Sea Shield : Assured Access in the Littoral UNCLASSIFIED Spirit of ‘76 Sea Shield : Assured Access in the Littoral 23 October 2003 CAPT Ray Spicer, N76E Deputy for Surface Ships UNCLASSIFIED

We Must Operate Here, and Counter Asymmetric Access-Denial Threat We are and will operate in the littoral Force disposition prior to Iraqi Freedom - forces in the east-med waiting Turkish permission to transit TLAM shooters in Red Sea and NAG OEF forces off of Pakistan What would be the effect if we faced a more potent foe? Recent Maritime Operations Highlight the Need for Assured Access in the Littoral We Must Operate Here, and Counter Asymmetric Access-Denial Threat 2

Sea Shield Mission Assure access and sustainability throughout the battle space Project robust defense Provide a sea-based layer for Homeland Defense Sea Shield goes beyond unit and task-force defense to project air defense ashore, and provide the nation with sea-based theater and strategic defense. Sea Shield provides a protective umbrella to assure access, reassure allies, and protect our homeland while deterring potential adversaries.

Theater Air and Missile Defense Sea Shield Pillars Sea Shield Force Protection Surface Warfare Under Sea Warfare Theater Air and Missile Defense Sea Shield encompasses all dimensions of the Battle Space. Within the Sea Shield pillar, there are 4 areas of responsibility: Force Protection, Surface Warfare, Under Sea Warfare, and Theater and Missile Defense. Once we break down Sea Shield in this way, it is clear that Sea Shield is a critical enabler to Sea Strike and Sea Basing – providing the Joint Force with the ability to project power ashore.

Surface Warfare Issues Over the Horizon surface threats Small Boat Threats Wide Area MIO Protection of MIW / EXW / CLF/ MPF-F Forces Breaking down the littoral into an SUW mission, we see our requirements against the threats. An attacking swarmed small boat threat will stress our detect to engage sequence. Helos cannot be airborne 24/7, so defeating this threat requires an organic layered defense. A layered defense will enable our platforms to detect, assess, determine intent, warn and engage inport and underway threats. This includes using shipborne helos, the 5 inch gun, CIWS 1B and crew-served weapons.

Threat vs. Current Capability BB Round (10nm) Armed Helo MK 45 GUN (6.5nm) Hellfire(4nm) .50 Cal (1nm) Small Arms (>1000 yds) MK 38 (1500 yds) CIWS IB (2nm) 5 10 NM RPG/Small Arms (>1000yds) An attacking swarmed small boat threat will stress our detect to engage sequence. Helos can not be airborne 24/7 so, defeating this threat requires an organic layered defense. A layered defense will enable our platforms to detect, assess, determine intent, warn and engage inport and underway threats. This includes using shipborne helos, the 5 inch gun, CIWS 1B and crew served weapons. The Threat ASCM (10nm) Wake Homing Torpedo (7nm) Layered Defense is key

Future SUW Warfighting Dispersed force of smaller networked platforms with distributed, unmanned sensors Directed-energy weapons, to provide protection both at sea and pierside. 5 Inch Force Protection Projectile to increase range and lethality CIWS 1B to provide inner layer defense against small boats Stabilized 25mm Gun to provide more accuracy and range Force Protection Projectiles In looking for a weapon to extend our ship’s lethality, the 5 inch gun provided some options against small boats. The 5 inch Force Protection rounds are existing CARGO rounds and filled with 9000 13 grain tungsten pellets. CIWS 1B CIWS 1B system provides an extremely effective defense against small boats. It is capable of attriting multiple boats in a swarm attack. It will not be fully fielded however until 2011. 25mm gun To fill the gap until CIWS is on all ships, we are improving the existing Mk38 25mm chain gun by stabilizing it. The stabilized gun is far more accurate that the unstabilized gun currently in the Fleet and its effective range (and the defensive bubble) is increased by almost 1000 yards.

Under Sea Warfare Issues Mine identification and neutralization Neutralize submarine threats to operations in the littorals Provide self-defense against sub-surface threat weapons ‘Hold at Risk’ submarine threat throughout the theater In order to protect the force (SEA SHIELD) we have several vital requirements.. Proliferating threat in the littorals – submarines (both old Soviet Bcl exprts) and newer quieter diesels pose an increasing threat. Weapons include mines, missiles and torpedoes So we need to defend the force against the threat, as well as seek out and attack the threat where environmentals favor the submarine We must also develop the capability to monitor the potential threat, allowing quick engagement if/when hostilities commence.

