Milorad Papic (RPEWG Chair) Salt Lake City, February 5, 2014 RPEWG Report RS Meeting Milorad Papic (RPEWG Chair) Salt Lake City, February 5, 2014

OUTLINE An Update on NERC TADS Activities An Update on 2013 WECC SOTI Report RPEWG Activities (Discussion)

1. TADSWG Meeting in Atlanta, January 28-30, 2014 The TADSWG reviewed and discussed the ‘Unknown’ cause code outages as stated in one of the key findings of the 2013 State of Reliability (SoR) report. Information presented to the TADSWG indicate that the proportion of outages with ‘Unknown’ cause is declining (i.e. an improving trend). Through ongoing efforts of the TADSWG in providing clarification to reporting questions from the reporting entities it is expected that this improving trend will continue. Also, the TADSWG recommended that NERC staff, along with Regional Entities identify events with a high concentration of “Unknown” outages and entities reporting a high proportion of “Unknown” outages and work with these cases and entities individually to resolve any outage coding issues.

1. TADSWG Meeting in Atlanta, January 28-30, 2014 Non-Automatic outage data collection initiated in 2010 as part of TADS Phase II implementation was reviewed and discussed in light of the “sunset provision”. A 5-year sunset clause built into the TADS Phase II implementation that established an end to the non-automatic outage data collection at the end of 2014 unless benefits of the collection of these data can be demonstrated. Review and discussion on this subject will continue through 2014 and we plan to finalize the decision regarding the collection of the non-automatic outage data in the August 2014 meeting.

1. TADSWG Meeting in Atlanta, January 28-30, 2014 The TADSWG discussed the various controls presently in place to address the quality of TADS data being collected. NERC staff will review past Change Orders submitted to OATI (the webTADS vendor) and consolidate the various data quality related controls specified within them and consult with OATI to confirm their implementation status. TADS training also serves as a data quality control. At the next meeting, the TADSWG will review available training records provided by NERC staff and determine the extent to which these can be used to monitor effectiveness of the TADS training.

1. TADSWG Meeting in Atlanta, January 28-30, 2014 The TADSWG continue to review and address questions from reporting entities through the TADScomments@nerc.net email box and other event scenarios that are presented to the TADSWG. A common theme has been uncertainty around sustained cause codes (SCC). The TADSWG continued discussion on this subject to clarify its purpose and intent. The focus of the discussion was on the “weather>weather” example which had been discussed in several previous meetings. The TADSWG decided to revise an existing example scenario coding in the manual from ICC: Weather; SCC: Weather to ICC: Weather; SCC: Equipment Failure. This indicates that the initiating cause for the outage was due to adverse weather conditions and the duration of the outage was substantially due to the time required for the repair of resulting equipment failure. This clarification will be communicated as part of the next round of TADS training scheduled for the fall of 2014.  

1. NERC ACSETF Survey   As recommended in the 2012 State of Reliability report, additional data was gathered on equipment failure, including secondary cause codes and the type of equipment failure experienced. Resulting analysis found that Failed AC Substation Equipment was statistically significant and positively correlated to 2008–2012 automatic transmission outage severity. Among all cause codes, Failed AC Substation Equipment was also the second largest contributor to the 2012 transmission severity, with relative risk the second highest, excluding Weather and Unknown initiating causes. Analysis of the transmission outage and disturbance event information shows that circuit breakers are the most common type of ac substation equipment failure. Please refer to the 2013 State of Reliability report key finding 5 To further refine results from 2012 SOR Report, The NERC AC Substation Equipment Task Force (ACSETF) has endorsed conducting a survey to provide additional insight into Automatic Outages due to AC substation equipment failure. This survey is intended for TADS reporting TOs. By February 14, 2014, please complete the attached voluntary survey (Entry Form A). Please return your completed surveys to naved.khan@nerc.net .

1. NERC SOR 2014 Report Draft outline and chapter assignments: Chapter 1 - Key Findings and Conclusions – Howard & Naved Chapter 2 – Daily Performance Severity Risk Assessment – Naved & Svetlana (if statistical analysis needed) Chapter 3 – Risk Issue Identification – Svetlana, Andy & Howard Response to Key finding 5 – Naved Response to Key finding 6 – Elsa & Andy Chapter 4 – Reliability Indicator Trends – Naved, Svetlana, Matthew, Elsa Chapter 5 – Event Analysis – RRM, Elsa & Matthew Chapter 6 – Spare Equipment Database – Naved

1. NERC SOR 2014 Report Risk Issue Identification - Statistical Study based on 5-year TADS Data with Duration (presentation on new findings from a study is available) 2013 State of Reliability Key Findings 4: Protection System Misoperations are a Significant Contributor to Disturbance Events and Automatic Transmission Outage Severity Key Findings 5: AC Substation Equipment Failures are a Second Significant Contributor to Disturbance Events and Automatic Transmission Outage Severity Key Findings 6: Automatic Transmission Events with Unknown Cause Necessitate Analysis

1. Integrated Risk Assessment Approach – Severity Risk Index

1. Transmission Severity

2. An Update on WECC SCOTI Report Build upon NERC efforts related to reliability concepts and risk assessment (SOR Reports). The 2013 WECC State of the Interconnection (SCOTI) report will cover the evaluation of the overall bulk power system reliability risk. The main goal is to quantify performance, highlight areas for improvement as well as reinforce and measure success in controlling various reliability risks. What to include from TRD Outage Data and how RPEWG might help?

Questions