Dr. Yuan-Chieh Chang1 The determinants of academic entrepreneurial performance in Taiwan: the institutional and resource-based perspective Dr. Yuan-Chieh Chang/ 張元杰博士 Visiting scholar, Tsing Hua University, Beijing Associate Professor, Institute of Technology Management National Tsing Hua University, Hsinchu

Dr. Yuan-Chieh Chang2 Research Outline Introduction Research Gap and Objectives Conceptual background –Institutional perspective –Resource-based perspective Methods Findings Discussion & Conclusions

Dr. Yuan-Chieh Chang3 Introduction Science has emerged as an alternative engine of economic growth Universities as the engine of regional economic development Academic researchers have more freedom to exploit research outcome.

Dr. Yuan-Chieh Chang4 The Previous Research Focus on a few elite universities Ignores academic researchers who might play active role Tend to focuses on academic spin-offs Tend to be more qualitative in nature (Rothaermel et al., 2007)

Dr. Yuan-Chieh Chang5 Research Question What do strategic factors contribute better academic entrepreneurial performance? – patenting –licensing and –equity participation?

Dr. Yuan-Chieh Chang6 Institutional Perspective Pursue their goals to be congruent with societal values (Scott, 1987) IPRs devolution (Mowery & Ziedonis, 2002) Many governments are operating on much tighter fiscal policies (Henderson et al., 1998) A new regime that merges academic and commercial reward systems (Owen- Smith and Powell, 2001).

Dr. Yuan-Chieh Chang7 S&T Policy Reforms In Taiwan Science and Technology Basic Law (1999) Subsidy Principle of Management and Promotion of Academia R&D Results (2002) –Assist research institutes to establish technology transfer or liaison offices; –to subsidize academic patent application and maintenance fees

Dr. Yuan-Chieh Chang8 Items for Institutional Legitimacy ItemActivity/relationSource Government IPR office subsidyPatenting/+Henderson et al., 1998; Mowery & Nelson, 2001 Government subsidy on university-industry cooperative project Licensing/+This study Share licensing income allocated to inventor Licensing/+NSC, 2002 Industrial on leaveEquity participation/+ This study

Dr. Yuan-Chieh Chang9 Hypothesis 1: The greater the institutional legitimacy that academic patent inventors perceive, the better their entrepreneurial performance is

Dr. Yuan-Chieh Chang10 Resource-based view A broad definition of resources (Wernefelt, 1984; 1995) Organizational resources –University ’ s IPR incentive program Networking resources –Researcher ’ s relationships with other researchers, industrial partners, manufacturers, and venture capitalists Personal resources –Researcher ’ s training, experience, intelligence, and insights of the researcher

Dr. Yuan-Chieh Chang11 Items for Organizational Resources (1/2) ItemsActivity/relationSource Patent grant incentivePatenting/+Druilhe and Garnsey, 2001 Patenting costs subsidyPatenting/+Di Gregorio and Shane, 2003 IPR evaluation committeePatenting/+This study IPR agentPatenting/+This study

Dr. Yuan-Chieh Chang12 Items for Organizational Resources (2/2) ItemActivity/relationSource Licensing incentiveLicensing/+Siegel et al., 2003; O ’ Shea et al., 2007 Entrepreneurial fund Equity participation/+ Di Gregorio and Shane, 2003; Roberts, 1991 Incubator facilityEquity participation/+ Druilhe and Garnsey, 2001

Dr. Yuan-Chieh Chang13 Hypothesis 2: The greater the organizational resources that academic patent inventors could receive, the better their performance is

Dr. Yuan-Chieh Chang14 Items for Networking Resources DescriptionActivity/ Relation Source Academic research membership Patenting /+Mowery and Oxley, 1998; Murray, 2004 Industrial collaborative research Licensing/+Etzkowitz, 2003 Industrial contract research Licensing /+Owen-Smith and Powell, 2003 Manufacturer linksEquity participation/+ This study Venture capitalist linksEquity participation/+ Davila et al., 2003