Goal – Technologies and CONOPS to fundamentally change ASW TF ASW Tasking CNO directed N6/N7 to conduct a focused ASW study to examine technology opportunities. Task Force ASW will provide options to the CNO for research and development, science and technology, CONOPS and training. CONOPS Science & Technology POR/ Systems - Team A – S&T and R&D opportunities and capabilities - Team B – CONOPS and Training Goal – Technologies and CONOPS to fundamentally change ASW

Future ASW Warfighting Anti-Submarine Warfare Supremacy: Render an opposing submarine force incapable of interfering with mission accomplishment: detect submarines anywhere, engage submarines rapidly, and neutralize submarine weapons. Orange Naval Base Hold at Risk Maritime Shield Clean Sweep Protected Passage Sea Base ASW CONSTRUCT Hold at Risk Achieve mission denial against adversary submarines and destroy enemy submarines at times and places of our choosing Protected Passage Assure access with safe transits in the face of submarine threats Maritime Shield Establish and protect Sea Bases from submarine penetration and defeat submarine attacks

Takeaways Sea Shield ASW SUW Concept is core to Joint Warfighting Most critical and most challenged in the littoral environment ASW, MIW, SUW ASW Move from mass force to mass effects SUW Early detection and a layered defense is key Stabilized 25mm fills capability gap until CIWS 1B is fully fielded Here are our takeways. As Sea Shield represents a projected defense umbrella – it has tremendous application to the Joint Force, projecting power ashore from the littoral. The Navy is now using a capability-based analysis to reduce “stovepipes” and focus the warfare sponsors and the SYSCOMS on warfighting capabilities vice platforms. The analysis leads us to Required Capabilities – focusing for this brief on ASW and SUW

Backups

Littoral Warfare Issues Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Neutralize submarine threats to operations in the littorals Provide self-defense against sub-surface threat weapons ‘Hold at Risk’ submarine threat throughout the theater Surface Warfare (SUW) Over the Horizon (OTH) surface threats Swarming Small Boat Threats Wide Area MIO Protection of MIW / EXW / CLF/ MPF-F Forces Against Surface Threats Mine Warfare (MIW) Counter Mines From Deep to Shallow Water Counter Minefields, Obstacles and Barriers from VSW to the Beach Exit Zone Breaking down the littoral into the significant anti-access missions, we see our requirements against the threats. These are the metrics we must measure our current and envisioned capabilities against. Where we see gaps in current or projected capability, we must fashion our investment strategy to close those Gaps, procuring those mature systems which can quickly apply to the requirements, and investing in S&T where technology is not able to help us.

Tomorrow – Mass Effects TF ASW Team A Concepts Background / Context Today - Mass Forces Tomorrow – Mass Effects Team B Current CONOPS Thoughts “We can’t do ‘effects based ASW’- must mass force and carve out an area for Battle Force Time-constrained large area search problem CPF: 130 false contacts per day* *Consistent with Falklands Conflict Very sensor, weapon and numbers of platforms limited” Team A Technology panel tasking - identify technology innovations so that we can mass effects not forces provide quantum improvements in ASW capabilities seek solutions: without reliance on force on force maximum compression of the ASW OODA loop highly responsive detect to engage sequence Mid-Term Concepts Far -Term Concepts (including systems needing further definition) Distributed Fields, Tactical UAV, Rapid Attack Weapon Decoys / Countermeasures Large-N, Large Area Non-acoustic Search, Long Range Stand-off Weapon, Tagging Integrated Technology Concept

Sea Shield Capabilities Under Sea Warfare Force Protection Surface Warfare Theater Air and Missile Defense CDR Brennan MR Smith CDR Kadowaki CDR Sullivan LCDR Cegielski Provide Self-Defense Against Subsurface Threats Protect Against SOF and Terrorist Threats Provide Self-Defense Against Surface Threats Provide Self-Defense Against Air and Missile Threats Mitigate Effects of CBRNE Neutralize Submarine Threats in the Littorals Conduct Offensive Operations against Surface Threats Provide Maritime Air and Missile Defense Neutralize Open Ocean Submarine Threats Provide Overland Air and Missile Defense These mission level capabilities were analyzed in order to identify critical Sea Shield gaps and overlaps. I assessed the cross-warfare impact of those results in order to highlight our key POM-06 issues. Counter Minefields from Deep to Shallow Water Conduct Sea-Based Missile Defense Breach Minefields, Obstacles, and Barriers from Very Shallow Water to the Beach Exit Zone Conduct Mining Operations 14 Capabilities

