Truman, David B., (1951) The Governmental Process: Political interests and Public Opinion. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Chapter 14 The Web of Relationship.

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Truman, David B., (1951) The Governmental Process: Political interests and Public Opinion. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Chapter 14 The Web of Relationship in the Administrative Process Diffusion of leadership and a multitude of points of access (437) Diffusion of leadership and a multitude of points of access (437) The legislature and executive share these characteristics as interdependentThe legislature and executive share these characteristics as interdependent One reflects and reinforces the patterns in the otherOne reflects and reinforces the patterns in the other Accepting too literally the formal separation of legislative from the executive is a disadvantage to understanding the political processAccepting too literally the formal separation of legislative from the executive is a disadvantage to understanding the political process Refers to “patterns of control” that are “dominant”—the group of relationships that have the ability to influence change (438)Refers to “patterns of control” that are “dominant”—the group of relationships that have the ability to influence change (438)

Truman, David B., (1951) The Governmental Process: Political interests and Public Opinion. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Chapter 14 The Web of Relationship in the Administrative Process The Character of the Legislative Mandate (439) The Character of the Legislative Mandate (439) The degree of controversy and the character of the opposition—significantly defined the nature of the mandate received by the administratorThe degree of controversy and the character of the opposition—significantly defined the nature of the mandate received by the administrator Demagogic leadership-direct relationship with members of an interest group (441)Demagogic leadership-direct relationship with members of an interest group (441) The interest group is loosely formed of other interests and the leaders serves as the galvanizing force to implement the policy change The interest group is loosely formed of other interests and the leaders serves as the galvanizing force to implement the policy change The Influence of the Office (executive branch) The Influence of the Office (executive branch) The dominant organized groups and many other factors impact the ability of the administrators in arriving at stable patterns of interactionThe dominant organized groups and many other factors impact the ability of the administrators in arriving at stable patterns of interaction The administrative official is constantly attempting to move from controversy to acceptance OR to maintain the routineThe administrative official is constantly attempting to move from controversy to acceptance OR to maintain the routine

Truman, David B., (1951) The Governmental Process: Political interests and Public Opinion. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Chapter 14 The Web of Relationship in the Administrative Process Recruitment and the Administrator’s Group Membership (450)Recruitment and the Administrator’s Group Membership (450) The notion of the administrator as a neutralized public servant without conflicting motivations is an illusion The notion of the administrator as a neutralized public servant without conflicting motivations is an illusion Identification with the Administrative Unit (453)Identification with the Administrative Unit (453) The claims, goals and identity of the unit becomes those of the person The claims, goals and identity of the unit becomes those of the person Formal Devices for Group Adjustment (457)Formal Devices for Group Adjustment (457) Advisory committees, administration by interest groups, propaganda by administrative agencies Advisory committees, administration by interest groups, propaganda by administrative agencies The Inflexibility of the Established Web (467)The Inflexibility of the Established Web (467) An administrative agency that survives the change of fortunes (vicissitudes) of the political process develops a set of relationships (internal, external-branch, legislative, interest groups) that are in a fairly stable equilibrium An administrative agency that survives the change of fortunes (vicissitudes) of the political process develops a set of relationships (internal, external-branch, legislative, interest groups) that are in a fairly stable equilibrium

Crozier, Michel (1964), The French Bureaucratic System of Organization in The Bureaucratic Phenomenon. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, page Model of a bureaucratic vicious circle—four basic elements (213). Model of a bureaucratic vicious circle—four basic elements (213). Impersonality of the rules-1Impersonality of the rules-1 Centralization of decisions-2Centralization of decisions-2 Strata isolation-3Strata isolation-3 Development of parallel power relationships-4Development of parallel power relationships-4 French Society has many parallels—to the extent exclusively French then are their other models that are culturally specificFrench Society has many parallels—to the extent exclusively French then are their other models that are culturally specific At least there is need for a new and broader perspectiveAt least there is need for a new and broader perspective In order to judge the relevance and usefulness limits of one model In order to judge the relevance and usefulness limits of one model

Crozier, Michel (1964), The French Bureaucratic System of Organization in The Bureaucratic Phenomenon. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, page Cultural dimension-Explanation in terms of dysfunction to an explanation in terms of latent function (213) Cultural dimension-Explanation in terms of dysfunction to an explanation in terms of latent function (213) These terms include interactions (formal but more informal) and values PLUSThese terms include interactions (formal but more informal) and values PLUS Cultural differences and time period differencesCultural differences and time period differences Latent—need to reduce tensions due to decline of friendly and informal interactionsLatent—need to reduce tensions due to decline of friendly and informal interactions Also due different and opposing values of groups Also due different and opposing values of groups

