China and the Arctic Elizabeth Wishnick, Professor of Political Science, Montclair State University, Senior Research Scholar, WEAI, Columbia University

A “Near-Arctic” State? ROC signs Svalbard Treaty (1925) PRC participates in Arctic Science Committee (1996) Builds a research station in Svalbard (2003) Completes First Northern Sea Route voyage (2012) Attains Arctic Council Observer status (2013) Xi Jinping calls China a “polar great power” (2014) Completes First Northwest Passage voyage (2017)

Key Documents on China’s Arctic Policy Article 32 of the July 1, 2015 National Security Law http://eng.mod.gov.cn/publications/2017-03/03/content_4774229.htm June 20, 2017 Vision for Maritime Cooperation under the Belt and Road http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-06/20/c_136380414.htm Agreement with Russia on July 4, 2017 to create Polar Silk Road http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-07/04/c_136417241.htm White Paper on the Arctic, January 26, 2018 http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2018/01/26/content_281476026660336.htm

Why the Arctic? Status: participation asserts China’s global reach and ensures its economic and energy security Presence: physical installations (research, investments in energy and infrastructure) justify its status as a “near-Arctic” state; effort to expand presence in small steps Voice: as the Arctic ice diminishes, China wants to be a player in regional governance and participant in (re)writing the rules Leverage: investments are a means of influencing Arctic Council members to support China’s positions and growing role in the Arctic Wedge tactics: effort to take advantage of political differences within the region and within individual countries (EU vs. non-EU, NATO vs. non-NATO, Greenland in Denmark, energy investment in Alaska and tariffs issue)

Impact on the Arctic Sovereignty Issues: Arctic Council observers must respect sovereignty but China says rights of observers must be respected. Economic: China has potential to devote huge resources through Belt and Road Initiative and domestic R&D but resource markets and local politics are a constraint. Environmental: Climate change stated rationale for Chinese involvement but China’s approach to resource development has been detrimental; China likely to press for expanding fishing rights as ice recedes. Political Culture: Arctic lacks a security organization to address emerging political-military threats; outsiders bring new perspectives but also challenge existing governance norms.

Military Implications Short-term Impact: Icebreaker technology (first real icebreaker to be built with Finnish cooperation in 2019; nuclear-powered icebreaker to be commissioned) Mapping Arctic waters Expanding BeiDou satellite ground stations and digital infrastructure Cooperation with Russia in Arctic navigation Port of call visits to Arctic states and freedom of navigation exercises Future Considerations: Sino-Russian naval exercises in the Arctic Development of nuclear-powered submarines for Arctic missions Security consequences of investments in Arctic ports

Thank you! ew124@columbia.edu The Sino-Russian Partnership in the Arctic Asia Dialogue 2018 http://theasiadialogue.com/2018/03/15/sino-russian-partnership-in-the-arctic/ China’s Interests and Goals in the Arctic, US Army War College 2017 https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1347