Government E-1275: Oct. 23, 2007 Session #6. The Taiwan Strait 1.What is the U.S. military commitment in the defense of the ROC? 2.How does the perceptions of balance of power shape the probability of conflict in the Taiwan Strait? 3.How does domestic politics and economic interdependence shape the probability of conflict in the Taiwan Strait?

U.S. Foreign Policy in the Taiwan Strait The challenge: “Strategic ambiguity” –Clear commitment to ROC’s defense: emboldens ROC to declare formal independence. –Ambiguous commitment to ROC’s defense: emboldens PRC to attack ROC. –Make a credible commitment to PRC, that U.S. would intervene if PRC were to attack ROC; but persuade ROC not to move towards formal independence. Joint U.S.-China Communique (The Shanghai Communique, Feb. 27, 1972). Taiwan Relations Act (Jan. 1, 1979). Taiwan Security Enhancement Act (Feb. 1, ’00). Anti-Secession Law (Mar. 14, 2005).

U.S.-China Balance of Military Power (Christensen vs. Ross) Sources of U.S. military superiority, and Chinese perceptions: –“Peer competitor debate” (Christensen). –U.S.-military’s global presence, and China’s perception of U.S. military commitment in the Taiwan Strait. –Uncertainty over U.S. allies’ cooperation, esp. Japan. PRC’s asymmetric military capabilities: –Sea mines. –Blockade of Taiwan’s ports (Kaohsiung etc.). –Information & electronic warfare. PRC’s perceptions: –U.S. resolve & tolerance of casualties. –Christensen vs. Ross: What explains their differences?

Domestic Politics in PRC, ROC, and U.S. PRC: Resilient, nationalist CCP with legitimacy problems. –Centrality of Taiwan for nationalist credentials: loss in Sino- Japanese War (1894-5); civil war against KMT. –Nationalism and patriotic campaigns in the 1990s. –Unemployment, environment etc. ROC: Democratization & rise of DPP. –Presidential election cycles. –President Lee Deng-hui (KMT) and Taiwan Strait Crisis (’96). –Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and President Chen Shui- bian (’00-’08). –Rise of Taiwan’s distinctive political and cultural identity (Chu). U.S. Justification and resolve?

PRC-ROC Economic Interdependence Trade: –PRC: ROC’s largest trading partner. –ROC: PRC’s 5 th largest trading partner. –26% of ROC’s exports to PRC; 10% ROC’s imports from PRC. Foreign Direct Investment: –PRC’s share of ROC’s FDI: 28% (’99)  54% (’03). –70,000 ROC firms on mainland PRC, employing 10 mil. –Shanghai: est. 300,000 ROC people. –ROC contributes to PRC’s IT/electronics exports.