By “Phumie” Phumelele Nomtshongwana Engineering Technician (ATNS)

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Presentation transcript:

“The value of measuring Technical Support contribution to Aviation Safety” By “Phumie” Phumelele Nomtshongwana Engineering Technician (ATNS) © 2015-2016 Nomtshongwana Phumelele

AFRICAN PROVERB “For as long as the Lion’s story is told by the Hunters, the real story might never be known! ! !”

To prevent accidents and preserve life. For WHO? AVIATION SAFETY: For WHAT? To prevent accidents and preserve life. For WHO? Aircrafts? Personnel: Flight crew; Passengers; Ground Staff; Aircraft Maintenance Technician/Engineers; …? Air Navigation Service Provider (ANSP): ATC? Technical Support? WHY?

Quotes: Lord Kelvin "If you cannot measure it, you cannot improve it.“ “When you can measure what you are speaking about, and express it in numbers, you know something about it, when you cannot express it in numbers, your knowledge is of a meagre and unsatisfactory kind; it may be the beginning of knowledge, but you have scarcely, in your thoughts advanced to the stage of science, whatever the matter may be.” "If you cannot measure it, you cannot improve it.“ "To measure is to know.“

What is measured: Availability Maintainability Reliability Availability Maintainability Availability, in essence, is a simple function of Reliability and Maintainability Derived from safety strategies

AT WHAT COST TO AVIATION SAFETY? Availability: The performance and effectiveness of Systems (Equipment) is measured solely on achieved Availability (Aa) A= T[Uptime] T Uptime +T[Downtime] Required Average = 99.80% (Achieved!) = (17 Hours down/year) Max = 99.98% = (1,75 Hours down/year) AT WHAT COST TO AVIATION SAFETY? (Achieved!)

Availability: Challenges Redundancy crux One channel being available CANNOT possibly have the same RISK FACTOR as both channels being available; e.g. Instrument Landing System (ILS)

Availability: Challenges Apart from probability of failure (Pf) and (Aa), consequences of failure is also very important.

Consequence of failure: Risk and Risk perception SUBJECTIVITY Eric Hollnagel (2014)

“The Butterfly Effect:” Interdependencies: “The Butterfly Effect:” Small catalytic events that are separated by distance and time can be the cause of significant changes in complex systems. 

Interdependencies: Systems Approach. Look at the bigger picture Understand the interdependence of objects and their attributes Complex wholes are made up of smaller subsystems VOR/DME Approach! ! !

© 2015-2016 Nomtshongwana Phumelele Dealing with Safety : AVIATION SAFETY SYSTEM ETC. / OTHER CNS (SAFETY SYSTEM) Air Craft IN OUT SAWS PILOT ATC Interdependency © 2015-2016 Nomtshongwana Phumelele

Dealing with Safety : These interactions are not simple, linear cause and effect relations, but complex networks of interdependencies. For us to have impacting results, we need to cultivate critical systems thinking! When confronted with a problem, we should not only look at one part of it, but should, instead, look at the whole/bigger picture.

© 2015-2016 Nomtshongwana Phumelele Swiss Cheese Model: © 2015-2016 Nomtshongwana Phumelele

© 2015-2016 Nomtshongwana Phumelele Swiss Cheese Model: © 2015-2016 Nomtshongwana Phumelele

Fallacy w.r.t. Safety: The greatest FALLACY when dealing with safety issues is the assumption that GROUPTHINK does not take place.

Fallacy w.r.t. Safety: Groupthink: “psychological phenomenon that occurs within a group of people, in which the desire for harmony or conformity in the group results in an irrational or dysfunctional decision-making outcome. Group members try to minimize conflict and reach a consensus decision without critical evaluation of alternative viewpoints, by actively suppressing dissenting viewpoints, and by isolating themselves from outside influences” Acceptance of obviously wrong answers simply because it is socially painful to disagree.

Weighted Aggregative Safety Index! The Way Forward: CALCULATE Technical Support SAFETY RISK HOW? Weighted Aggregative Safety Index! © 2015-2016 Nomtshongwana Phumelele

© 2015-2016 Nomtshongwana Phumelele Points to consider (WASI): Redundancy of equipment Relation or Interdependence between equipment VOR/DME Type of ATC operations Procedural backed by Radar Approach or En-route VOR Level of busyness (Traffic Volume) Low (0 - 15 movements/hour) Medium (16 - 34 movements/hour) High (= > 35 movements/hour) © 2015-2016 Nomtshongwana Phumelele

© 2015-2016 Nomtshongwana Phumelele Points to consider (WASI): Serious consultation is required to achieve a proper matrix! There is absolutely NO WAYS that an individual can create such; it should be a consultative team effort! © 2015-2016 Nomtshongwana Phumelele

© 2015-2016 Nomtshongwana Phumelele Where to start: Demystify Risk! HOW? Understand ATC perception of Risk in relation to CNS equipment failure. Level the playing fields. © 2015-2016 Nomtshongwana Phumelele

Implications: Enhanced aviation safety; globally Create awareness Spins offs into other critical equipment industries like health care. Review of maintenance strategies

LET US TALK. . .