Crozier, Michel (1964), The French Bureaucratic System of Organization in The Bureaucratic Phenomenon. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, page Describes approach as rational and empirical used to explore the cultural dimension question (213, 214). Describes approach as rational and empirical used to explore the cultural dimension question (213, 214). Examine interpersonal and intergroup relationshipsExamine interpersonal and intergroup relationships Where cultural determinants appear to be the easiest to discover Where cultural determinants appear to be the easiest to discover Discuss authority relationships and the general fear of face-to- face relationshipsDiscuss authority relationships and the general fear of face-to- face relationships Present a first general hypothesis of French features of modelPresent a first general hypothesis of French features of model The problem of change: understood in cultural termsThe problem of change: understood in cultural terms The paradox: The weakness of the omnipotent power at the top of bureaucratic pyramidThe paradox: The weakness of the omnipotent power at the top of bureaucratic pyramid Develop other comparable models for different dysfunctions and rigidities that develop in different cultural environmentsDevelop other comparable models for different dysfunctions and rigidities that develop in different cultural environments Russian system (228), American system (232), Russian system (228), American system (232), The American system emphasizes functional specialization and due process The American system emphasizes functional specialization and due process where Russia relies on hierarch, suspicion, and control (232) where Russia relies on hierarch, suspicion, and control (232) American dysfunctions are totally different in nature than Russian or French systems American dysfunctions are totally different in nature than Russian or French systems

Heidenheimer et al (1989), Political Corruption: A Handbook. Transaction: New Brunswick. Chapter 6, Corruption as a historical phenomenon Corruption as a historical phenomenon Corruption as a ‘dysfunction’ Corruption as a ‘dysfunction’ Historically, corruption has not been regarded as a ‘problem’ Historically, corruption has not been regarded as a ‘problem’ Seen only as a series of accidental acts of dishonesty on part of civil servantsSeen only as a series of accidental acts of dishonesty on part of civil servants Two extreme ideal types where corruption doesn’t exist Two extreme ideal types where corruption doesn’t exist Monarchy (absolute one-person rule)Monarchy (absolute one-person rule) Popular sovereignty (‘popular will reflected in national policy’ = democracy?)Popular sovereignty (‘popular will reflected in national policy’ = democracy?) ‘Intermediary’ bodies, gradations between the two ideal types, nurture corruption ‘Intermediary’ bodies, gradations between the two ideal types, nurture corruption

Heidenheimer et al (1989), Political Corruption: A Handbook. Transaction: New Brunswick. Chapter 6, Monarchy (absolute one-person rule) Monarchy (absolute one-person rule) Inca state: impossible for civil servants to divert more revenues than already allocated to them by the monarchInca state: impossible for civil servants to divert more revenues than already allocated to them by the monarch The more developed the monarchy, the greater its corruption-checking tendencyThe more developed the monarchy, the greater its corruption-checking tendency Popular sovereignty Popular sovereignty Civil servants are only executive instruments of the people’s will; people will not allow their own exploitationCivil servants are only executive instruments of the people’s will; people will not allow their own exploitation Corruption: stems from people being subjected to the control of officials Corruption: stems from people being subjected to the control of officials

Heidenheimer et al (1989), Political Corruption: A Handbook. Transaction: New Brunswick. Chapter 6, Intermediary groups Intermediary groups Created by the monarch: public officialsCreated by the monarch: public officials Autonomous, traditional: landlords, oligarchs and urban patriciansAutonomous, traditional: landlords, oligarchs and urban patricians Van Klaveren debunks the myth that these ‘urbanites’ were champions of ‘democracy’ Van Klaveren debunks the myth that these ‘urbanites’ were champions of ‘democracy’ They have rights of their own They have rights of their own Monarch may adjust to let them claim what they regard as their due portion of the national incomeMonarch may adjust to let them claim what they regard as their due portion of the national income Struggle around distribution of national income within this ‘conflict triangle’Struggle around distribution of national income within this ‘conflict triangle’

Heidenheimer et al (1989), Political Corruption: A Handbook. Transaction: New Brunswick. Chapter 6, Corruption embedded within these intermediary groups perhaps because of ‘cultural’ reasons Corruption embedded within these intermediary groups perhaps because of ‘cultural’ reasons Underlying organizational structureUnderlying organizational structure Oligarchs - collegial; civil servants - hierarchical Oligarchs - collegial; civil servants - hierarchical ‘Entitlement’ mentality of the middle groups‘Entitlement’ mentality of the middle groups Entitled to a certain lifestyle and corresponding income Entitled to a certain lifestyle and corresponding income Shocklike effect of external conditionsShocklike effect of external conditions Spread of French fashion and oriental luxury goods Spread of French fashion and oriental luxury goods Perceived need to build a ‘fortune’ for posterityPerceived need to build a ‘fortune’ for posterity High salaries of civil servants did not deter corruption High salaries of civil servants did not deter corruption

