Final Conference, CERN Geneva (CH), January 2015 ITER MAINTENANCE POLICY ITER MAINTENANCE DIRECTORY 1.database of all maintenance tasks defined for ITER 2.management tool for the approval of maintenance tasks (incl. risk assessment) IMD Policy IMD Procedure ITER Maintenance Policy IMD Work Instruction RH Compatibility Procedure ITER MAINTENANCE MANAGEMENT BASIS ITER MAINTENANCE PROGRAM RH Code of Practice

Page 16 © 2013, ITER Organization Page 16 PURESAFE Final Conference, CERN Geneva (CH), January 2015 ITER MAINTENANCE COMPATIBILITY ASSESSMENT PROCESS PDF TDF OSD Define Plant Define Task Define RH Sequence Verify RH Sequence Validate RH Sequence VR Animation VR / HW Mock-up Tooling concepts Plant Design Feedback

Page 17 © 2013, ITER Organization Page 17 PURESAFE Final Conference, CERN Geneva (CH), January 2015 ITER Maintenance Regulatory Context

Page 18 © 2013, ITER Organization Page 18 PURESAFE Final Conference, CERN Geneva (CH), January The legislative and regulatory sections of the French Public Health Code and of the Labour Code were amended in 2001 and 2006 in order to integrate EURATOM directives concerning radiation protection 2.In parallel, the French Autorité de sûreté nucléaire (ASN) updated the regulatory part of both Codes in order to integrate theAutorité de sûreté nucléaire EURATOM Directive No. 2003/122 of 22 December 2003 on the Control of High-activity Sealed Radioactive Sources and Orphan Sources 3.It is the ASN’s responsibility to license the commissioning of any Basic Nuclear Installation (INB) and to set relevant design, implementation and operation requirements pursuant to the related decrees. ITER is an INB Radiation Protection is one such fundamental requirement Ref: Code de la santé publique [Public Health Code], Journal officiel de la République française10, French version only. See: Law & Regulations

Page 19 © 2013, ITER Organization Page 19 PURESAFE Final Conference, CERN Geneva (CH), January 2015 The general international radiation-protection principles (justification, optimisation, limitation), established by the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) and included in EURATOM Directives, are integrated into the Public Health Code (Article L1333-1). They constitute the guidelines for regulatory activities within ASN’s jurisdiction. Ref: Code de la santé publique [Public Health Code], Journal officiel de la République française10, French version only. See: Radiation Protection Principles JUSTIFICATION PRINCIPLE “A nuclear activity or intervention may not be undertaken or performed unless justified by its health, social, economic or scientific benefits, when compared with the hazards inherent to ionising radiation to which the persons are likely to be exposed.” Assessment of the expected benefit of a nuclear activity and the associated health detriment may cause an activity to be prohibited, if the benefit does not appear to outweigh the hazard. OPTIMISATION PRINCIPLE “Exposure of persons to ionising radiation resulting from a nuclear activity or intervention must be kept as low as reasonably achievable, with current technology, economic and social factors being taken into account, and, as applicable, the medical purpose.” ( a.k.a. ALARA principle ) LIMITATION PRINCIPLE “Exposure of a person to ionising radiation resulting from a nuclear activity may not raise the sum of doses received beyond regulatory limits, except when that person is subject to exposure for medical or biomedical research purposes.”

Page 20 © 2013, ITER Organization Page 20 PURESAFE Final Conference, CERN Geneva (CH), January 2015 “NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES” include those performed in INBs, including MAINTENANCE, which are the subject of specific attention, due to the significant risks of exposure to ionising radiation. In the framework of the procedures referred to in the Transparency and Security in the Nuclear Field Act (*), all INB operators must demonstrate how they comply with radiation protection principles (Justification, Optimization, Limitation) as early as the design stage and at every further stage in the lifetime of their facility for which ASN delivers a licence, that is, its creation, its commissioning and its dismantling. INBs are the subject of further safety reviews, during which the operator must demonstrate that he is constantly improving safety and radiation-protection levels. In addition, radiation protection in INBs is the subject of controls whenever the facilities are undergoing changes that have an impact on the radiological protection of workers. Lastly, inspections are also conducted throughout the term of the licence. (*) ACT No of 13 June 2006 Radiation Protection in INBs

Page 21 © 2013, ITER Organization Page 21 PURESAFE Final Conference, CERN Geneva (CH), January 2015 Why Remote Handling in ITER ? To mitigate the effect of radiological hazards to workers caused by proximity to: radiation sources activated materials and components activated dust and activated corrosion products Tritium The implementation of Remote Handling techniques and processes in ITER greatly contributes to achieve the ITER general safety objectives by avoiding workers exposure to radiation sources.

