GREECE AND TURKEY Understanding the Past, Anticipating the Future Panayotis J. Tsakonas University of the Aegean

A threatened Greece attempts to balance a threatening Turkey From the restoration of Greek democracy in 1974 onwards the Greek political discourse has been dominated by the strong belief – which has also been reflected in a remarkable continuity of the views of all successive Greek governments – that Turkey constitutes the gravest external threat to Greece’s (even Hellenism’s) survival or, in the least, a major security concern Successive Greek administrations have embarked since the mid-1970s upon a series of balancing strategies whose basic element has been deterrence of the perceived Turkish threat. For balancing threats to its security, Greece has traditionally relied on a combination of ‘internal’ (strong Armed Forces) and ‘external balancing’ (participation in all West European security and political organizations). European Union and NATO allies were viewed as ‘security-providing’ hegemons or as levers of pressure to deter Turkey from potential adventures in the Aegean. Especially, the EU was for a lengthy period of time viewed as a precious instrument of a [state] ‘strategy of conditional sanctions’ with regard to Turkey’s European vocation or a strategy of ‘reinforcement by punishment’

Socialization: What is it? Socialization is the process by which new members come to adopt a society’s preferred ways of behaving One of the most common and large-scale processes of international socialization began after the end of the Cold War when the Western community of states embarked – through its main international organizations, i.e. the European Union and NATO – on the socialization of the former Communist states.

Socialization in IR Theory I REALISM Socialization is the process of reconciling states’ (especially revolutionary states’) individual aspirations to generally accepted standards The construction of a stable international order is dependent upon the successful linkage of state interests to international legitimizing principles NEOLIBERALISM The transnational transmission of ideas matters Liberal variables define the conditions under which high rates of communication and transaction alter state behavior.

Socialization in IR Theory II . CONSTRUCTIVISM International institutions transmit --through the ‘process of socialization’-- their norms, rules, beliefs and standards of appropriate behavior (and the subsequent internalization of the institutions’ rules and norms) into their members as well as to prospective member-states. International institutions cannot simply affect states’ behavior or strategies; they can succeed in changing states’ preferences and even their identities by promoting a ‘common/collective security identity’

EU: An example of effective international socialization by an institution The socialization strategy of the European Union = ‘intergovernmental reinforcement’ The EU offers the government of a target state positive incentives – rewards such as financial assistance or institutional ties/membership – on the condition that the state adopts and complies with the EU’s norms, namely the basic liberal norms of human rights and democracy. The high material incentive of membership is what distinguishes the socialization activity of the EU from that of other European organizations such as the OSCE or the Council of Europe

The mechanisms institutions use ‘Logic of Appropriateness’ (do what is deemed appropriate) ‘Cognitive Mechanism’ [teach domestic actors what is deemed appropriate in a given situation] ‘Normative Mechanism’ [seek to convince states of their norms] ‘Logic of Consequentiality’ (based on a cost/benefit analysis actors choose the action that maximizes their individual utility) ‘Rhetorical Mechanism’ [institutions use social-psychological rewards for compliance and punishment for non-compliance] ‘Bargaining Mechanism’ [institutions use material threats and promises either directly to coerce a state to follow its norms or indirectly to alter the domestic balance of power in favor of actors that support its norms]

Can a state pursue socialization strategies? COMMON KNOWLEDGE International socialization is a strategy which is being developed by international institutions with the aim to socialize states to international norms and rules. NEW KNOWLEDGE: WHAT GREECE’S POLICY TOWARDS TURKEY SUGGESTS? States can also pursue socialization strategies --through the use of international institutions-- with the aim to better balancing other more threatening states and/or to transform their behavior

The EU Summit in Helsinki Greece lifts its veto and the EU grants Turkey the official status of a candidate state. Progress on Turkey’s candidacy/membership in the EU was linked to the resolution of its border disputes with an EU member. Thus, the –peaceful-- resolution of outstanding border disputes was established as a community principle as it was made clear to Turkey (as well as to the EU member, Greece) that they have four years –until the end of 2004—to resolve their conflict. This in turn meant that for the first time in the history of the two states’ conflict, there was a clear reference to a particular time- frame (2004 was identified as the deadline) and to the final forum and/or mechanism the two states should use for resolving/ending their long-standing conflict, namely the International Court of Justice in The Hague.

