Database Security - Farkas 1 Database Security and Privacy.

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Presentation transcript:

Database Security - Farkas 1 Database Security and Privacy

2Database Security - Farkas Security Objectives Secrecy Prevent/detect/deter improper Disclosure of information Availability Prevent/detect/deter improper Denial of access to services Integrity Prevent/detect/deter Improper modification of information

3Database Security - Farkas Policy Organizational policy Information systems policy

Databases Collection of Collection of interrelated data and interrelated data and set of programs to access the data set of programs to access the data Convenient and efficient processing of data Convenient and efficient processing of data Database Application Software Database Application Software 4Database Security - Farkas

Database Security Protect Sensitive Data from Protect Sensitive Data from Unauthorized disclosure Unauthorized disclosure Unauthorized modification Unauthorized modification Denial of service attacks Denial of service attacks Security Controls Security Controls Security Policy Security Policy Access control models Access control models Integrity protection Integrity protection Privacy problems Privacy problems Fault tolerance and recovery Fault tolerance and recovery Auditing and intrusion detection Auditing and intrusion detection 5Database Security - Farkas

6 Protection of Data Confidentiality  Access control  Access control – which data users can access  Information flow control  Information flow control – what users can do with the accessed data  Data Mining

7Database Security - Farkas Access Control direct accesses  Ensures that all direct accesses to object are authorized read, write and execution  Protects against accidental and malicious threats by regulating the read, write and execution of data and programs

8Database Security - Farkas Access Control Requires: - Proper user identification - Information specifying the access rights is protected form modification

9Database Security - Farkas  Access control components: Access control policy - Access control policy: specifies the authorized accesses of a system Access control mechanism - Access control mechanism: implements and enforces the policy Access Control

HOW TO SPECIFY ACCESS CONTROL? 10Database Security - Farkas

11Database Security - Farkas Access Control  Subject: active entity that requests access to an object - e.g., user or program  Object: passive entity accessed by a subject - e.g., record, relation, file  Access right (privileges): how a subject is allowed to access an object - e.g., subject s can read object o

12Database Security - Farkas Protection Object Database Database Relation Relation Record Record Attribute Attribute Element Element Advantages vs. disadvantages of supporting different granularity levels

13Database Security - Farkas Relation-Level Granularity Person- name Company- name Salary SmithBB&C$43,982 DellBell$97,900 BlackBB&C$35,652 Confidential relation

14Database Security - Farkas Tuple-level Granularity Person-name Company- name Salary SmithBB&C $43,982 Public DellBell $97,900 Conf. BlackBB&C $35,652 Public Works

15Database Security - Farkas Attribute-Level Granularity Person- name Person- name Publ. Company- name Publ. Salary Conf. Conf. SmithBB&C$43,982 DellBell$97,900 BlackBB&C$35,652 Works

16Database Security - Farkas Cell-Level Granularity Person- name Company- name Salary Smith P BB&C P $43,982 C Dell C Bell C $97,900 C Black P BB&C C $35,652 C Works

17Database Security - Farkas Access Control Policies DAC  Discretionary Access Control (DAC) MAC  Mandatory Access Control (MAC) RBAC  Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)

18Database Security - Farkas Discretionary Access Control (DAC) each subject  For each subject access right to the objects are defined  (subject, object, +/- access mode)  (Black, Employee-relation, read)  User based  Grant and Revoke  Problems: - Propagation of access rights - Revocation of propagated access rights

19Database Security - Farkas DAC by Grant and Revoke Brown (owner) Black Red White GRANT SELECT ON Employee TO Red GRANT SELECT ON Employee TO Black WITH GRANT OPTION ? Brown revokes grant given to Black ? Brown does not want Red to access the Employee relation GRANT UPDATE(Salary) ON Employee TO White

20Database Security - Farkas Implementation Access Control List (column) File 1File 2Joe:Read Joe:WriteSam:Read Joe:OwnSam:Write Sam:Own Capability List (row) Joe: File 1/Read, File 1/Write, File 1/Own, File 2/Read Sam: File 2/Read, File 2/Write, File 2/Own Access Control Triples SubjectAccessObject JoeReadFile 1 JoeWriteFile 1 JoeOwnFile 1 JoeReadFile 2 SamReadFile 2 SamWrite File 2 SamOwnFile 2 (ACL)

21Database Security - Farkas Access Control Mechanisms Security through Views Security through Views Stored Procedures Stored Procedures Grant and Revoke Grant and Revoke Query modification Query modification

22Database Security - Farkas Security Through Views Assign rights to access predefined views CREATE VIEW Outstanding-Student AS SELECT NAME, COURSE, GRADE FROM Student WHERE GRADE > B Problem: Difficult to maintain updates.

23Database Security - Farkas Stored Procedures Assign rights to execute compiled programs Assign rights to execute compiled programs GRANT RUN ON TO GRANT RUN ON TO Problem: Programs may access resources for which the user who runs the program does not have permission.