Page 22 © 2013, ITER Organization Page 22 PURESAFE Final Conference, CERN Geneva (CH), January 2015 Statutory Dose Limits and ITER Objectives Workers’ individual limits to ionizing radiation: ITER Objectives Maximum dose constraint in all casesALARA and in any case < 10 mSv/year Average individual dose for workers classified for radiation exposure ALARA and in any case ≤ 2.5 mSv/year Individual dose after incidentALARA and in any case ≤ 10 mSv per incident

Page 23 © 2013, ITER Organization Page 23 PURESAFE Final Conference, CERN Geneva (CH), January 2015 ORE Control Provisions in ITER Maintenance (ORE) OCCUPATIONAL RADIATION EXPOSURE control provisions are normally take during: SSC’s design process Buildings design Maintenance equipment design and use (including its maintenance) o Hands on operations optimized for speed o Remote operations optimized for reliability ensure RH equipment reliability (FMECA), rescue, recovery measures to avoid human intervention establish a RH equipment maintenance plan and procedures RH equipment decontamination to rely on and to allow human intervention

Page 24 © 2013, ITER Organization Page 24 PURESAFE Final Conference, CERN Geneva (CH), January 2015 ITER Baseline Remote Handling Equipment

Page 25 © 2013, ITER Organization Page 25 PURESAFE Final Conference, CERN Geneva (CH), January 2015 ITER Baseline Remote Handling Equipment TRANSFER CASK SYSTEM

Page 26 © 2013, ITER Organization Page 26 PURESAFE Final Conference, CERN Geneva (CH), January 2015 ITER Baseline Remote Handling Equipment TRANSFER CASK SYSTEM

Page 27 © 2013, ITER Organization Page 27 PURESAFE Final Conference, CERN Geneva (CH), January 2015 ITER Baseline Remote Handling Equipment TRANSFER CASK SYSTEM

Page 28 © 2013, ITER Organization Page 28 PURESAFE Final Conference, CERN Geneva (CH), January 2015 ITER Baseline Remote Handling Equipment South Wall TRANSFER CASK SYSTEM (rescue) Tritium recovery trolley Winch recovery system

Page 29 © 2013, ITER Organization Page 29 PURESAFE Final Conference, CERN Geneva (CH), January 2015 ITER Baseline Remote Handling Equipment TRANSFER CASK SYSTEM (rescue)

Page 30 © 2013, ITER Organization Page 30 PURESAFE Final Conference, CERN Geneva (CH), January 2015 ITER Baseline Remote Handling Equipment TRANSFER CASK SYSTEM (maintenance)

Page 31 © 2013, ITER Organization Page 31 PURESAFE Final Conference, CERN Geneva (CH), January 2015 ITER Baseline Remote Handling Equipment MULTI PURPOSE DEPLOYER

Page 32 © 2013, ITER Organization Page 32 PURESAFE Final Conference, CERN Geneva (CH), January 2015 ITER Baseline Remote Handling Equipment MULTI PURPOSE DEPLOYER

Page 33 © 2013, ITER Organization Page 33 PURESAFE Final Conference, CERN Geneva (CH), January 2015 ITER Baseline Remote Handling Equipment MULTI PURPOSE DEPLOYER (rescue, maintenance) MPD rescue solution MPD in Hot Cell

Page 34 © 2013, ITER Organization Page 34 PURESAFE Final Conference, CERN Geneva (CH), January 2015 ITER Baseline Remote Handling Equipment NEUTRAL BEAM RH SYSTEM

Page 35 © 2013, ITER Organization Page 35 PURESAFE Final Conference, CERN Geneva (CH), January 2015 ITER Baseline Remote Handling Equipment NEUTRAL BEAM RH SYSTEM Crane Rail & Trolley System NB Vessel opening mechanism Beam source RH equipment Beam Line Transporter

Page 36 © 2013, ITER Organization Page 36 PURESAFE Final Conference, CERN Geneva (CH), January 2015 ITER Baseline Remote Handling Equipment NB system cooling pipes and flange tools NEUTRAL BEAM RH SYSTEM

Page 37 © 2013, ITER Organization Page 37 PURESAFE Final Conference, CERN Geneva (CH), January 2015 ITER Baseline Remote Handling Equipment DIVERTOR RH SYSTEM CMM mockup CMM Design Divertor cassettes system

Page 38 © 2013, ITER Organization Page 38 PURESAFE Final Conference, CERN Geneva (CH), January 2015 ITER Baseline Remote Handling Equipment Blanket Remote Handling system (in-cask configuration) BLANKET RH SYSTEM

Page 39 © 2013, ITER Organization Page 39 PURESAFE Final Conference, CERN Geneva (CH), January 2015 ITER Baseline Remote Handling Equipment BLANKET RH SYSTEM Blanket Remote Handling system (in-vessel deployed configuration)

Page 40 © 2013, ITER Organization Page 40 PURESAFE Final Conference, CERN Geneva (CH), January 2015 ITER Baseline Remote Handling Equipment HOT CELL RH SYSTEM Hot Cell RH operations process logic

Page 41 © 2013, ITER Organization Page 41 PURESAFE Final Conference, CERN Geneva (CH), January 2015 ITER Baseline Remote Handling Equipment

Page 42 © 2013, ITER Organization Page 42 PURESAFE Final Conference, CERN Geneva (CH), January 2015 ITER Baseline Remote Handling Equipment

Page 43 © 2013, ITER Organization Page 43 PURESAFE Final Conference, CERN Geneva (CH), January 2015 Conclusion

Page 44 © 2013, ITER Organization Page 44 PURESAFE Final Conference, CERN Geneva (CH), January 2015 Conclusion 1.ITER is a Basic Nuclear Installation and as such is required to comply with the safety guidelines and rules applicable to nuclear activities carried out in commercial nuclear power plants. 2.Nuclear activities include MAINTENANCE, which is the subject of specific attention by the Safety Authorities, due to the significant risks of exposure to ionising radiation. 3.The implementation of Remote Handling techniques and processes in ITER greatly contributes to achieve the ITER general safety objectives by avoiding workers exposure to radiation sources.

Page 45 © 2013, ITER Organization PURESAFE Final Conference, CERN Geneva (CH), January 2015 THANK YOU