Protection: A Theoretical View Lt Col (retd) Jim Storr PhD

Introduction

Doctrine? ‘Command’ is defined as ' … the direction, coordination and control of military forces.' ‘Control’ is ‘the process by which a commander … organises, directs and coordinates the activities of the forces allocated to him…' So Command = direction + coordination + control; and Control = organisation + direction + coordination Thus Command + = direction + coordination + 2 x control; Control ?

Why 'do' Force Protection? It keeps people alive; uninjured, healthy: –Humanitarian considerations –Morale –Commander's duty –Legal obligations Maintains operational effectiveness

Clausewitz How good is your early 18 th Century German? Zweck Mittel Ziele

The Dialectic An interchange of Ends (aims) and Means Ways, Ends and Means? Also, an interchange between enemy and friendly forces

The Dialectic Own Forces Enemy Forces

The Dialectic Own Means Own Aims

The Dialectic Own Means Own Aims Enemy Aims Enemy Means

The Dialectic Own Forces Enemy Forces Own Means Own Aims Enemy Aims Enemy Means

The Dialectic Own Means Own Aims Enemy Aims Enemy Means

Force Protection? Own Means Own Aims Enemy Aims Enemy Means Preventing this

Force Protection? Own Means Own Aims Enemy Aims Enemy Means To enable us to do this

Example 1: 1982

Example 2: BATUS and Digital Situational Awareness (SA)‏ Better SA: Knowing where my tanks and his tanks are... fewer of my tanks are lost because we know where the enemy is... therefore more of my tanks cross the line of departure... therefore I'm more likely to win; to win quicker; and to suffer fewer casualties.

Example 2: BATUS and Digital Situational Awareness Better SA: Knowing where my tanks and his tanks are... fewer of my tanks are lost because we know where the enemy is... therefore more of my tanks cross the line of departure... therefore I'm more likely to win; to win quicker; and to suffer fewer casualties. All just a wee bit 'Cold War'

Example 2: Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in Northern Ireland Improvements in countering IEDs keep soldiers alive... but you can't stop terrorists inventing new kinds of bombs... so you're always reacting? The terrorist always has the initiative?

Example 2: Improvised Explosive Devices in Northern Ireland But: –Link intelligence, tactics, organisations, scientific advice, EOD policy, training, EW,... –Wargame –Couple them very closely into a very responsive system –You can then react very quickly to changes in the threat –... and begin to predict, and even pre-empt, changes in the threat

Example 2: Improvised Explosive Devices in Northern Ireland And: –.... so you can begin to reduce the terrorist's initiative –... and he's no longer 'doing' terror – What do you call a terrorist who can't 'do' terror?

Deductions Force Protection can have operational- level consequences You are removing, or at least affecting, his MEANS; and thus also his aims

The Dialectic Own Means Own Aims Enemy Aims Enemy Means You are now doing this

The Dialectic Own Means Own Aims Enemy Aims Enemy Means...and preventing him doing this

The Dialectic Own Means Own Aims Enemy Aims Enemy Means What is this?

Countering IEDs A lot of very expensive technology? The '10% / 30% / 60%' Rule Deductions: –1: Minor unit tactics are twice as important as technology –2. Luck can play a significant part: if you are prepared to exploit it

Countering Irregular Activity A lot of very expensive technology? The '10% / 30% / 60%' Rule Deductions: –1: Minor unit tactics are twice as important as technology –2. Luck can play a significant part: if you are prepared to exploit it

Other Examples Urban and rural multiple patrolling Helicopter top cover to rural foot patrols Many of these measures are highly asymmetric They will not translate directly to other theatres

Observation Have the lessons of Northern Ireland been carried into other theatres?

Observation Have the lessons of Northern Ireland been carried into other theatres? Yes?

Observation Have the lessons of Northern Ireland been carried into other theatres? Yes? No

Conclusions

1: The Dialectic Own Means Own Aims Enemy Aims Enemy Means

1: The Dialectic Own Means Own Aims Enemy Aims Enemy Means Force Protection is not just about this

1: The Dialectic Own Means Own Aims Enemy Aims Enemy Means It's also about this

1: The Dialectic Own Means Own Aims Enemy Aims Enemy Means Which directly affects this

1: The Dialectic Own Means Own Aims Enemy Aims Enemy Means Hence we can win

Deductions (2)‏ Tactical Force Protection measures can have operational level consequences: They can deny the insurgent, or terrorist, the ability to achieve his aims; and hence contribute directly to operational success

Deductions (3)‏ Issues such as minor unit tactics can be twice as important as technology Luck can play a significant part: if you are prepared to exploit it That requires suitable organisations and processes at the theatre, or campaign, level.

Questions?

The Dialectic Own Forces Enemy Forces Own Means Own Aims Enemy Aims Enemy Means

The Dialectic Own Forces Enemy Forces Own Means Own Aims Enemy Aims Enemy Means