Foreknowledge and free will God is essentially omniscient. So assuming that there are facts about the future, then God knows them. And it’s impossible for God to be wrong. Free will (arguably) requires alternatives. –In order to freely do something, one must have had the power to do something else. The basic line of reasoning: If God knows you’ll do something, then since it’s impossible for God to be wrong, it’s therefore impossible for you to do anything else, which means you’re not free.

Does knowledge compel? If you’re compelled to do something, then you’re not doing it freely. But does God’s knowledge that you’ll do something compel you to do it? Arguably not: –If I know what Napoleon did in the past, it doesn’t follow that Napoleon’s activities are compelled by my knowledge. –If I know what you’re doing right now, it doesn’t follow that your activities are compelled by my knowledge. The mere fact that God has knowledge concerning our activities, it seems, needn’t bring in any freedom-canceling compulsion.

Does foreknowledge require determinism? Many think that causal determinism takes away free will. –They think that, if everything we do is necessitated by laws of nature and previous states of the universe, then we are not free. And perhaps God’s foreknowledge is based on causal determinism. –Perhaps God’s knowledge of the future is taken from his infallible knowledge of the laws of nature and states of the universe. If so, then God’s foreknowledge would be inconsistent with free will. But perhaps God’s foreknowledge isn’t based on causal determinism. Perhaps God has other ways of knowing.

‘Sleigh’s fallacy’ Here’s a crucially important claim: If God knows I’ll do something, I can’t do anything else. It’s ambiguous between two readings: –R1: It is necessary that, if God knows I’ll do x, then I’ll do x. –R2: If God knows I’ll do x, then it is necessary that I’ll do x.

‘Sleigh’s fallacy’ Here’s a crucially important claim: If God knows I’ll do something, I can’t do anything else. It’s ambiguous between two readings: –R1: It is necessary that, if God knows I’ll do x, then I’ll do x. –R2: If God knows I’ll do x, then it is necessary that I’ll do x.

‘Sleigh’s fallacy’ Here’s a crucially important claim: If God knows I’ll do something, I can’t do anything else. It’s ambiguous between two readings: –R1: It is necessary that, if God knows I’ll do x, then I’ll do x. –R2: If God knows I’ll do x, then it is necessary that I’ll do x. R2 says my doing x is necessary: that would take away my freedom. R1 says the connection between God’s knowledge and my doing x is necessary: it’s more controversial whether that would take away my freedom.

‘Sleigh’s fallacy’ R1’: It’s impossible for God to know I’ll x and yet for me to do something else. R2’: If God knows I’ll x, then it’s impossible for me to do anything else. –Again, R2’ is bad for freedom. –But R1’ might be innocuous. Notice that R1’ doesn’t imply R2’. –Even if God’s foreknowledge necessitates my activities, still my activities themselves might not be necessary.

The necessity of the past The past is, in some sense, necessary. –It’s not straightforwardly necessary: it could have been different. –But now it’s fixed, closed off, set in stone, etc. –It’s certainly beyond our control—I can’t change what happened in 100 BC. But God’s foreknowledge is part of the past. –In 100 BC, God knew what I would do today. So God’s foreknowledge has the necessity of the past. –I can’t change what God knew in 100 BC. –God’s foreknowledge in 100 BC is ‘set in stone’.

An argument for the incompatibility of foreknowledge and free will 1.Long ago, God knew what I’d do today. 2.The past is necessary. 3.So God’s foreknowledge of what I’d do today is necessary. 4.God’s foreknowledge necessitates what I’m doing today. –That is, it’s impossible for my activities to diverge from God’s foreknowledge. 5.So what I’m doing today is necessitated by something that is itself necessary. 6.Therefore, what I’m doing today is also necessary: I can’t do anything else.

Solution 1: Timelessness The first premise puts God’s foreknowledge in the past. –“Long ago, God knew what I’d do today.” But if God’s foreknowledge can’t be put in the past, then it will avoid partaking of ‘the necessity of the past’. If God’s knowledge of the future is outside of time, then perhaps it won’t be necessary. Then the argument collapses.

Solution 1: Timelessness Problems with timelessness as such –Can God still be a person with a mind? –How can God interact with us? –How can a timeless cause produce effects in time? Problems with timelessness as a solution –Can we humans (located inside of time) have control over facts outside of time? –Isn’t it still true that, at 100 BC, God knew what I would do today?

Solution 2: Hard and soft facts The second premise puts the past beyond our control. –“The past is necessary.” But is this true of all facts in the past? –For example, take the fact expressed when a person living in 100 BC says “In the future, a man named Cole Mitchell will give a lecture on foreknowledge and free will.” –Arguably I have some control over whether this is true. –After all, it doesn’t really concern the past. Some facts in the past aren’t really about the past, so maybe they’re within our control: they’re ‘soft facts’

Solution 2: Hard and soft facts Here are some things that (let’s say) were true at 100 BC: –“Alexander the Great has been dead for about 223 years” –“The Hellenistic Period is in full swing” –“Cicero is a young boy” –“Cole Mitchell will lecture on June 25, 2007” –“God thinks it’s true that Cole Mitchell will lecture on June 25, 2007” The last two seem different.

Solution 2: Hard and soft facts Problem: Drawing the distinction –You might think the distinction is a matter of whether a fact in the past entails something about the future. –Soft facts do entail something about the future, and hard facts don’t entail anything about the future. –But be careful: if (for example) causal determinism is true, then there are facts that entail something about the future that are not ‘soft’ because they’re beyond our control. –So not all future-entailing facts in the past are within our control. –So we need a better way of drawing the distinction.

Solution 3: Changing the past This is a somewhat more radical way of challenging the argument. Instead of finding ‘soft’ facts in the past that are arguably within our control, you insist on being able to make the past different. How to change the past –I could have skipped class today. –If I had, then the past would be different (the past would have God knowing I’d skip class instead of knowing I’d show up). –So I could have made the past different.

Another response to the argument If the incompatibility argument works, then it works even without God involved. But that’s an unacceptable result. So there must be something wrong with the incompatibility argument.

Another response to the argument 1.Long ago, God knew what I’d do today. 2.The past is necessary. 3.So God’s foreknowledge of what I’d do today is necessary. 4.God’s foreknowledge necessitates what I’m doing today. –That is, it’s impossible for my activities to diverge from God’s foreknowledge. 5.So what I’m doing today is necessitated by something that is itself necessary. 6.Therefore, what I’m doing today is also necessary: I can’t do anything else.

Another response to the argument 1.Long ago, it was a fact that I’d do what I’d do today. 2.The past is necessary. 3.So the facts about what I’d do today are necessary. 4.These facts necessitate what I’m doing today. –That is, it’s impossible for my activities to diverge from these facts about the future. 5.So what I’m doing today is necessitated by something that is itself necessary. 6.Therefore, what I’m doing today is also necessary: I can’t do anything else.

Another response to the argument Could mere facts about the future take away our free will? –That seems like an unacceptable result. But what’s the difference? –What’s the difference between the argument with God’s foreknowledge and the argument with facts about the future? So maybe this is adequate grounds to reject the original incompatibility argument.