Reputation, incentives, and opportunism (with Christian Hilbe)

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Presentation transcript:

Reputation, incentives, and opportunism (with Christian Hilbe)

Public Good game with positive or negative incentives Two players game for simplicity and to compare with Rand, Armao, Nakamaru and Ohtsuki (2010)

Public goods with punishment

2-Stage Game

2 Stage Game

Conditional Strategies

Punishment unstable

Opportunistic Players

Bistability [O C,P]

Role of reputation in Punishment Punishment as deterrent

Role of reputation in Punishment Punishment as deterrent Revenge economically useful

Role of reputation in Punishment Punishment as deterrent Revenge economically useful Revenge is sweet (=fitness-enhancing) Anger is loud

Role of reputation in Punishment Punishment as deterrent Revenge economically useful Revenge is sweet (=fitness-enhancing) Anger is loud Barclay (‚Don‘t mess with the enforcer‘)

Role of reputation in Punishment Punishment as deterrent Revenge economically useful Revenge is sweet (=fitness-enhancing) Anger is loud Barclay (‚Don‘t mess with the enforcer‘) Non-altruistic punishment

Role of reputation in Punishment Punishment as deterrent Revenge economically useful Revenge is sweet (=fitness-enhancing) Anger is loud Barclay (‚Don‘t mess with the enforcer‘) Non-altruistic punishment Kurzban et al, Suter: ‚Audience effects‘

The feeling of being watched ‚Conscience…the nagging feeling that someone may be watching‘ (Mencken)

The feeling of being watched Subliminal cues: Fessler, Haley Bateson et al Ancestral environment

Public goods with reward

Trust game

Trust game with reputation

Trust game with reputation For large mu, prosocial behavior

Reward and Punishment

Payoff

Results:

The case of high information (μ=0.75)

The case of low information (μ=0.25)

Antisocial Punishment

Antisocial punishment Rand, Armao, Nakamaru, Ohtsuki (JTB 2010) Localised interaction: Social life in groups of N+1 individuals (introduces spite effects) Modified replicator equation (or z-dynamics)

Antisocial Punishment