24Database Security - Farkas Grant and Revoke GRANT ON GRANT ON To To [WITH GRANT OPTION] GRANT SELECT * ON Student TO Matthews GRANT SELECT * ON Student TO Matthews GRANT SELECT *, UPDATE(GRADE) ON Student TO FARKAS GRANT SELECT *, UPDATE(GRADE) ON Student TO FARKAS GRANT SELECT(NAME) ON Student TO Brown GRANT SELECT(NAME) ON Student TO Brown GRANT command applies to base relations as well as views

25Database Security - Farkas Grant and Revoke REVOKE [ON ] FROM FROM REVOKE SELECT* ON Student FROM Blue REVOKE SELECT* ON Student FROM Blue REVOKE UPDATE ON Student FROM Black REVOKE UPDATE ON Student FROM Black REVOKE SELECT(NAME) ON Student FROM Brown REVOKE SELECT(NAME) ON Student FROM Brown

26Database Security - Farkas Non-cascading Revoke A B C D E F A B C A revokes D’s privileges E F

27Database Security - Farkas Cascading Revoke A B C D E F A B C A revokes D’s privileges

28Database Security - Farkas Positive and Negative Authorization Problem: Contradictory authorizations GRANT ON X TO DENY ON X TO A B C E D

29Database Security - Farkas Negative Authorization A B C E D F + What should happen with the privilege given by D To F?

30Database Security - Farkas Query Modification GRANT SELECT(NAME) ON Student TO Blue WHERE COURSE=“CSCE 590” GRANT SELECT(NAME) ON Student TO Blue WHERE COURSE=“CSCE 590” Blue’s query: Blue’s query: SELECT * FROM Student Modified query: Modified query: SELECT NAME FROM Student WHERE COURSE=“CSCE 590”

31Database Security - Farkas DAC Overview Advantages: Advantages: Intuitive Intuitive Easy to implement Easy to implement Disadvantages: Disadvantages: Inherent vulnerability (look TH example) Inherent vulnerability (look TH example) Maintenance of ACL or Capability lists Maintenance of ACL or Capability lists Maintenance of Grant/Revoke Maintenance of Grant/Revoke Limited power of negative authorization Limited power of negative authorization

32Database Security - Farkas Mandatory Access Control (MAC)  Security label - Top-Secret, Secret, Public  Objects  Objects: security classification - File 1 is Secret, File 2 is Public  Subjects  Subjects: security clearances - Brown is cleared to Secret, Black is cleared to Public  Dominance  Dominance (  ) - Top-Secret  Secret  Public

33Database Security - Farkas MAC  Access rights  Access rights: defined by comparing the security classification of the requested objects with the security clearance of the subject access control rules  If access control rules are satisfied, access is permitted  Otherwise access is rejected  Granularity  Granularity of access rights!

34Database Security - Farkas MAC – Bell-LaPadula (BLP) Model  Single security property: a subject S is allowed a read access to an object O only if label(S) dominates label(O)  Star-property: a subject S is allowed a write access to an object O only if label(O) dominates label(S) No direct flow of information from high security objects to low security objects!

Multilevel Security Multilevel security  users at different security level, see different versions of the database Multilevel security  users at different security level, see different versions of the database Problem: different versions need to be kept consistent and coherent without downward signaling channel (covert channel) Problem: different versions need to be kept consistent and coherent without downward signaling channel (covert channel) 35Database Security - Farkas

Multilevel Relation Schema R(A 1,C 1,…,A n,C n,T c ) Schema R(A 1,C 1,…,A n,C n,T c ) R: relation name R: relation name A i : attribute name A i : attribute name C i : security classes C i : security classes T c : Tuple security classes T c : Tuple security classes Instantiation of relation: sets of tuples of the form Instantiation of relation: sets of tuples of the form a i : attribute value a i : attribute value c i : attribute classification label c i : attribute classification label t c : tuple classification label t c : tuple classification label 36Database Security - Farkas

37Database Security - Farkas CSCE Farkas 37 Multilevel Relation Example SSN (SSN) Course (Course) Grade (Grade) SCSCE 786SATS SCSCE 567SCTS Top-secret user sees all data Secret-View Secret user sees Secret-View: SSN (SSN) Course (Course) Grade (Grade) SCSCE 786SnullS SCSCE 567SnullS

38Database Security - Farkas Polyinstantiation Secret user sees Secret-View: SSN (SSN) Course (Course) Grade (Grade) SCSCE 786SnullS SCSCE 567SnullS SSN is primary key Secret user wants to update Grade for from null (i.e., missing value) to F Allow update: inconsistent database, at TS level two different tuples exist with the same primary key (see next slide) Not allow update: downward signaling channel, update is because of the existence of a TS value

39Database Security - Farkas Polyinstantiation SSN (SSN) Course (Course) Grade (Grade) SCSCE 786SATS SCSCE 786SFS SCSCE 567SCTS Top-Secret View: