M.Tavlet, H.Taureg - ALICE

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Presentation transcript:

M.Tavlet, H.Taureg - ALICE ALICE Safety Systems The ones managed by TS: Fire and gas detections, incl. SNIFFER Radiation monitors for personnel protection (RAMSES) Access control Alarms (AUG, evacuation, red tel…) Alarm transmission (CSAM) The other ones: CO2 flush in racks, N2 flush in detector areas Radiation monitors for material protection ( Rad-Mon + BCM) The missing ones: Public address system Safety Information Panel (SIP) Note: To add SF6 sensors; study of feasibility ~10 kCHF ; delay = after LHC start-up. The Technical Coordinator holds the overall responsibility for project management, except safety ! The GLIMOS holds responsibility for safety of the experiment by delegation from EP Div.leader. he reports to the DL, he acts on safety issues via the Tech.Coord., He is assisted by Safety Coordinators. M.Tavlet, H.Taureg - ALICE

Synopsis of Alarm transmissions via CSAM and DSS Info in ACR ?? ? ? DIP (non secure) DCS Info & SW actions Info in ACR Secure, local link Pre- alarms Alarms (AL3) C S A M D S SNIFFER ODH gas smoke Cut power to group of racks Smoke det. in areas ? Cut power Interlock equipment ODH in areas ??? CCC (TCR) Action Flam. gas in areas Close cooling water valves Cut power/gas Cooling water temperature Water flooding Start pumps Detector specific action Ambient temperature Dead-man detector Fire Brigade Action Water leak CRs Blocked lifts … Presence of power Evacuation buttons ITS N2 Release ? Evac. signal Detector spec. inputs Emergency Stop buttons Cut power Stop flam. Gas ? … Red telephones Local/direct actions M.Tavlet, H.Taureg - ALICE

ALICE requirements about Safety systems managed by TS-CSE Want all information in ALICE Control Room (ACR) Re-use synoptic where available Note: To add SF6 sensors; study of feasibility ~10 kCHF ; delay = after LHC start-up. The Technical Coordinator holds the overall responsibility for project management, except safety ! The GLIMOS holds responsibility for safety of the experiment by delegation from EP Div.leader. he reports to the DL, he acts on safety issues via the Tech.Coord., He is assisted by Safety Coordinators. M.Tavlet, H.Taureg - ALICE

ALICE requirements about Safety systems managed by TS-CSE Fire Detection Systems in Areas (halls, pits, cavern…) Installed, tested, in operation Gas Detection Systems in Areas (SG, CR5, cavern) Partially installed Not yet in operation Action matrix defined Note: To add SF6 sensors; study of feasibility ~10 kCHF ; delay = after LHC start-up. The Technical Coordinator holds the overall responsibility for project management, except safety ! The GLIMOS holds responsibility for safety of the experiment by delegation from EP Div.leader. he reports to the DL, he acts on safety issues via the Tech.Coord., He is assisted by Safety Coordinators. M.Tavlet, H.Taureg - ALICE

ALICE requirements about Safety systems managed by TS-CSE SNIFFER This has become an expensive system Therefore, we have minimized it It appears to be ‘impossible’ (or very expensive and long) to add additional features, such as SF6 sensors It appears not to be allowed (feasible ?) to change the individual threshold per sensor. Want all info in the ACR Adding a full information screen in the ACR appears to be expensive (~ 7-10 kCHF) Note: To add SF6 sensors; study of feasibility ~10 kCHF ; delay = after LHC start-up. The Technical Coordinator holds the overall responsibility for project management, except safety ! The GLIMOS holds responsibility for safety of the experiment by delegation from EP Div.leader. he reports to the DL, he acts on safety issues via the Tech.Coord., He is assisted by Safety Coordinators. M.Tavlet, H.Taureg - ALICE

ALICE requirements about Safety systems managed by TS-CSE CSAM Designed only to transmit AL3 Want all info concerning ALICE in ACR RAMSES Installation ongoing. Want information in ACR Should it be connected to the access safety system ? Information available at access points ? Should access be forbidden in case of high radiation level ? Note: To add SF6 sensors; study of feasibility ~10 kCHF ; delay = after LHC start-up. The Technical Coordinator holds the overall responsibility for project management, except safety ! The GLIMOS holds responsibility for safety of the experiment by delegation from EP Div.leader. he reports to the DL, he acts on safety issues via the Tech.Coord., He is assisted by Safety Coordinators. M.Tavlet, H.Taureg - ALICE

ALICE requirements about Safety systems managed by TS-CSE Access Control System (ACS) Access to the site should be dissociated from access to the underground. Example: someone wanting to come at night to the ACR would only need Safety Course Level 2, and we would not have to grant him an underground access (today, LHCI-24). ALICE internal sectorisation is managed locally (with padlocks and procedures) by ALICE, ACS is not involved Note: To add SF6 sensors; study of feasibility ~10 kCHF ; delay = after LHC start-up. The Technical Coordinator holds the overall responsibility for project management, except safety ! The GLIMOS holds responsibility for safety of the experiment by delegation from EP Div.leader. he reports to the DL, he acts on safety issues via the Tech.Coord., He is assisted by Safety Coordinators. M.Tavlet, H.Taureg - ALICE

Other Alarm transmissions via DCS Rack control Smoke det. [all racks] CO2 flush in racks of C area Temp. switch [all racks] or Cut power+ Flam. gas D C S Main Temp. Sensor SW action (non secure) ? Cut power /rack Local/direct actions Radiation Monitors SW action (non secure) ? Extra Temp. Sensors Cut equipment Cut power to equip-t or rack(s) Equipment Stop buttons Part of TS-EL control ? Info in ACR M.Tavlet, H.Taureg - ALICE

Other ALICE Safety Systems CO2 flush for rack fire-protection (area C) (This was a project initiated by S.Fratianni who is now in TS.) Part of the hardware is installed: bottles and hoses. Still no triggering system; experiments are left on their own to think about, design, build and implement it. ALICE requests TS to centralize and implement the system N2 flush for fire-protection of L3 solenoid and FASS Tanks and pipes still to be installed Automatic or manual triggering to be decided Note: To add SF6 sensors; study of feasibility ~10 kCHF ; delay = after LHC start-up. The Technical Coordinator holds the overall responsibility for project management, except safety ! The GLIMOS holds responsibility for safety of the experiment by delegation from EP Div.leader. he reports to the DL, he acts on safety issues via the Tech.Coord., He is assisted by Safety Coordinators. M.Tavlet, H.Taureg - ALICE

Missing Safety Systems in ALICE Public Address System Useful to transmit info from the ACR to UX Have common technical solution Safety Information Panel Idea from Safety Commission Display useful info at the entrance of underground areas and in ACR Essential to have it installed Note: To add SF6 sensors; study of feasibility ~10 kCHF ; delay = after LHC start-up. The Technical Coordinator holds the overall responsibility for project management, except safety ! The GLIMOS holds responsibility for safety of the experiment by delegation from EP Div.leader. he reports to the DL, he acts on safety issues via the Tech.Coord., He is assisted by Safety Coordinators. M.Tavlet, H.Taureg - ALICE