Agenda Part 3  Part 3 Why is change is hard? Calls for change [from the top!] War is getting harder:  Cadets face challenges  Casualty of our own success?  “Where’s the beef?” Evidence is there  The Army thinks it’s reforming itself? How about society? What are we going to expect? The Result Conclusion “Professional attainment, based upon prolonged study, and collective study at colleges, rank by rank, and age by age … those are the title reeds of the commanders of the future armies, and the secret of future victories.” Winston Churchill, (Speech at Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri (5 March 1946).

Calls for Change “Warfare is becoming more complex at lower and lower levels, and our professional military education system must continue to evolve to develop the thinking warriors the future will require. I understand that the way your career timelines are managed now, we can not just add more educational requirements without relieving some of the other demands on your time. I think eventually reconciling this tension between professional education and other assignments required for career development is going to require a fundamental reassessment of what an Army career means and how success is measured.” Congressman Ike Skelton Remarks to Space & Missile Defense Symposium and Exhibition Dinner, Association of the United States Army (8 December 2004)

War is Getting Harder Cadets face challenges  War is the norm, peace is the exception  Our adversaries seek adaptive advantage through asymmetry  We have near-peer competitors in niche areas  Conventional force-on-force conflicts are still possible  There is an enormous pool of potential combatants armed with irreconcilable ideas  Our homeland is part of the battlespace  The rest of the Army is adapting to these challenges NOW

War is Getting Harder Casualty of our own success? ROTC OCS USMA ROTC OCS USMA Factors of Resistance: Lack of “Shock” to force change- society largely not impacted by changing and distant operating environment (only on TV) U.S. society’s definition of individual success? Not against “the pursuit of happiness” but when does enough become enough? “Global responsibility?” Ends drive means, impact value system--selfless vs. selfish leadership--decades of “cheerleading”--real truth hurts Factors of Resistance: Lack of “Shock” to force change- society largely not impacted by changing and distant operating environment (only on TV) U.S. society’s definition of individual success? Not against “the pursuit of happiness” but when does enough become enough? “Global responsibility?” Ends drive means, impact value system--selfless vs. selfish leadership--decades of “cheerleading”--real truth hurts Allows for pursuit of Political Correctness: diminishes standards to create professionalism & undermines trust in organization Reinvent Culture What? Strategic Leaders Strategic Lieutenants Must revisit leadership & professionalism What? Strategic Leaders Strategic Lieutenants Must revisit leadership & professionalism Competency Development Dealing with complex problems must accelerate Δ = Increased Rigor; move from quantity to quality based HOW? Change POI Holistic Change Decreasing? Δ = Time But how much? How does this impact Emotional Development? Why? Dramatic changes in operating environment Why? Dramatic changes in operating environment

War is Getting Harder “Where’s the beef?”  Lieutenants need more, earlier: “Thinking Beyond War: Civil-Military Operational Planning in Northern Iraq,” Major Isaiah Wilson, Cornell University (October 2004) “Educating the Post-Modern U.S. Army Strategic Planner: Improving the Organizational Construct,” Major Isaiah Wilson, SAMS ( ) “Army Transformation and the Junior Officer Exodus,” Mark Lewis, Armed Forces and Society, (Fall 2004) Not A Good Day To Die – The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda, by Sean Naylor (forthcoming, Summer 2005) “Stifling Innovation: Developing Tomorrow’s Leaders Today,” (SSI, AWS, 2002), “the reality is that junior officers are seldom given opportunities to be innovative in planning training; to make decisions; or to fail, learn, and try again.” 3 rd ID After Action Review (Iraq, Summer 2003) “Officer of 2030” (Office of Net Assessment Summer of ) “Developing Adaptable Leaders” (SSI, AWC, Summer of 2004)-If allowed, LTs adapted well, but received little Education or Training in the Problems They Would Deal With Before Their Arrival in Iraq “Learning to Adapt to Asymmetric Threats,” (Institute of Defense Analysis, Dec 2004)

War is Getting Harder “Where’s the beef?”  There is also data that tells us that we are not going to create “adaptive leaders”:  Cadet Command’s proposed and past curriculum have focused on Leader and Organizational Development issues within time; in the here and now of incumbents’ and units’ behavior, rather than examining what matures across time to cause them TABLE 1. Level of CD and ED in USAWC Students SOCIAL-EMOTIONAL COGNITIVE StageFreq. ( n = 36 )*%StratumFreq. (n = 41) % 200III III-IV IV IV-V V25 * Different numbers of useable results were available for each assessment from a total of 44 officers. Of the 44, 38 were USAWC students and the remaining 6 were from ICAF. TABLE 2 ED Percentage at Three Year Markers for West Point Cadets StageFreshmanSophomoreSenior Freq. (n = 38)* %Freq. (n = 52) %Freq. (n = 32) % * Different numbers of students participated at each interval making the investigation ‘cross-sectional’ rather than truly ‘longitudinal.’ Nonetheless, these findings should approximate longitudinal results.

