Human Rights in the post-Soviet space: Russia and the Council of Europe 9 hypotheses for reflexions and discussions by Andreas Gross (Zurich) (Political Scientist, MP, PACE) At the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs’ Centre for Russian Studies Annual Conference 2006 «The Multilateral Dimension in Russian Foreign Policy» Oslo October 13 th 2006

“Europe needs the Russian gas; the next months will show us, how much the defense of basic human rights in comparison with economic interests really counts.” Film-Maker Eric Bergkraut in the NZZ from 11 th october 2006 “The consternation about the assassination of Anna Politkowskaja does not change anything about the double morality (“Doppelmoral”) of the West. Putins oil is too important” J.Voswinkel /J.Ross in the ZEIT from October 12 th 2006

I. To end the (first) Chechnya's war was 1996 the condition for Russia’s entry in the Council of Europe No general (western) consensus (will) about:   How to build up Human Rights in post totalitarian societies   How to do this in Russia   How the end of war will be transformed into peace

Old Europe welcomed and wanted to support the project of the new Russian elite: Modernization means Europeanization Everything else would not have been in the interest of the Security of Europe - but how much old and new Europe have been ready to invest and engage for this ?

II. Human Rights are never ending collective learning processes There is always a beginning, never an end. The will to begin and to make progress is essential This process has to be monitored

III. You can’t ignore the heritage of totalitarism, and you have to transform it in a common effort What is the “political” in a “political solution”? Elections have to be inclusive, not exclusive if you want to integrate a disintegrated society What is (democratic) power all about ? What are (democratic) politics all about ? Peace in Chechnya depends on the success of the democracy building process in Russia

IV. For the (too few) sustainably en- gaged Russian citizens the Russian CoE-Membership is of great help:   The European Court of Human Rights ruled until now nearly only in the interest of the Russian citizens and not of the Russian Courts   The PACE delivered in it’s Parliamentarian Monitoring Process one of the most complete critical analyses of Russia’s HR deficits   The PACE is the only official body who brought light and public attention to Chechnya since 1996

V. One of many Russian/CoE paradoxes:   The CoE ‘s “power” are values only - no military or economy   Russia is still weak concerning CoE’s values   But Russia feels at home in the CoE - more than in the OSCE, UN (EU)

VI. The Russian society and elites are heavily divided - but there are no open debates about these divisions, so there is no mutual learning   “Normal” state or old/new Empire ?   Is there an own way to understand “Democracy”?   How should the new economic strength and richness be used and made useful for all Russians ?   What kind of legitimacy democratic power needs ?   How to overcome old (totalitarian) mentalities ?

VII. The Russian nation is still a subjectively humiliated nation   Humiliated nations are difficult to challenge   They tend to transform internal problems in to external real and rhetoric agressivity

VIII. You can’t impose Human Rights in Russia against or without Russians you have to integrate Human Rights and it’s main interests in an (more) open, clearer and controversial dialogue (one of the many underestimated potentials of the CoE)

IX. The leaders and peoples of Europe and the West can’t delegate their responsi- bilities, as well as the Russian leader cant delegate theirs to semi criminal structures The disregard of our principles discredit them most Energy- needs and high prices do not legitimize the ignorance of Humans Rights Human Rights are not sunshine- policies but conditions for peace and real stability