REN-Rede Eléctrica Nacional,S.A. Can the California and New York crisis occur in Europe ? Rui Pestana IST - 25th October 2003

Topics n The California Market n Portuguese outages n International outages –U.S. & Canada –London –Sweden & Denmark –Italy

The California Market n Reserve Margins –Unexpected increase of unit unavailability n California Exports –Buy at any cost & Price Cap

The California Market

n Buy at any cost & Price Cap –The exports were bought back at higher price, giving big revenues to market players. –The final customer was protected by the price cap. –The TSO became bankrupt. –The market design was wrong.

Portuguese Outages n 9-May-2000 : Lisbon & South n 6-September-2001 : South n 2-August-2003 : South

Portuguese Outages

9-May-2000 n External cause : Stork n Internal cause –Inadequacy Maintenance Procedure –Incomplete Commissioning of the bus bar differential protection –Design philosophy of backup protections

9-May-2000

9-May-2000

9-May-2000

9-May-2000 n Internal cause –Inadequacy Maintenance Procedure (line fault -> bus bar fault) –Incomplete Commissioning of the bus bar differential protection (bus bar fault -> double bus bar fault) –Design philosophy of backup protections (double bus bar fault -> Station fault)

6-September-2001 n Lost two 400kV lines -> Network split n External cause : live insulator washing n Internal cause –Backup protection with a wrong orientation –Lost thermal stability of a coal power station (1200 MW).

2-August-2003 n Lost two 400kV lines -> Network split n External cause : bush Fire n Internal cause –Lost thermal stability of a coal power station (1200 MW). n Restriction in supplying the load –The fire prevented to reconnect the lines –The thermal units took 4 hours to synchronise

U.S. & Canada n 14 August 2003 n MW load lost n 50 million people –Ohio, Michigan, New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, Massachusetts. –Ontario, Quebec.

U.S. & Canada n The Network has to carry big quantities of energy to great distance. –Any contingency causes voltage drop, limiting the capacity to carry power, and it may evolve to a Voltage Collapse. n The great Lakes didn’t help –Increased the transport distance. –Amplified the power swing.

U.S. & Canada n Planned Outages (Generation and Lines) –The network was less reliable. n Peak Load –Very humid n Computer problems –FirstEnergy had no alarms. –MISO had the State Estimator down.

U.S. & Canada

NERC - North American Electric Reliability Council n Near-Term Actions to Assure Reliable Operations –Voltage and Reactive Management –Reliability Communications –Failures of System Monitoring and Control Functions –Emergency Action Plans –Training for Emergencies –Vegetation Management

London n 28 August 2003 n 724 MW load lost n customers –London Underground –Network Rail

London n Planned Outages

London n “Buchholz alarm” at Hurst

London n Wrong Setting in a Backup Protection

London n N-1 criteria was used –but with protection pieces, with 99,99% reliability, there are 4 pieces malfunctioning. n The topology of the station requires that to remove a transformer, it was first needed to remove a line.

Sweden & Denmark n 23 September 2003 n 3000 MW load lost in Sweden n 1850 MW load lost in Denmark n 1.6 million people in Sweden n 2.4 million people in Denmark –Copenhagen

Sweden & Denmark

n N-1 criteria n Double bus bar fault –Lost 6 lines, –Lost 2 Nuclear units. n The lack of generation (3000 MW) and lines causes a voltage collapse

Lesson to be learn - bus bar fault n Bus bar fault is not a contingency used in the planning of the transmission grid in Portugal. n REN has installed differential bus bar protections. n In the Operation handbook between REN and EDIS, we have a description of the regional blackouts related to the lost of one voltage level by station.

Italy n 28 September 2003 n MW load lost n 50 million people n Frequency rose in the rest of Europe

Italy

Italy n 3:01 - Line tripped in Switzerland (ATEL). n 3:15 - Call from ATEL to GRTN to reduce 300 MW. n 3:25 - Line tripped in Switzerland (EGL). –220 kV tielines IT-CH tripped by overload. n 3:27 - three 400 kV tielines IT-FR tripped. n 3: kV tieline IT-Slovenia tripped. –The Italian network became isolated.

Italy

Italy n The deficit of load was –300(Swiss)-3700(pump)=-3400 MW n The deficit of generation was –6700(imp)+3650(units)+2000(dist.)=12350 MW n Total deficit – =8950 MW n Remaining generation – =10650 MW n Percentage of load to shed –8950/10650=84%

Italy n N-1 criteria, admits that some lines can be temporarily overloaded. n The overload was not eliminated in time, due to the lack of communication between ETRANS (6 TSO) and GRTN. –The GRTN control room has a button to loadshed 1000 MW of pumping. n The Italian under-frequency loadshed was unable to hold the frequency.

Lesson to be learn - N-1 criteria n The computation of the Interchange Capacity is based in the N-1 criteria. –Any increase of security, implies a decrease of interchange capacity. n With the creation of the Iberian Market the need for interchange capacity is essential to avoid market split.

Iberian Split n 27 December 1999 –We were not connected to UCTE during 1:51:17 n The frequency dropped –Spain was importing from France –Spain became supplier of south of France

Iberian Split

Split at 19:52:52

Iberian Split Synchronous with UCTE at 21:44:09

Iberian Split n Due to the reduced Interchange capacity between France and Spain it was possible to control the frequency.

REN-Rede Eléctrica Nacional,S.A. Can the California crisis occur in Europe ? - No, because there are too many institutional players working together (EC, ETSO, CEER, EuroPEX, …). Can the New York crisis occur in Europe ? - Never in Italy (Berlusconi) - Yes (Rui Pestana)