Making the EU act as a ‘framework’ and as an ‘active player’ Greece’s ‘socialization strategy’ viewed the EU as the factor which can act: as a framework that can eliminate the bases of its long-standing conflict with a threatening neighbor in the long-run by ‘socializing’ Turkey into the EU institutional and normative environment through democratization and gradual integration as an active player which can impact on border conflicts through direct and indirect ways. Thus the European Union appears as a [necessary] condition that can have a direct (‘compulsory’ and/or ‘connective’) as well as an indirect (‘enabling’ and/or ‘constructive’) impact on the disputants’ – especially on Turkey’s – strategies towards cooperation and, by implication, on the positive transformation of the two states’ conflict.

The goals Greece’s socialization strategy aimed at achieving 1 By viewing the EU as a precious instrument to and as an indispensable means towards goals Greece aimed: at borrowing the ‘socialization power’ component of the EU, namely the high degree of its normative persuasion (the EU appears as the best available forum for enmeshing Turkey into its rule-based, institutionalized, and normative context, by setting conditions and placing prerequisites) at using the EU to monitor and sanction compliance of Turkey (by putting Turkey under the constant screening and monitoring process of certain EU mechanisms and procedures, allowing thus for certain structural changes (i.e., democratization) to take place in Turkey in order for the European acquis to be fully endorsed at exercising a certain amount of control over Turkey –which was also an aspiring member of the EU at imposing obligations on Turkey such as the prohibition of certain modes of behavior –both internally and externally– that do not comply with the rules, norms and standards of the EU, of which it seeks to become a member

The goals Greece’s socialization strategy aimed at achieving 2 Link Turkey’s strong incentive for closer relations and stronger institutional ties with –and eventual membership in– the EU with particular conditions, which would facilitate the promotion and realization of Greece’s interests These conditions are not, however, part of a strategy of ‘conditional sanctions’ vis-à- vis Turkey, i.e. a strategy of hindering closer institutional ties between Turkey and the EU unless certain conditions are first met, but part of a strategy of ‘conditional rewards’, i.e. one that gives Turkey material rewards in return for its compliance with the norms and standards of the EU Engage Turkey in a short, medium and long-term process which would better serve Greece’s balancing efforts, i.e. by passing part of the buck Greece was traditionally obliged to pay to balance Turkey to Turkey’s fulfilment of particular European rules and conditions. Greece’s ‘socialization strategy’ was in fact a policy of ‘balancing engagement’ of Turkey, which aimed to preserve the hope inherent in engagement policy while deterring Turkey from becoming hostile.

EU and Greece’s socialization mechanisms The main goals Greece’s active socialization strategy had achieved at the EU level concerned Greece’s ability to ensure and further enhance the monitoring of Turkey’s behaviour both internally (i.e. democratization) and externally (towards Greece and Cyprus) by EU mechanisms Institutional (EU) Mechanisms The European Commission had published since 1998 annual ‘Progress Reports’ assessing ‘progress’ (or lack thereof) in Turkey’s alignment with EU requirements Beginning in 2001, the EU had also published Accession Partnership Documents pinpointing the specific short and medium-term recommendations that Turkey should follow in its attempt to meet the criteria. Since the Helsinki summit in 1999, the EU Councils had also expressed their views every six months. The European Parliament had also voiced its views, through regular reports, on Turkey’s progress towards meeting European norms and conditions, especially in regard to respect of human rights and the rule of law State (Greece’s) Mechanisms Establishment of a Joint Task Force for facilitating Turkey’s alignment with the EU acquis

“The ‘success of socialization depends on the socializee’s domestic Assessing the effectiveness of EU and Greece’s socialization strategies “The ‘success of socialization depends on the socializee’s domestic environment/politics and its effect on its foreign policy style and substance”. Successful socialization is expected to result in some level of behavioural change on the part of the socializee (i.e. Turkey) vis-à-vis the socializers (i.e. Greece and EU) Turkey’s EU path: the period 2001-2004 has been recorded as ‘the golden years of the EU accession process’.

Assessing institutional effects Turkey’s EU path: the period 2001-2004 has been recorded as ‘the golden years of the EU accession process’. The normative and internalization effects of the EU on Turkey took place on a series of levels: At the ‘domestic institutions’ level, from 2001 to 2004 various political reform packages were adopted in order to fulfil the Copenhagen political criteria, while some big steps were also taken for the regulation of the constitutional role of the National Security Council, and the fulfilment of certain economic and legal conditions. At the elite level, the civil-military elite, painfully but steadily entered a process of ‘de-securitization’. One may at this point stress the change in Turkey’s elite interests over the Cyprus issue due to EU membership incentive and the EU’s normative impact on Turkey’s political elite. Most importantly, at the societal level, Turkey’s EU membership candidacy has empowered the domestic actors in both Greece and Turkey who were in favor of promoting Greek-Turkish cooperation. After 1999 a pro-EU coalition emerged which gradually and steadily gained ground over another vocal “anti-EU” coalition. Overall, these changes have had an apparent impact on the process, style and content of Turkey’s foreign policy, leading thus towards a more rationalized and multilateralist stance on foreign policy issues.

