Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) Maritime Security Strategy for Radiological and Nuclear Threats September 26, 2007 Vayl S. Oxford Director Domestic Nuclear Detection Office

2 Outline  Defining the radiological and nuclear threat  Multi-layered approach to security  Developing a strategy to secure cargo –Operational solutions –Technical solutions –DNDO progress and programs  Developing a strategy to secure small vessels –Operational solutions –Technical solutions –DNDO progress and programs

3 Rad/Nuc Threat  The risk of a terrorist acquiring and using a nuclear or radiological device is one of the greatest threats to the Nation –A robust, layered defense must be developed –Each layer must reduce the terrorist’s ability to use such threats against us  The layered defense concept includes: –Eliminating excess stocks of nuclear materials and weapons –Protecting existing stocks from theft or diversion –Detecting illicit movement of nuclear or radiological material overseas –Enhancing domestic detection and interdiction efforts

4 A multi–layered, international system offers multiple opportunities for detection Coast Guard Inspection Seaport and Border Scanning Second Line of Defense Materials Protection, Control, & Accountability Port-of-Departure Screening Potential source of SNM Potential target At-sea Interdiction Global Nuclear Detection Architecture

5 Cargo Containers and the Supply Chain  Almost 32,000 seagoing containers arrive and are off loaded at United States seaports each day  In FY 2006, that equated to 11.6 million cargo containers annually  Rad/nuc scanning is only one piece of supply chain security: –24-Hour Rule –Advanced Targeting System –C-TPAT  Significant challenges: –Sheer volume –Requirement to facilitate continued flow of goods

6 Cargo Scanning Strategy DHS and partner programs will deploy integrated technologies both domestically and overseas  Unshielded or lightly shielded materials –Current and next-generation passive radiation portal monitors detect radiation emitted by threat materials –Next generation radiation portal monitors promise to significantly reduce false alarm rates by identifying the radioisotope  Shielded materials –Gamma ray imagers detect dense materials used to avoid passive detection –Next generation imagers automate the detection of dense materials –Future systems may directly detect shielded materials

7 Cargo Security – DNDO Progress & Programs  Radiation Portal Monitor Program –Develop and deploy, in partnership with CBP, current- and next-generation radiation portal monitors to all U.S. ports of entry –Target completion date is FY 2013  Rail Test Center –Established in FY 2007 at the Port of Tacoma. –Will focus on identifying potential solutions for scanning cargo moved directly from ship to rail prior to exiting a port.  Advanced Spectroscopic Portal Program –Developing next-generation radiation portal monitors that can both detect and identify potential threats in cargo –Completed performance testing at Nevada Test Site and operational testing at the New York Container Terminal –Currently undergoing field validation at Los Angeles/Long Beach (CA), Newark (NJ), Detroit (MI), and Laredo (TX)  Cargo Advanced Automated Radiography Systems –Developing next-generation imaging systems that will automate the detection of high- density materials –Initial testing planned in FY 2009/2010

8 Program Goals:  Develop next-generation passive detection systems for multiple applications  Initial focus on fixed portals for POEs; substantial investment in rail, mobile, and re-locatable assets for non-POE venues  Provide 100% passive detection capability at all official POEs  Deploy fixed and re-locatable systems to non-POE locations Advanced Spectroscopic Portal Program

9 Cargo Advanced Automated Radiography Systems Program Goals:  Develop and deploy a radiography system that automatically detects threat materials in mixed commerce without impeding the flow of commerce  Conduct radiographic inspection of up to 50% of all incoming cargo  Improved penetration capability

10  Vessels less than 300 Gross Tons  Includes all types: recreational boats, commercial fishing vessels, tugs, etc.  Vessels with fewer security regulations & information required by law, such as –Automatic Identification System (AIS) requirement –96 Hour Advance Notice of Arrival –24 Hour Crew List  Significant challenges: –Relatively anonymous –Free to navigate on the water –Sheer volume and density Small Maritime Vessels

11 Small Maritime Vessel Strategy Goal: Establish an efficient, risk-informed Preventive Rad/Nuc Detection (PRND) Program focused on smaller maritime threats –Exploit geographic choke points for efficiency –Establish buffer zones to limit potential consequences –Leverage targeting information to focus resources Objectives: –Assist Federal, state and local agencies with deploying detection & reporting capability consisting of human-portable, mobile, & remote radiation detection systems for maritime applications –Assist with developing a maritime PRND CONOPS with alarm resolution & maritime operational threat response (MOTR) protocols –Provide training on equipment, CONOPS, and protocols –Enhance Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA): communications infrastructure, information/data networks & collaboration amongst Fed, State & local agencies

12 Small Maritime Vessel Approach  Step 1 - Architecture Analysis –Baseline current PRND capabilities within a maritime region –Conduct architecture “gap” analysis –Leverage Area Maritime Security Committee (AMSC) to identify maritime & law enforcement stakeholders  Step 2 – Design –Assess geographic choke points & buffer zones to maximize opportunities to encounter, detect & interdict –Develop initial deployment strategy & CONOPS –Identify PRND technology requirements and system integration approach  Step 3 – Deploy Capability –Field detection and reporting technologies –Commence training operational users –Enhance reach-back networks for situational awareness & information/data sharing  Step 4 – Assess & Document –Conduct exercises –Refine protocols; share lessons learned

13 Enhancing Maritime Capability  Detection equipment for the maritime environment includes: –Human Portable Radiation Detection Systems (HPRDS): Enhanced detection & standardized user interfaces. –New technologies: Mobile/fixed standoff systems are being research & developed.  While detection equipment & technology are important, an effective PRND Program needs to be built around the POETE/Ops framework. –Planning –Organization –Equipment –Training –Exercise –Operations Support  DNDO is actively working in all these areas to improve the Nation’s maritime PRND capability.

14 Handheld and Backpack Isotope Identifiers Program Goals:  Develop a lightweight (4.5 lbs) system with improved probability of identification, improved ability to communicate with a joint reach back center, and better durability at a price of less than $15K  Meet key operator needs (U.S. Coast Guard, CBP, U.S. Border Patrol, State, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies and first responders)  Options include: –Weight and power reduction in Germanium devices –Advanced material (e.g., Lanthanum Halides, Cadmium Zinc Telluride) –Cooling systems (e.g., third-generation Stirling cooler) –Filling operational gaps through the purchase of capable COTS systems

15 Small Vessel Security – DNDO Progress & Programs  Port Partnership Initiative –A DNDO team actively engages select high-risk port regions to increase awareness and assist Federal, state & local agencies establish an effective maritime PRND Program that will focus on the small maritime vessel threat  CG-DNDO Joint Acquisition Strategy –Assist CG to achieve full operational capability by 2007  Maritime Module for PRND Program Management Handbook –Assist state & local agencies establish a maritime PRND Program –Describes issues/concerns related to the unique maritime environment  Maritime Test Campaign –Establish a maritime test facility in 2008 –Initial focus will be to determine the effectiveness of mobile standoff detectors on small maritime vessels  Enhancing Detection Capability –Human Portable Radiation Detection Systems (HPRDS): maritime variant requirements are incorporated in spiral development

16 Summary  DNDO is working to counter the threat of radiological and nuclear terrorism throughout the maritime environment  The only way to successfully counter this type of threat is to layer detection assets between potential sources and targets  Cargo security is a major focus of current efforts, and DNDO is working closely with CBP to continue to improve detection capabilities at our ports  DNDO is increasingly focused on improving detection capabilities in the small vessel community, and is working with the Coast Guard and State and local officials to develop innovative solutions  No single solution will improve capabilities; a mix of operational and technical solutions will be required to address this challenge.