Solomon (1992), Other Voices, Other Vistas. Mentor: New York. The Wog by Khushwant Singh, Story about a Westernized Oriental Gentleman or a WOG (brown sahib) Story about a Westernized Oriental Gentleman or a WOG (brown sahib) Perhaps provides a counter backdrop to the English / French models Perhaps provides a counter backdrop to the English / French models Contrast Contrast Impersonal, detached and rule-based bureaucratic culture imposed by the colonial mastersImpersonal, detached and rule-based bureaucratic culture imposed by the colonial masters Natives followed a more open, personalized and physically interactive traditionNatives followed a more open, personalized and physically interactive tradition

Solomon (1992), Other Voices, Other Vistas. Mentor: New York. The Wog by Khushwant Singh, Consequences Consequences Creation of a local ‘elite’ that has contempt for its own native, traditional modelCreation of a local ‘elite’ that has contempt for its own native, traditional model Buffer between the ‘ruler’ and the ‘masses’Buffer between the ‘ruler’ and the ‘masses’ Creates a conflict on the psycho-social level by blurring the line between the ‘public’ and the ‘private’ life of the civil servantCreates a conflict on the psycho-social level by blurring the line between the ‘public’ and the ‘private’ life of the civil servant Works while the colonials still have power but disintegrates in post-colonial transitionWorks while the colonials still have power but disintegrates in post-colonial transition Theme: building on an existing model vs. imposing a new model Theme: building on an existing model vs. imposing a new model

A Synthesis: Historical Models, Contemporary Models, Socio-Economic Change Politics & Administration clearly connected Politics & Administration clearly connected Dominant political influence staffing beau racy with staff similar ideology, concepts, values Dominant political influence staffing beau racy with staff similar ideology, concepts, values Government related to society with preference to supporters Government related to society with preference to supporters Authority based models of bureaucracy Authority based models of bureaucracy Legal rational system Legal rational system Position has authority; impersonal relationshipsPosition has authority; impersonal relationships Traditional system Traditional system Person has authority; kinship relationshipsPerson has authority; kinship relationships Charismatic system Charismatic system Leader and follower relationshipsLeader and follower relationships Usually we see hybrid structures Usually we see hybrid structures

A Synthesis: Historical Models, Contemporary Models, Socio-Economic Change Bureaucratic—French Model Bureaucratic—French Model Impersonality of the rules, strata isolation Impersonality of the rules, strata isolation Isolation of the individualIsolation of the individual Struggles for privilegesStruggles for privileges Latent—need to reduce tensions due to decline of friendly and informal interactions Latent—need to reduce tensions due to decline of friendly and informal interactions And different/opposing values of groups And different/opposing values of groups Avoidance of face-to-face relationships Avoidance of face-to-face relationships Avoiding authority relationship encountersAvoiding authority relationship encounters Difficulty facing conflictDifficulty facing conflict Do not take a political system or a regime at its face value Do not take a political system or a regime at its face value Methods of influence: formal/informal; different points in history; different cultural settings Methods of influence: formal/informal; different points in history; different cultural settings

A Synthesis: Historical Models, Contemporary Models, Socio-Economic Change Corruption Corruption Historically not seen as a systemic problemHistorically not seen as a systemic problem Facilitated by intermediary groups between the ‘governor’ and the ‘governed’Facilitated by intermediary groups between the ‘governor’ and the ‘governed’ Socio-cultural dimension Socio-cultural dimension Lifestyle; entitlement mentality of the ‘middle groups’Lifestyle; entitlement mentality of the ‘middle groups’ Not viewed as a dysfunction per se but as isolated incidental phenomenonNot viewed as a dysfunction per se but as isolated incidental phenomenon

A Synthesis: Historical Models, Contemporary Models, Socio-Economic Change United States United States Diffusion of leadership and a multitude of points of access (Truman) Diffusion of leadership and a multitude of points of access (Truman) Converting the controversial into routine— moving from controversy to acceptance Converting the controversial into routine— moving from controversy to acceptance Government reflects the claims of interest groups-organized and unorganized Government reflects the claims of interest groups-organized and unorganized Administrator’s decision making—not consciously thinking of guarding the constitutional understandings of peopleAdministrator’s decision making—not consciously thinking of guarding the constitutional understandings of people The notion of the administrator as neutralized public servant--an illusion The notion of the administrator as neutralized public servant--an illusion

A Synthesis: Historical Models, Contemporary Models, Socio-Economic Change Japan – more to it than meets the eye Japan – more to it than meets the eye Traditional reasons cite cultural, structural, institutional and incidental bases for the Japanese miracle Traditional reasons cite cultural, structural, institutional and incidental bases for the Japanese miracle Orientation of state: regulatory vs. developmental Orientation of state: regulatory vs. developmental Plan rational, developmental – Japan: emphasis on substantive issues (ends rather than means)Plan rational, developmental – Japan: emphasis on substantive issues (ends rather than means) Market rational, regulatory – USA: emphasis on market-environment issues (means rather than ends)Market rational, regulatory – USA: emphasis on market-environment issues (means rather than ends) Trade-offs – not two ideal types but a continuum Trade-offs – not two ideal types but a continuum