War is Getting Harder The Army thinks its reforming itself? Does ROTC Select, Develop, Evaluate and Commission A Campaign- Capable and Expeditionary Officer with the right skills? Laying the foundation for the rest of the Army Army Force Design Modularity – immediate need for versatile, cohesive units Shed excess and redundant capabilities Expeditionary Mindset Army in contact, engaged in ongoing operations Fight on arrival w/ aggressive, intelligent, empowered Soldiers Joint Mindset Joint interdependent capabilities based Army Conduct sustained warfare in a Joint environment Future Land Power Capabilities Sustained interoperability across the full spectrum of Ops Future Combat System (FCS) / Network-enabled Ops Army Culture Continuous immersion in the Army’s Warrior Ethos Warriors first, specialists second

100,000 soldiers retrained and reallocated Field Artillery Units Air Defense Units Engineer Units Armor Units Certain Logistic Units Decrease Increase Military Police units Transportation units Civil Affairs units Special Operations units Biological Detection units Military Intelligence units War is Getting Harder The Army thinks it’s reforming itself? Most Significant Army Restructuring in the last 50 Years Divesting Cold War structure to better fight 4 th Generation War Relieve stress on high demand units (reduce overhead/increase units) Improve readiness and deployability of units (life-cycle) Execute Military-to-Civilian Conversions – free-up Soldiers to deploy All officers must have foundation w/adaptibility and intuition

How About Society? What Charlie Moskos Found  The Moskos’ proposals = insights for reform of ROTC: Two-thirds of high school graduates go to higher education  “About half will graduate with a bachelor’s degree”  “Each year 1.2 million young people graduate with a bachelor’s degree”  “40 percent intend to go on to some form of graduate work”  “Average college graduate today leaves with about $19,000 in debt”  “Average debt of one who attends graduate school is $38,000!” Cost of not reforming the system:  Lowering of entrance standards  Higher entry pay and larger enlistment bonuses  An expanded recruitment force with attendant costs  Increased contracting out of military functions  More recruitment of non-American citizens, and  More strains on IRR From the “The Citizen Soldier: The Ideal and Reserve Culture” by Dr. Charlie Moskos (October 2004)

How About Society? What Charlie Moskos Found  The Moskos’ proposals = insights for reform of ROTC: A 15-month enlistment option with generous educational benefits Counterbalance the prevailing econometric approach with social psychological theories in recruitment analysis. For recruitment purposes, nothing would be more meaningful than one’s friends joining the Army Consider a cohort enlistment for certain colleges to serve in a specified peacekeeping mission. Emphasize military service as a rewarding experience between undergraduate and graduate school Link all federal aid to college students to some form of national service. We have created a G.I. Bill without the G.I. “Let us also keep in mind the long-term benefits for the country if military service became more common among privileged youth. We will have future leaders in civilian society with a rewarding military experience—and who will be future informal recruiters. This can only be to the advantage of the armed services and the nation.” Dr. Charlie Moskos “The Citizen Soldier: The Ideal and Reserve Culture” draft (October 2004)

How about society? Y-Gen Expects? Information Age Success = Adaptability + Agility Empowering the “Edges” Virtual Integration Information Sharing Increased Transparency Collaboration & Synchronization Sense and Respond Externally Oriented Accelerated Innovation & Experimentation New Rules New Behaviors New Competencies New Relationships Industrial Age Success = Scale + Scope Top Down - Centralized Vertical Integration Information Hoarding Local Awareness Arms Length Relationships Make and Sell Inwardly Focused

What are we going to expect? The new LT?  Future LTs must be adaptive and have intuition: Commanding units that operate dispersed—but cannot rely on technology Leading more powerful units—at all levels! Influence decisions at all levels of war Transition from complex unit fighting to humanitarian tasks demanding different skills, based on decision making skills => Both are Key to Success “The US military must overcome the way it has trained and educated leaders. Defense officials are moving ahead to overcome Cold-War era training to create a new generation of leaders who aren't constrained by what the doctrine says.” General Richard B. Myers, CJCS September 2004

What are we going to expect? Old vs. new POI, or is it? POI Use when time isAdvantagesDisadvantages Current POI produces leaders who use: “Analytical decision making” Not criticalCan justify decision to others Manages large amounts of information Relies on subject matter expert contributions Decision maker can feel as comfortable as possible, while dealing with uncertainty Time consuming Requires large amounts of information input Does not develop decision- making abilities of those involved, particularly of subordinates Proposed POI produces leaders with: Adaptability and intuition Critical; during crisis situations Requires little time Can work with relatively little current information Requires less planning time Leads to increased tempo and increases ability to maintain the initiative against the enemy Requires large experience base on the subject prior to use Requires moral courage Decision maker assumes increased risk without group absolution from staff planning

The Result! The Army’s Proposal-Combining the Old w/New  How the Army develops these future LTs remains flawed (not in concept but in details): Ft Benning Ft Bliss Ft Knox Ft Sill SCMI QMODFIAG TCMS FAAV AD INAR ENMPCM Functional Training (ABN/Ranger, Scout Leader) Functional Training (ABN/Ranger, Scout Leader) First Unit Assigned BOLC I BOLC II BOLC III Increasing Rigor later vs. sooner? Cognitive Skills education Task Training Baseline What happens to a lieutenant that fails the standard?

War is Getting Harder Conclusion  While the world and war are changing around us: Our own success is now our worst enemy  Due to lack of significant “shock”  Allows us to only adjust “around the edges” We want to see our society advance, but  Definition of success works against selfless service  Too divorced to take the time to understand Today’s global problems have an impact