Dr. Yuan-Chieh Chang15 Hypothesis 3: The greater networking resources that the academic patent inventors possess, the better their performance is

Dr. Yuan-Chieh Chang16 Items for Personal Resources DescriptionActivity/ relation Source IPR training and education Patenting/+Siegel and Phan, 2005; Smith and Parr, 2003 Technology transfer experience Licensing/+This study Entrepreneurial pro- activeness Equity participation/+ Di Gregorio and Shane, 2003 Entrepreneurial risk- taking Equity participation/+ Di Gregorio and Shane, 2003 Satisfactory level of current works Equity participation/- Di Gregorio and Shane, 2003 Level of time availabilityEquity participation/+ Lach & Schankerman, 2004; Murray, 2004

Dr. Yuan-Chieh Chang17 Hypothesis 4: The greater the personal resources that academic patent inventors possess, the better their performance is (e.g., 4a: patenting: 4b: licensing and 4c:spin-offs).

Dr. Yuan-Chieh Chang18 Patent Grant License Agreement Spin-off Equity Participation Institutional factors Resource-based factors Conceptual framework

Dr. Yuan-Chieh Chang19 recursive regression models Number of patent grants = α +β1 IPR office subsidy +β2 Patenting incentive +β3 Patent subsidy +β4 IPR evaluation expert +β5 IPR agent+β6 Academic research links +β7 IPR training & education + μ ………… (Equation 1) Number of licenses = α+β1 ΛPatent grant +β2 Royalty distribution+ β3 U-I cooperative project subsidy + β4 Licensing incentive + β5 Industrial collaborative research +β6 Industrial contract research+ β7 Technology transfer experience + η ……….. (Equation 2) –where ΛPatent grant is the predicted number of patent grants (from Equation 1) Number of spin-off equities = α+β1 ΛPatent grant +β2 ΛLicense + β3 Industrial temporary transfer + β4 Campus entrepreneurial fund + β5 Incubator facility + β6 Manufacturer links+ β7 Venture capitalist links +β8 Pro-activeness +β9 Risk-taking+ β10 Work satisfactory + β11 Time availability +ξ …… ( Equation 3) where ΛPatent grant is the predicted number of patent grants (Equation 2) and ΛLicense is the predicted number of licenses (Equation 3). The above recursive models assume that the error terms μ, η andξare all independent.

Dr. Yuan-Chieh Chang20 Research Method in-depth interview –Un-structured interview with 8 faculty members survey –474 academic researchers with patent grants are surveyed. –Nominal and self-reported scale are measured for the investigating variables –229 valid questionnaires through a three-wave postal survey (response rate is 48%)

Dr. Yuan-Chieh Chang21 Dependent Variables Number of patent grants –the first step of academia-based research commercialization (Mowery & Ziedonis, 2002) Number of licenses –the most common approach to exploiting academic research result (Powers and McDougall, 2005) Equity participation of spin-off –The patent inventors retain their academic positions and share equity ownership with industrial partners

Dr. Yuan-Chieh Chang22 Independent Variables Institutional legitimacy: IPR office subsidy, licensing income distribution, U-I cooperative project subsidy, and industrial temporary transfer Organizational resources: patenting incentive, patenting subsidy, IPR evaluation committee, IPR agent, licensing incentive, entrepreneurial fund, and incubator facility Networking resources: academic research links, industrial research links, manufacturer links, and venture capitalist links Personal resources: IPR training & education, technology transfer experience, entrepreneurial attributes, work satisfaction, and time availability

Dr. Yuan-Chieh Chang23 Reliabilities for Variables VariablesCronbach ’ s alpha Institutional legitimacy0.87 Organizational resources 0.85 Networking resources0.84 Personal resources0.83

Dr. Yuan-Chieh Chang24 Nature of respondents Types of academic scientists (N) Number of Patent Grant (Mean) Number of License (Mean) Equity number of Spin-off * (Mean, NT$) Professor (135) 557 (1.38) 178 (0.44) 305,000 (753.09) Associate professor (67) 205 (1.02) 46 (0.23) 8,000 (39.80) Assistant professor (22) 38 (0.58) 2 (0.03) 0 (0) Instructor (3) 2 (0.22) 0 (0) 0 (0) Others (2) 5 (0.83) 1 (0.17) 0 (0) Total (229) 807 (1.17) 227 (0.33) 313,000 (455.60)

