TOM REGAN’S ARGUMENT FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS The Rights View.

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Presentation transcript:

TOM REGAN’S ARGUMENT FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS The Rights View

Terminology Moral agent: can think/act morally, can be held responsible for actions (most of us, but not babies; not people with certain severe mental disabilities) Moral patient: can’t think/act morally, shouldn’t be held responsible, but can be treated right and wrong (e.g. babies, people with certain severe mental disabilities) Subject-of-a-life (SOAL)—a someone, not a something (see Regan p. 22 for mental capacities that are involved) Inherent value—value for its own sake, as opposed to instrumental value for others Intrinsic value—e.g. pleasure is intrinsically good, pain is intrinsically bad Basic rights--e.g. rights such as right to life, right to liberty Non-basic rights--e.g. right to vote, right to an education

EINSTEIN GAGA JOE BABY MARY CHIMP DOG FISH BEE moral human“higher”other agents moralanimalsanimals patients THE HUMAN/ANIMAL DIVIDE

EINSTEIN GAGA JOE BABY MARY CHIMP DOG FISH BEE moral human“higher”other agents moralanimalsanimals patients EQUAL INHERENT VALUE 1. All moral agents have inherent value. 2. In fact, they have equal inherent value.

EINSTEIN GAGA JOE BABY MARY CHIMP DOG FISH BEE moral human“higher”other agents moralanimalsanimals patients EQUAL INHERENT VALUE EQUAL BASIC RIGHTS EQUAL BASIC RIGHTS 3. Because of their equal inherent value, moral agents have equal basic rights. YIELDS

EINSTEIN GAGA JOE BABY MARY CHIMP DOG FISH BEE moral human“higher”other agents moralanimalsanimals patients EQUAL INHERENT VALUE EQUAL BASIC RIGHTS EQUAL BASIC RIGHTS SUBJECTS-OF-A-LIFE 4. The equal inherent value of moral agents must be due to their being subjects-of-a-life. (What else could it be based on?) YIELDS

EINSTEIN GAGA JOE BABY MARY CHIMP DOG FISH BEE moral human“higher”other agents moralanimalsanimals patients EQUAL INHERENT VALUE EQUAL BASIC RIGHTS EQUAL BASIC RIGHTS SUBJECTS-OF-A-LIFE 5. Human moral patients are subjects-of-a-life too. YIELDS

EINSTEIN GAGA JOE BABY MARY CHIMP DOG FISH BEE moral human“higher”other agents moralanimalsanimals patients EQUAL INHERENT VALUE EQUAL BASIC RIGHTS EQUAL BASIC RIGHTS SUBJECTS-OF-A-LIFE 6. So human moral patients also have equal inherent value and equal basic rights. YIELDS

EINSTEIN GAGA JOE BABY MARY CHIMP DOG FISH BEE moral human“higher”other agents moralanimalsanimals patients EQUAL INHERENT VALUE EQUAL BASIC RIGHTS EQUAL BASIC RIGHTS SUBJECTS-OF-A-LIFE 7. Some “higher” animals are subjects-of-a-life too. (There’s no major mental difference between human moral patients and “higher” animals.) YIELDS

EINSTEIN GAGA JOE BABY MARY CHIMP DOG FISH BEE moral human“higher”other agents moralanimalsanimals patients EQUAL INHERENT VALUE EQUAL BASIC RIGHTS EQUAL BASIC RIGHTS SUBJECTS-OF-A-LIFE 8. So at least “higher animals” have equal basic rights – i.e. equal to those of human moral patients and human moral agents. YIELDS

EINSTEIN GAGA JOE BABY MARY CHIMP DOG FISH BEE moral human“higher”other agents moralanimalsanimals patients EQUAL INHERENT VALUE EQUAL BASIC RIGHTS EQUAL BASIC RIGHTS SUBJECTS-OF-A-LIFE YIELDS ?

OBJECTIONS Carl Cohen

EINSTEIN GAGA JOE BABY MARY CHIMP DOG FISH BEE moral human“higher”other agents moralanimalsanimals patients EQUAL INHERENT VALUE EQUAL BASIC RIGHTS EQUAL BASIC RIGHTS SUBJECTS-OF-A-LIFE 4. The equal inherent value of moral agents must be due to their being subjects-of-a-life. (What else could it be based on?) YIELDS CARL COHEN OBJECTS TO PREMISE 4 CARL COHEN OBJECTS TO PREMISE 4

EINSTEIN GAGA JOE BABY MARY CHIMP DOG FISH BEE moral human“higher”other agents moralanimalsanimals patients EQUAL INHERENT VALUE EQUAL BASIC RIGHTS EQUAL BASIC RIGHTS YIELDS MORALITY, SELF- AWARENESS, REASON COHEN: INHERENT VALUE/RIGHTS COME FROM DISTINCTIVELY HUMAN CAPACITIES COHEN: INHERENT VALUE/RIGHTS COME FROM DISTINCTIVELY HUMAN CAPACITIES

EINSTEIN GAGA JOE BABY MARY CHIMP DOG FISH BEE moral human“higher”other agents moralanimalsanimals patients EQUAL INHERENT VALUE EQUAL BASIC RIGHTS EQUAL BASIC RIGHTS YIELDS MORALITY, SELF- AWARENESS, REASON REGAN : THIS CAN’T BE THE BASIS OF INHERENT VALUE—IT WOULD MEAN BABY AND MARY LACK INHERENT VALUE AND RIGHTS REGAN : THIS CAN’T BE THE BASIS OF INHERENT VALUE—IT WOULD MEAN BABY AND MARY LACK INHERENT VALUE AND RIGHTS

EINSTEIN GAGA JOE BABY MARY CHIMP DOG FISH BEE moral human“higher”other agents moralanimalsanimals patients EQUAL INHERENT VALUE EQUAL BASIC RIGHTS EQUAL BASIC RIGHTS YIELDS MORALITY, SELF- AWARENESS, REASON COHEN: BABY AND MARY BELONG TO THE SAME SPECIES AS THE MORAL AGENTS, SO HAVE THE SAME INHERENT VALUE AND RIGHTS COHEN: BABY AND MARY BELONG TO THE SAME SPECIES AS THE MORAL AGENTS, SO HAVE THE SAME INHERENT VALUE AND RIGHTS

EINSTEIN GAGA JOE BABY MARY CHIMP DOG FISH BEE moral human“higher”other agents moralanimalsanimals patients EQUAL INHERENT VALUE EQUAL BASIC RIGHTS EQUAL BASIC RIGHTS YIELDS MORALITY, SELF- AWARENESS, REASON REGAN: COHEN’S APPEAL TO SPECIES IS JUST FLAGRANT SPECIESISM

EINSTEIN GAGA JOE BABY MARY CHIMP DOG FISH BEE moral human“higher”other agents moralanimalsanimals patients EQUAL INHERENT VALUE EQUAL BASIC RIGHTS EQUAL BASIC RIGHTS SUBJECTS-OF-A-LIFE YIELDS

REGAN’S LIFEBOAT CASE

Imagine they are at sea and sinking fast. If one is tossed off, the rest will survive. Regan says: This is a special case—a “prevention case” All have the same inherent value. All have the same rights. But somebody’s rights have to be overridden. Regan thinks the dog has the least to lose, assuming these are typical humans with typical lifespans. The dog must go! He denies this is speciesist.