A Synthesis: Historical Models, Contemporary Models, Socio-Economic Change Contemporary Models Contemporary Models New Public Management and reformersNew Public Management and reformers Neutral unbiased modelsNeutral unbiased models Seemingly in conflict with competitive preferences Seemingly in conflict with competitive preferences Must involve a pragmatism to reconcile Must involve a pragmatism to reconcile Focus on process alterations—such as privatizationFocus on process alterations—such as privatization Principles driven from experience rather than theoryPrinciples driven from experience rather than theory Methodological pluralism Methodological pluralism

A Synthesis: Historical Models, Contemporary Models, Socio-Economic Change Socio-Economic Change Socio-Economic Change Structural changes are slow and the effects far reachingStructural changes are slow and the effects far reaching Bureaucratic staff embedded with values and ideas regardless to changes in formal relationshipsBureaucratic staff embedded with values and ideas regardless to changes in formal relationships Growing economies and societies accompanied by growing bureaucratic capacity Growing economies and societies accompanied by growing bureaucratic capacity Request for more and different types of servicesRequest for more and different types of services New and bigger departmentsNew and bigger departments More staffMore staff

A Synthesis: Historical Models, Contemporary Models, Socio-Economic Change Bigger budgetsBigger budgets Bureaucracies a force to be reckoned with by political officials giving oversightBureaucracies a force to be reckoned with by political officials giving oversight And those looking to the bureaucracy to implement policy And those looking to the bureaucracy to implement policy Public backlash to govt and bureaucracy Public backlash to govt and bureaucracy Thinning of infrastructure, reduced capacityThinning of infrastructure, reduced capacity Competitiveness of market-type mechanismsCompetitiveness of market-type mechanisms Performance, results focusPerformance, results focus Challenges of transition Challenges of transition Too slow for contemporary societyToo slow for contemporary society Too fast for necessary careful consideration of long-term impactsToo fast for necessary careful consideration of long-term impacts

Literary Map Historical Perspective of PA Authority-based Models of bureaucracy (Jreisat, Peters, Picard, Heady) Socio-Cultural & Political Context (Crozier, Picard, Singh) Dysfunctions (Crozier) Reform; move away from legal-rational model / emphasis on ends rather than means (Barzelay, Truman) Role of state: regulatory vs. developmental / MITI (Johnson) Corruption (Warren, Klitgaard, Van Klaveren, Scott)

References Solomon, Barbara (1992). Other Voices, Other Vistas. Mentor: New YorkSolomon, Barbara (1992). Other Voices, Other Vistas. Mentor: New York Crozier, Michel (1964). The Bureaucratic Phenomenon. University of Chicago: ChicagoCrozier, Michel (1964). The Bureaucratic Phenomenon. University of Chicago: Chicago Truman, David B. (1951). The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion. Alfred A. Knopf: New YorkTruman, David B. (1951). The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion. Alfred A. Knopf: New York Heidenheimer, et. Al. (1989). Political Corruption: A Handbook. Transaction: New BrunswickHeidenheimer, et. Al. (1989). Political Corruption: A Handbook. Transaction: New Brunswick Johnson, Chalmers (1983). MITI and the Japanese Miracle. The Free Press: New YorkJohnson, Chalmers (1983). MITI and the Japanese Miracle. The Free Press: New York Jreisat, Jamil E. (2002). Comparative Public Administration and Policy. Westview: BoulderJreisat, Jamil E. (2002). Comparative Public Administration and Policy. Westview: Boulder Picard, Louis A (2005). The State of the State: Institutional Transformation, Capacity and Political Change in South Africa. Johannesburg: Wits University PressPicard, Louis A (2005). The State of the State: Institutional Transformation, Capacity and Political Change in South Africa. Johannesburg: Wits University Press Heady, Ferrel (2001). Public Administration: A Comparative Perspective, 6th Edition. New York: Marcel DekkerHeady, Ferrel (2001). Public Administration: A Comparative Perspective, 6th Edition. New York: Marcel Dekker Peters, B. Guy (1989). The Politics of Bureaucracy. New York: London.Peters, B. Guy (1989). The Politics of Bureaucracy. New York: London. Baker, Randall, ed. (1994) Comparative Public Management: Putting U.S. Public Policy and Implementation in Context. Westport: PraegerBaker, Randall, ed. (1994) Comparative Public Management: Putting U.S. Public Policy and Implementation in Context. Westport: Praeger