GMD and Spare Equipment Database: Perspectives and Status Eric Rollison Engineer of Reliability Assessments

About NERC: Mission  Develop and enforce reliability standards  Assess current and future reliability  Analyze system events and recommend improved practices  Encourage active participation by all stakeholders  Pursue mandatory standards in all areas of the interconnection To ensure the reliability of the North American bulk power system 2

NERC Reliability Assessments  Peak Demand Forecasts  Resource Adequacy  Transmission Adequacy  Key Issues & Emerging Trends Impacting Reliability  Regional Self-Assessment  Ad-hoc Special Assessments 3

High-Impact, Low-Frequency (HILF) Risks  “Black Swan” events Occur very infrequently, or, in some cases, have never occurred Little real-world operational experience with addressing these risks Generally have the potential to impact many assets at once Catastrophic impacts on the bulk power system and society-at-large

HILF Report  Created a common understanding of three HILF risks Coordinated Cyber/Physical Attacks EMP/GMD Pandemics  Lays the groundwork for the development of an action plan 19 Proposals for Action suggested by workshop participants

Critical Infrastructure Strategic Coordinated Action Plan NERC Technical Committee Leadership Planning Operating Critical Infrastructure Protection NERC Technical Committee Leadership Planning Operating Critical Infrastructure Protection Resources and Expertise Electricity entities Vendors Suppliers Government partners Resources and Expertise Electricity entities Vendors Suppliers Government partners Scope Approved Dec 2010 Scope Approved Sep 2010

GMD Background  Geomagnetic Disturbances is on the NERC President’s Top Priority issues for Bulk Power System Reliability – MRC, January 2011  Geomagnetic storms emanating from the sun can produce an impulsive disturbance to earth’s geomagnetic field over wide geographic regions. This field disturbance causes induced ground currents (geomagnetically induced currents or GIC)  These GIC can saturate and severely damage bulk power system equipment that may be difficult to replace, such as high voltage transformers. GMD7

SWPC G2 Alerts and Warning dissemination Midwest ISO, St. Paul NYISO WECC Reliability Coordinator, Vancouver WECC Loveland, CO SWPC product distribution

GMD Task Force Scope - Deliverables PC/OC/CIPC March  Purpose of GMD TF: … will investigate bulk power system reliability implications and develop solutions to help mitigate this risk.  Deliverables: … consider changes to current planning and operating criteria; evaluate and prioritize mitigation and restoration options; improve sector-wide spare equipment sharing programs; develop industry guidance, and provide input into NERC’s reliability Standards process.

 Chair and Vice Chair have been appointed: Chair: Donald Watkins – Bonneville Power Administration Vice Chair: Frank Koza – PJM Interconnection  Task Group Membership spans Electric Industry, US and Canadian Government Agencies, and Transformer and Relay Manufacturers Manufacturers: ABB, Siemens, GE Prolec, Efacec, Schweitzer Relays Governmental: US (DOE, DHS, State, and NOAA) and Canada (NR Can, DPS) GMDTF Status GMD10

GMDTF Deliverables 2011Deliverables 1 st Quarter Whitepaper outlining the current industry experience and capability and identifies opportunities, options and alternatives to enhanced how the industry manages GMD risks. 2 nd Quarter Whitepaper on current warning limitations, the ability of operators to take mitigating action, and areas for improvement. 3 rd Quarter Whitepaper on restoration abilities and areas for improvement. 4 th Quarter (Dependencies) 1.Whitepaper that reviews industry prevention approaches to GMD events. 2.Complete a final report incorporating the findings of the whitepapers and simulations with suggested recommendations and follow-on actions. GMD11

Critical Priorities  Transformer Vulnerability ID vulnerability, prioritize, establish characteristics (GIC vs Time) This is the primary reason for concern with GMD What is your “Live to fight the next day.” plan in an extreme storm?  “Reference Event” – given a locational 1:100y: How should we establish performance requirements? : Each system should be able to withstand the reference storm, or Should each do what is prudent in their own estimation Should it be a reference worse credible case with each entity deciding how to protect their system? (This is where we are headed)

NERC Advisory  NERC released an advisory to industry that covered immediate operational planning, operating and long-term planning recommendations to address GMD.  The Advisory was developed in partnership with NERC management, NERC’s technical committees (OC/PC/CIPC), North American Transmission Forum, and U.S. government (FERC)  Released to industry on May 10, GMD13

SEDTF Members PC/OC/CIPC March  Chair and Vice Chair have been appointed: Chair: Dale Burmester – American Transmission Company Vice Chair: Mark Westendorf – Midwest ISO  Task Group Membership (43) includes experts from across the North American Electric Industry, US Government Agencies, and Transformer Manufacturers  Content and Function Subgroups initiated to focus on SED efforts and scope milestones/activities.

Question & Answer

Background Slides

Reliability Risk Management Concepts

Monitoring Progress – The Big Picture

Advisory Actions to Consider  Increase attention to Situation Awareness and coordinate all actions with Reliability Coordinator.  Discontinue maintenance work and restore out-of- service transmission lines, wherever possible.  Increase real and reactive reserves to preserve system integrity during a strong GMD event Real-Time Operations  Consider bringing equipment online to provide additional reactive power reserves.  Decrease loading on susceptible transformers through transmission reconfiguration and generation redispatch 19

Defined Scope for Each Task Force

Inter-Task Force Coordination

1859 Storm 1921 Storm Large geomagnetic storms can occur with smaller cycles The largest geomagnetic storms on record occurred during smaller than average cycles Sunspot History

Solar minimum in December 2008 Solar Cycle 24 now well underway Cycle 24 maximum forecast - May 2013 Status of Current Solar Cycle

Impacts on Electric Power Grid CME impacts Earth’s magnetic field Fluctuations generate electric fields on Earth. These geomagnetically induced currents (GIC) can flow into power lines and transformers Leads to transformer saturation and over-heating, voltage drops, harmonic generation, transformer damage, grid collapse (Credit: K. Turnbull / J. Wild / ESA) Information Notice No : FAILURE OF ELECTRICAL POWER EQUIPMENT DUE TO SOLAR MAGNETIC DISTURBANCES Specific events occurred at the Three Mile Island, Unit 1, Hope Creek Unit 1, and Salem Unit 1 nuclear power plants. …inspection of the generator step-up transformer… severe overheating, melted low -voltage service connections in phases A and C, and insulation discoloration in phase B. On September 19, at Salem Unit 2 nuclear power plant, a second solar storm damaged the generator step-up transformer. Sep 1990

Power systems in areas of igneous rock (gray) are the most vulnerable to the effects of intense geomagnetic activity because the high resistance of the igneous rock encourages geomagnetically induced currents (GICs) to flow in the power transmission lines situated above the rock. Shown in cross-hatching are the auroral zone and the extremes that the aurora can reach during severe disturbances such as March 13, Credit: American Geophysical Union Areas vulnerable to GMD Impacts

Impacts in the SERC Region Storm Centered 50° Latitude GMD27 From FERC – ORNL Meta-R-319 report – Page Greater than a 10x 1989 Storm (>5000 nT/Minute) will introduce significant GIC into the Southeastern US and may have BPS impacts

Impacts in the SERC Region Storm Centered 45° Latitude GMD28 From FERC – ORNL Meta-R-319 report – Page N OAA East Coast GIC Measurement Station is located at Fredericksburg, VA

Q4 Q3 Q1Q2Q3Q4 Scope Approved Resources In-Place Work Underway Q4 Status – Coordinated Action Plan NERC Priority Initiatives Spare Equipment Database Define objectives Streamlined processes Performance requirements Cyber Attack Attack tree analysis GridEx Summit Cyber security monitoring Operator cyber certification Geomagnetic Disturbance Warning limitations, mitigation Restoration abilities Prevention approaches GMD workshop DHS bi-directional info sharing Severe Impact Resilience NLE New Madrid DOD case study NERC cyber exercise Milestone deliverables NERC crisis/communications plan Other Initiatives Policy-level severe impact scenario

SEDTF Scope - Deliverables PC/OC/CIPC March  Purpose of SEDTF: …provide recommendations for enhancing resilience to High Impact Low Frequency events through improved access to critical spares, and potentially other long-lead time electric transmission system equipment.  Deliverables: …recommend a uniform approach to collecting, storing, and distributing information on CONFIDENTIAL long-lead time spare equipment.

SEDTF Deliverables 2011Deliverables 1 st Quarter Whitepaper (draft) defining SED objectives and assessing options/alternatives for a centralized database; including specification of what that database might contain, criteria for participation and identification of communication features that might be incorporated. Complete Whitepaper in Q4. 2 nd Quarter Expand Whitepaper to discuss SED confidentiality, definitions for long-lead time and spare definitions, state/provincial and federal support possibilities, and appropriate ‘streamlined’ processes to access SED equipment information and communication same among entities responding to HILF events. 3 rd Quarter Expand Whitepaper to define a process for evaluating the performance and readiness to implement the SED program. 4 th Quarter 1.Complete final whitepaper/report incorporating the findings of the whitepapers. 2.SED will provide recommendations, but not build or implement technology solutions. 31