Sea Shield POM-06 Gaps Protect the Naval Force Platform Defense Against Undersea Threats Platform Force Protection Sea Based Ballistic Missile Defense Assure Access in Contested Littorals MIW Capacity to Clear Large Areas ASW Cueing and Search 3. (Excess) Maritime Air Defense Capability Project Defensive Power Over Land MIW Assault Breaching Capability

Force Protection Projectiles Requirements: 800 – 8,000 yards Near-term enhanced SuW capability High level interest in the program Short turnaround At sea test Jul 03; Oct SWARMEX One-time procurement of 6000 rounds Status: Completing Mk-160 & Mk-86 integration Cargo Projectile Body Aluminum Spacers WC294 Expelling Charge MK 432 Fuze 13-Grain Tungsten Alloy Shot Shell Pellets (~ 9000) HE-CVT or HE-ET KE-ET In looking for a weapon to extend our ship’s lethality, the 5 inch gun provided some options against small boats. The 5 inch Force Protection rounds are existing CARGO rounds and filled with 9000 13 grain tungsten pellets in the case of the BB round, shown on the right, or changing the HE-CVT fuse for a HE-ET fuse and making it a HI-FRAG round, shown on the left. Requirements: 800 yards – 8000 yards Open craft, unprotected personnel HE-ET twice as effective (lethal area) as current best ammo HE-CVT KE-ET twice as effective as HE-ET Doubles the lethal area of the HE frag pattern Frag pattern in the range direction, where most errors

Force Protection Projectiles 5”/54 BB-round At-sea Testing 30 July (CG-57) Effective Range 500-8,000 yds Procured 6000 BB-rounds (IOC Spring 04) Shipboard Demo conducted 30 Jul in LAKE CHAMPLAIN (MK 86 GFCS) Successfully engaged towed targets with HE-ET & KE-ET rounds Targets engaged at 8,000 to 800 yards Reliability & Lethality, as predicted 24 Oct SWARMEX in VACAPES will test the rounds against a HSMST. Twice the Lethal Area (for topside personnel) of current HE round.

Phalanx Block 1B Highly effective vs Small Boat Swarm Threat Key Capabilities 4-5 ASM Engagements without reload 8-10 Surface Engagements without reload Integrated Radar & Infra-red Sensors Increased Kill Range against advanced maneuvering ASM threats. Autonomous or Integrated with CDS Provides critical Low Elevation detection and tracking data to the ships CDS RF SEARCH EO TRACK RF TRACK Target Mix Anti-ship Missiles: All Altitudes Subsonic / High Supersonic High-G Maneuvering Fixed-wing Aircraft Helicopters Surface Threats including small craft and mines. CIWS 1B system provides an extremely effective defense against small boats. It’s capable of attriting multiple boats in a swarm attack. It will not be fully fielded however until 2011. 17 Mounts in Fleet, All Ships by 2011

25mm Stabilized vs Unstabilized Probability of hit (16'x16' billboard) 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 Range (yds) Stabilized with E/O sight & LRF (Composite of STARC 25, Typhoon, Valkyrie) Unstabilized 25mm Mount (MK 38) Empirical Data (Modeling) PH To fill the gap until CIWS is on all ships, we are improving the existing Mk38 25mm chain gun. The graph shows a stabilized gun is far more accurate that the unstabilized gun currently in the Fleet. Effective range (and the defensive bubble) is increased by almost 1000 yards. 6 mounts to Fleet by Summer 2005; ramp up to 46 ships by 2007

Small Arms Purchased GOTS to close the Gap MK38 Chain Gun (Unstabilized 25mm) POR now supports 2 guns per deployer Mk44 GAU-17 Gatling Gun (3000 rds/min) Delivered 90 guns Training Commands FCTC Dam Neck & FTC San Diego Mk 95 Twin .50 cal Machine Gun Mounts (1100 rds/min) Delivered 255 mounts - 135 more on contract Arriving 50/month to deployers Mk 99 Twin M240 Machine Gun (1500 rds/min) Increased reliability over M-60 - Delivered 10 for Fleet demo Positive feedback - possible low-cost alternative to GAU-17 These systems made our near-term target list because: - They were already available (GOTS for Mk44 GAU 17s and COTS for Mk95 twin .50 cals) - They represented increased firepower from the current .50 cal mounts onboard ships. - They were affordable now. All deployers now have 2 MK38 Chain Guns and either 2- GAU-17 or 2-Twin .50 cal machine guns