Types of Greece’s socialization strategy Active socialization It came into existence when Greece realised that a more constructive use of Turkey’s European vocation would better serve its balancing efforts vis-à-vis the Turkish threat while it would also provide a way-out of the long-standing Greek- Turkish rivalry. It counts on the dual ability of the EU to act both as a framework and as an active player. It includes the compromise costs a final agreement with Turkey may entail. Passive Socialization It calls for the emancipation of Greece’s strategy from the commitments entailed by the EU’s active role, namely the responsibility of Greece to come to a compromise solution with Turkey within a particular time-frame. It attempts to allow the EU factor to only act as a framework that, by contributing to the Europeanization of Turkey en route to Brussels, would make the future resolution of the Greek-Turkish conflict more favorable to Greece’s interests

What do ‘active’ and ‘passive’ socialization strategy have in common? They both aim at the –smooth or painful-- integration of Turkey into the binding commitments of the EU’s strategy of ‘intergovernmental reinforcement’ and in joining the short, medium and long term benefits of Turkey’s compliance with the EU norms and standards What distinguishes the two strategies? It the ‘active’ vis-à-vis the ‘passive’ dealing of the EU’s potential to become the catalyst for the resolution of the long-standing dispute between the threatened (Greece) and the threatening state (Turkey)

Change in Greece’s strategy: From ‘active’ to ‘passive socialization’ The Karamanlis government, which emerged from the parliamentary elections in March 2004, opted for a transference of the resolution of the Greek-Turkish dispute to the future. At the December 2004 EU Summit in Brussels, the EU decided –obviously with Greece’s concession—that the Helsinki timetable urging the two countries to solve their bilateral differences or else agree, by December 2004, to refer them to ICJ, should be withdrawn. Turkey –in addition to the Copenhagen criteria—was only asked by the EU to commit to good neighborly relations and resolve any outstanding border disputes in conformity with the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter, including if necessary jurisdiction of the ICJ. Progress on Turkey’s membership would no longer be linked to the resolution of its dispute with Greece, with an obvious decrease on both disputants’, especially Turkey’s, incentives to find a way of resolving their conflict. A resolution of the Greek-Turkish conflict should, for the immediate future, be sought outside the EU context and be achieved sometime in the distant future by a hesitant Greece and a –hopefully--increasingly Europeanized Turkey en route to Brussels.  

What impact on the EU’s socialization ability? Change in Greece’s socialization strategy had negative consequences for the ability of the EU to act as ‘an active player’ (i.e. to constructively intervene and contribute to the resolution of the Greek-Turkish conflict). EU’s ability to be viewed as ‘a framework’ with potential positive effects in the long-run was also affected by a series of negative trends (a) The EU-Turkey relationship: EU Commission added new requirements of “integration capacity” = enhanced Turkey’s suspicions of the EU’s good faith Rise of ‘turko-sceptic’ governments in the engine-countries of the EU (Germany, France) and suspicion of EU citizens towards the enlargement project has turned into clear opposition to Turkey’s accession The freezing of Turkey’s accession process suggests a rekindling of the advancement of a ‘special or privileged partnership’ between EU and Turkey (see EU’s recent attempts to develop a ‘positive agenda’ for Turkey) (b) Within Turkey: Set-backs in the reform process –already evident since 2005 the Turkish public support for EU membership at an all-time low (about 37%) since the beginning of the accession negotiation (73%) (c) In Turkey’s foreign policy: Less EU, more Middle East-oriented  

Incentives/Prospects Constraints Incentives/Prospects Continuity of the status of ‘Re- bilateralized’ relations between Greece and Turkey The prospects for a resolution of the Greek-Turkish dispute are dim The freezing of Turkey’s accession process suggests a rekindling of the advancement of a ‘special or privileged partnership’ between EU and Turkey (see EU’s recent attempts to develop a ‘positive agenda’ for Turkey) Greece’s economic crisis affects its credibility as well as its ability to take initiatives There is a direct reflection and linkage between Turkey’s economic development and its outward-looking and dynamic foreign policy, especially in regard to its immediate region, i.e. the Middle East Since 2009 bilateral relations are strengthened –especially in terms of economic cooperation and trust building--through the establishment of the Greek-Turkish Council of Cooperation, the signing of more than 20 agreements on various domains of ‘low-politics’ issues, CBMS etc. On ‘high-politics’ issues the Greek side had revitalized the procedure of the ‘Exploratory Talks’