1 Atomic Routing Games on Maximum Congestion Costas Busch Department of Computer Science Louisiana State University Collaborators: Rajgopal Kannan, LSU Malik Magdon-Ismail, RPI
2 Introduction Price of Stability Price of Anarchy Outline of Talk Bicriteria Game
3 Network Routing Each player corresponds to a pair of source-destination Objective is to select paths with small cost
4 Main objective of each player is to minimize congestion: minimize maximum utilized edge
5 A player may selfishly choose an alternative path that minimizes congestion Congestion Games:
6 Player cost function for routing : Congestion of selected path Social cost function for routing : Largest player cost
We are interested in Nash Equilibriums where every player is locally optimal Metrics of equilibrium quality: Price of StabilityPrice of Anarchy is optimal coordinated routing with smallest social cost
8 Results: Price of Stability is 1 Price of Anarchy is Maximum allowed path length
9 Introduction Price of Stability Price of Anarchy Outline of Talk Bicriteria Game
10 We show: QoR games have Nash Equilibriums (we define a potential function) The price of stability is 1
11 number of players with cost Routing Vector
12 Routing Vectors are ordered lexicographically = = == < <= =
If player performs a greedy move transforming routing to then: 13 Lemma: Proof Idea: Show that the greedy move gives a lower order routing vector
14 Player Cost Before greedy move: After greedy move: Since player cost decreases:
15 Before greedy move player was counted here After greedy move player is counted here
16 > == No change Definite Decrease possible decrease possible increase or decrease Possible increase > END OF PROOF IDEA
17 Existence of Nash Equilibriums Greedy moves give lower order routings Eventually a local minimum for every player is reached which is a Nash Equilibrium
18 Price of Stability Lowest order routing : Is a Nash Equilibrium Achieves optimal social cost
19 Introduction Price of Stability Price of Anarchy Outline of Talk Bicriteria Game
20 We show for any restricted QoR game: Price of Anarchy =
Path of player 21 Consider an arbitrary Nash Equilibrium edge maximum congestion in path
must have an edge with congestion Optimal path of player 22 In optimal routing : Since otherwise:
23 In Nash Equilibrium social cost is:
24 Edges in optimal paths of
25
26 Edges in optimal paths of
27
28 In a similar way we can define:
29 We obtain sequences: There exist subsequence: Where: and
30 Maximum edge utilization Minimum edge utilization Maximum path length Known relations
31 Worst Case Scenario:
32 Introduction Price of Stability Price of Anarchy Outline of Talk Bicriteria Game
33 We consider Quality of Routing (QoR) congestion games where the paths are partitioned into routing classes: With service costs: Only paths in same routing class can cause congestion to each other
34 An example: We can have routing classes Each routing class contains paths with length in range Service cost: Each routing class uses a different wireless frequency channel
35 Player cost function for routing : Congestion of selected path Cost of respective routing class
36 Social cost function for routing : Largest player cost
37 Results: Price of Stability is 1 Price of Anarchy is
38 We consider restricted QoR games For any path : Path lengthService Cost of path
39 We show for any restricted QoR game: Price of Anarchy =
Path of player 40 Consider an arbitrary Nash Equilibrium edge maximum congestion in path
must have an edge with congestion Optimal path of player 41 In optimal routing : Since otherwise:
42 In Nash Equilibrium:
43 Edges in optimal paths of
44
45 Edges in optimal paths of
46
47 In a similar way we can define:
48 We obtain sequences: There exist subsequence: Where: and
49 Maximum edge utilization Minimum edge utilization Maximum path length Known relations
50 We have: By considering class service costs, we obtain: