1. Office of Port and Facility Compliance (CG-FAC)
NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE WATERSIDE SECURITY OF ESPECIALLY HAZARDOUS CARGO
Office of Port and Facility Compliance (CG-FAC)
U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters 1

2. EHC National Security Strategy
Congressionally mandated
CG Authorization Act (Section 812):
Initiate National Study to improve security measures for transport of “Especially Hazardous Cargo”
Report of findings to DHS, House Committees on Homeland Security, Transportation & Infrastructure
National Strategy
To be developed using results of National Study
Mitigate risk of terrorist attack against the bulk transport, transfer or storage of EHCs
Per Coast Guard Auth. Act (2010), National Study shall include:
Waterside security risk assessment analysis (MSRAM)
Maritime stakeholder roles & responsibilities
Recommended measures to improve waterside security
Alternative sources of funding for security measures
National Study Report due 15 Oct 2011
National Strategy due 15 Apr 2012 2

3. EHC National Security Strategy
Signed by Commandant Zukunft , 1 Sep 15
Charter (in-house)
The Office of Port and Facility Compliance (CG-FAC) will be facilitating an EHC Implementation Plan Workgroup co-led by the National Maritime Security Advisory Committee (NMSAC) and Chemical Transportation Advisory Committee (CTAC)
Workgroup will recommend revisions/best practices to U.S. Coast Guard and current maritime industry practices and policies aimed at reducing the security risks associated with the transit, transfer, and storage of bulk EHCs through the ports and waterways of the United States

4. Chlorine Ammonium Nitrate Anhydrous Ammonia LPG LNG Cargoes
Bulk cargoes only
Subset of CDCs, Especially Hazardous Cargoes (EHCs). Coast Guard only term. Originated with first version of Op Neptune Shield (ONS)
The EHC list contains five cargoes, including both LNG and LPG.
Focusing our escort resources on EHC vessels rather than all CDC vessels was a risk-based decision.
Even after the ONS escort requirement was revised to focus on EHCs, the Coast Guard has not met all of the escort requirements in all locations. This shortfall – driven mainly by resources and resource distribution – was validated in a recent GAO report (“Maritime Security: Federal Efforts Needed to Address Challenges in Preventing and Responding to Terrorist Attacks on Energy Commodity Tankers”).

5. Purpose
Coalesce a strategic approach to acceptably mitigate the risk of an intentional, successful, terrorist attack against the bulk transport, transfer, or storage of CDCs within the U.S. maritime zone
Roadmap to achieve and maintain an acceptable security risk level
Designed to be used
Purpose contains some important terms that carry throughout document: mitigate risk—to an acceptable level—intentional attack—bulk CDCs—transit, transfer, storage—U.S. maritime zone. Maritime zone is redefined here to include normal CG FOSC areas as well as EPA FOSC areas shoreward to outermost fencing of MTSA facility transferring/storing CDCs
Maritime domain awareness enables risk-informed security through the collection and sharing of public and private sector operational and security data, often integrated with current intelligence and law enforcement data.
Identification of key national maritime areas is important for efficient resource allocation.
Law enforcement presence provides both a deterrent effect and the ability to disrupt an attack should one be launched.
Prevention actions also involve mitigating threats through background checks and anomaly detection through maritime domain awareness efforts.
Routine patrols, industry involvement, domain awareness, fixed and moving security zones around EHC vessels and fixed security zones around facilities enforced by federal, state and local law enforcement provide the best opportunity to deter, detect, and disrupt attacks.
Coast Guard seeks to improve the training and qualifications of security forces, as well as standardize deployed equipment to make it easier to conduct operations.
Acquiring and sustaining adequate numbers of trained and qualified maritime security and law enforcement forces to operate on waters adjacent to high population areas, or among heavy boating traffic areas, constitutes an important recommended improvement for prevention and protection. 5

6. Strategic Goals Awareness/MDA Vulnerability/Prevention Consequence
Resiliency/Recovery
** Galvanize action within and beyond the Federal Government, and effectively manage risk by focusing our efforts on those enhancements that result in the most significant improvement or reduction in risk
Apply a government-wide risk management doctrine that assesses the risk of an attack on the Marine Transportation System involving especially hazardous cargo and mitigates that risk to the fullest extent possible.
Share risk mitigation responsibilities with public and private sector stakeholders.
Mitigate risk to the Marine Transportation System while minimizing impact and costs on the private sector, recognizing that transfer of risk to other modes of the transportation system may not be in the best interests of the nation.
Implement operational risk mitigation measures at the local level; maintain consistency in those measures across geographic regions.
Prioritize situations that require physical deployment of assets to ensure efficient risk mitigation.
Achieve and maintain the highest appropriate levels of training and qualification for Coast Guard personnel and other stakeholders involved in especially hazardous cargo security.
Properly outfit personnel for successful mission execution and personal protection; require appropriate outfitting of stakeholders assisting in especially hazardous cargo security.
Leverage existing safety, security, and environmental programs in achieving this Strategy’s goals wherever feasible. 6

7. “Safety, Security and Stewardship”
QUESTIONS?