66 th Annual Georgia Tech Protective Relaying Conference Gerry Cauley, President and CEO, NERC April 26, 2012

2RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY NERC Mission The North American Electric Reliability Corporation’s (NERC) mission is to ensure the reliability of the North American bulk power system. Florida Reliability Coordinating Council Midwest Reliability Organization Northeast Power Coordinating Council ReliabilityFirst Corporation SERC Reliability Corporation Southwest Power Pool, Inc. Texas Regional Entity Western Electricity Coordinating Council

3RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY Top Priority Reliability Issues Misoperations of relay protection and control systems Human errors by field personnel Ambiguous or incomplete voice communications Right-of-way maintenance Changing resource mix Integration of new technologies Preparedness for high impact, low frequency events Non-traditional threats via cyber security vulnerabilities NERC President’s Top Priority Issues for Bulk Power System Reliability, at

4RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY Top Priority Reliability Issues Misoperations of relay protection and control systems Human errors by field personnel Ambiguous or incomplete voice communications Right-of-way maintenance Changing resource mix Integration of new technologies Preparedness for high impact, low frequency events Non-traditional threats via cyber security vulnerabilities NERC President’s Top Priority Issues for Bulk Power System Reliability, at

5RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY Reliability Equipment Reliability Human Performance Human Interaction with Equipment (coupled w/Automation)

6RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY Misoperation Categories (2011 Q2-Q3) Misoperation Count Misoperation Category

7RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY Misoperation Causes (2011 Q2-Q3) Misoperation Count Misoperation Cause

8RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY Misoperation Relay Technology (2011 Q2-Q3) Misoperation count Misoperations by Relay Technology (only Relay Failure/Malfunction Cause)

9RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY Misoperation count Misoperations by Relay Technology (only incorrect Settings/Logic/Design Error Cause) Misoperation Relay Technology (2011 Q2-Q3)

10RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY Mental Model of the System Apparent simplicity with hidden complexity  Fitting your understanding into the system constraints (hardware and software)  Different manufacturers, diverse applications and tools, requires different approaches Design for a person to use, set and operate

11RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY Malcolm K. SparrowJohn F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University Solving Problems: Untying the Knot

12RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY Solving Important Problems Increase of certain behaviors  Discussion of Risk Control  Maintain regulatory objectivity  Examine the nature of problems  Cross-functional problem solving  Identify creative data-driven solutions Traditional Model Expert Model Measured Results Problem Solving Risk Based Priorities Enforcement ComplianceStandards

13RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY NERC and the ERO Solve Problems Category 1 - Grow-ins Zero during 2011 Category 2 – Fall-ins Zero during 2011 Category 3 – Fall-ins One outage caused by vegetation falling into lines from outside the right-of-way was reported during the 4th quarter 2011.

14RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY Lessons Learned – Published 2011 Lessons Learned Brief Description Generator Plant Gas Supply Event #1 (Minimum Gas Pressure Trip Settings) Generator Plant Gas Supply Event #2 (Communications Protocols) Area Control Error Event Relay Protection and Coordination for Close-in Faults RTU to SCADA Path Vulnerabilities Power Line Carrier Relaying Zone 3 Relay Misoperation Wave Trap Mounting Issue AGC Application Freeze Sub-Synchronous Interaction between Series-compensated Transmission Lines Insulator Coating Protective Relay Field Revisions

15RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY Lessons Learned Brief Description Backup Control Center Operation and Training Special Protection Systems Maintenance Precautions Protection Relaying – Out of date prints Transmission Relaying –Coupling Capacitor Voltage Transformer Failure Indications for Operations Transmission Relaying – Removed Unused Components Transmission Line Splice Failure Generating Unit Temperature Design Parameters and Extreme Winter Conditions Adequate Maintenance and Inspection of Generator Freeze Protection Plant Instrument and Sensing Equipment Freezing Due to Heat Trace and Insulation Failures Plant Fuel Switching and Cold Weather Lessons Learned – Published 2011

16RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY Lessons Learned – Published 2012 Lessons Learned Brief Description Plant Onsite Material and Personnel Needed for a Winter Weather Event Plant Operator Training to Prepare for a Winter Weather Event Transmission Facilities and Winter Weather Operations DC Supply and AC Transients Saturated Bus Auxiliary Current Transformer causes Bus Differential Operations during Line Fault Rotational Load Shed

17RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY Cause Code Assignment Process (CCAP) A1 Design/Engineering Problem A2 Equipment/Material Problem A3 Individual Human Performance LTA A4 Management Problem A5 Communication LTA A6 Training Deficiency A7 Other Problem

18RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY A3 - Human Performance Cause Code Assignment Process (CCAP) A1 Design/Engineering Problem A2 Equipment/Material Problem A3 Individual Human Performance  B1 SKILL BASED ERROR  B2 RULE BASED ERROR  B3 KNOWLEDGE BASED ERROR  B4 WORK PRACTICES A4 Management Problem A5 Communication LTA A6 Training Deficiency A7 Other Problem

19RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY A3 - Human Performance Cause Code Assignment Process (CCAP) A3 Individual Human Performance  B1 SKILL BASED ERROR o C01 Check of work LTA o C02 Step was omitted due to distraction o C03 Incorrect performance due to mental lapse o C04 Infrequently performed steps were performed incorrectly o C05 Delay in time caused LTA actions o C06 Wrong action selected based on similarity with other actions o C07 Omission / repeating of steps due to assumptions for completion  B2 RULE BASED ERROR  B3 KNOWLEDGE BASED ERROR  B4 WORK PRACTICES

20RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY NERC Alert-Advisory Configuration Control Practices- Advised Industry of events resulting from human performance errors during protection system maintenance. Event examples of inadequate control procedures: Relay technician follow proper procedure to return protection system to normal state resulting in remote trip. Construction team failed to use latest construction document resulting in incorrect calibration of equipment. Relay technician leaves work site. Returns to resume work but did so at wrong cabinet and trips substation. Technician trips a transformer due opening a wrong current shorting switch.

21RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY The Way Ahead Relays need to be designed understanding the human interface needs Relays require checks and supports for understanding, installing, operating and maintaining Risk based approach

22RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY Questions and Answers

23RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY NERC CCAP