1. Safety Performance Review
Radu CIOPONEA
Performance Review Unit
EUROCONTROL

2. Why is safety performance review useful?
The goal of
safety performance review is to improve safety
The PRC process is composed of performance measurement, consultation and recommendations
The PRC is only interested to measure indicators which can provide useful indications to steer performance
Performance measurement can give indications on the efficiency of service provision,
It also gives indications on the effectiveness and adequacy of regulations.

3. Safety review State models in best practices
The role of CAAs varies across Europe
There are different ways of sharing tasks between the CAA, the ANSP and an AAIB (where one exists)
Active CAA: investigating and overseeing body;
Controlling CAA: regulations and oversight;
Regulatory CAA: pure regulatory body.
Regulation and oversight are very important for all
The real matter is
to establish the sharing of safety review
between ANSP and CAA/Independent bodies

4. Safety data flow in best practices
Human reporting remains the only reliable reporting.
Some States don’t have any Mandatory Occurrence Reporting System for ATCOs to report safety occurrences
Automated tools are a good complement to human reporting
Severity classification should be determined for all incidents
Presently “expert judgment” is used and harmonisation is missing
In some States causal factors are only available for serious incidents
Very few data available on risk exposure (traffic).
Nb. of IFR flights known, but not OAT and VFR flights.

5. EUROCONTROL and the EU EUROCONTROL has presently 35 Member States
The EU has 25 States, soon to be 27;
Both organisations want to measure safety;
EUROCONTROL has devised a number of Safety Regulatory Requirements, one of which deals with safety reporting and safety review in ATM;
The EU has issued a Directive (European law) for the same purpose (applies to the whole of aviation);
Together, the EU and EUROCONTROL will need to review ATM safety without duplication or omissions;
Most probable compromise: EUROCONTROL will review ATM safety for all its Member States, rather for all ECAC Member States (virtually the whole geographical Europe)

6. Suggested safety monitoring framework
High Level
Performance
Indicators
Incident reports
Public information
Detection
and
Reporting
ASMT
TCAS
ATCO
Pilots
European
Common
Data base
Performance Monitoring, Recommendations
Regulated flow
Mandatory
Regulator confidential
Protection for
reporting individuals
Mandatory reporting EC Dir. 94/56 & 03/42 Monitoring encouraged ICAO annex 13
National
Investigation
Processes
Severity +
Risk Exposure
(develop)
Service provision
Voluntary
Fast response
Confidential
Performance Monitoring, Recommendations
ANS Co-operative
processes

7. Initial scope for safety review
Focus on what ANS can influence (provide added value to safety) rather than considering ATM as a contributing factor
ATM can reduce the risk of accidents
ATM, Navigation and Surveillance can reduce the risk of CFIT
MET can reduce the risk of weather-related accidents
PRC Safety performance review will only use validated data
Key Indicators are still to be developed
Initial KPIs:
Airprox
RWY incursions
A limited number of States with mature systems are involved at this stage;
Importantly, the FAA is also involved, which is likely to make the system consistent globally.

8. Extended scope for safety review
Data collection process must be improved;
Need to harmonise severity and risk exposure at European level
Same standards applied by all (e.g. SRC standards) or
Use of legislation / mandatory regulation
More KPIs to be developed;
Risk model and risk exposure are important elements;
Safety targets must be thoroughly developed and validated;
No detailed target possible until system is mature;
EUROCONTROL strategic target: number of accidents and serious or risk-bearing incidents to remain constant with traffic increase

9. Possible way ahead for PRC
Yearly high-level indicators (European breakdown) – Public Access
Safety events in airspace (separation infr. + inadequate separations) weighted on risk exposure data
Safety events on the runway (serious RWY incursions. + inadequate separations) weighted on risk exposure data
PRC detailed Safety Performance Review – Access restricted to professionals
Use of ESARR 2 data
More issues (near CFIT + MET related)
Analysis on causal factors
Meaningful operational breakdown (European level):
Controlled / Uncontrolled airspace
Complex / simple runway lay out
Etc.
In a not-so-distant future: State-by-State breakdown and benchmarking

10. Thank you!
Questions? ?