Dr. Yuan-Chieh Chang25 ItemsPatent grant Institutional legitimacy IPR office subsidy0.197**(0.140) Organizational resources Patenting incentive0.138*(0.092) Patenting subsidy0.048(0.070) IPR evaluation committee0.098*(0.092) IPR agent0.060(0.151) Networking resources Academic research links0.173**(0.088) Personal resources IPR training and education0.101*(0.152) LR χ249.53** Log-likelihood Pseudo R Findings

Dr. Yuan-Chieh Chang26 ItemsLicense number Λ Patent grant 0.256**(0.719) Institutional legitimacy License income distribution (0.256) U-I cooperative project subsidy0.158*(0.266) Organizational resources Licensing incentive0.009(0.210) Networking resources Industrial collaborative research0.257**(0.204) Industrial contract research0.346***(0.191) Personal resources Technology transfer experience0.410***(0.046) LR χ ** Log-likelihood Pseudo R

ItemsSpin-off equity number Λ Patent grant0.290*(2.081) Λ License0.313**(0.833) Institutional legitimacy Industrial temporary transfer0.137(0.432) Organizational resources Campus entrepreneurial fund0.388*(0.357) Incubator facility (0.567) Networking resources Manufacturer links0.106(0.472) Venture capitalist links0.177(0.693) Personal resources Pro-activeness0.314**(0.593) Risk taking0.222*(0.607) Work satisfactory-0.136(0.855) Time availability0.455**(0.533) LR χ254.13** Log-likelihood Pseudo R

Dr. Yuan-Chieh Chang28 ItemDescriptionResult Hypo. 1aInstitutional & PatentingSupported Hypo. 1bInstitutional & LicensingSupported Hypo. 1cInstitutional & Spin-off EquityReject Hypo. 2aOrg. resource & PatentingSupported Hypo. 2bOrg. resource & LicensingReject Hypo. 2cOrg. resource & Spin-off EquitySupported Hypo. 3aNetwork res. & PatentingSupported Hypo. 3bNetwork res. & LicensingSupported Hypo. 3cNetwork res. & Spin-off EquityReject Hypo. 4aPersonal res. & PatentingSupported Hypo. 4bPersonal res. & LicensingSupported Hypo. 4cPersonal res. & Spin-off EquitySupported

Dr. Yuan-Chieh Chang29 Take-away points for patenting IPR infrastructure –Most inventors tend to rely on the assistance of the IPR offices to file patent application. Org ’ al resources: –The organizational incentive programs might not be necessary foster performance of academic patenting. Network resource: –Strong research lab teamwork in terms of information collecting and brainstorming substantially enlarges the robustness of the research discoveries (Timmons, 1999). Prior experiences: –IPR training and education reflects the willingness and capability of a researcher to realize their research potentials.

Dr. Yuan-Chieh Chang30 Institutional factors: –The higher share (e.g., 80%) of licensing income distributed to the academic inventors and U-I cooperative project subsidy fosters academic licensing performance Network resources: –Industry-academia research links lead academic research results to be closer to industrial needs (Jensen et al., 2003; Zucker et al., 1998). Personal resources: –The transfer experience decreases transaction costs and makes exchange mechanisms to transfer university knowledge possible. Take-away points for licensing

Dr. Yuan-Chieh Chang31 Institutional factors –Entrepreneurial fund and incubator facility were suggested as the important impetus in fostering equity participation of academic spin-off (Di Gregorio & Shane, 2003). Personal resources –pro-activeness and risk-taking were significant in fostering equity participation of academic spin-off (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000) –Time availability for academic researchers was suggested as one of the determinants Take-away points for spin-offs

Dr. Yuan-Chieh Chang32 Thank you for your attention! Dr. Yuan-Chieh Chang