Preparedness for Newcastle Disease Eemergency/Lessons Learned from Outbreak

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Presentation transcript:

Preparedness for Newcastle Disease Eemergency/Lessons Learned from 2011-2012 Outbreak Dr. Farhan Afzal Assistant Research Officer Poultry Research Institute, Rawalpindi

An Overview of Poultry Sector Current investment = Rs. 200 Billion Employment generation = 1.50 Million Contribution in Agri growth = 6.4 % Contribution in Livestock growth = 11.5 % Poultry Meat Share = 25.8 % of total meat Annual Growth rate = 8-10 % Per Capita Meat consumption = 4.62 Kgs. Per Capita Egg consumption = 72.57 No. Punjab Province share = 73% Source: Economic Survey of Pakistan 2011-12

Incidence of ND, IB, H9 in Punjab

ND Losses in Broilers Month Mortality (Mill) Av. Rate/Kg (Rs) Value (Mill Rs.) Nov,11 0.86 108.03 92.90 Dec,11 3.68 117.58 432.69 Jan,12 8.60 148.19 1274.40 Feb,12 15.48 151.31 2342.27 Mar,12 15.97 136.00 2171.92 April,12 09.85 152.73 1504.39 May,12 17.09 125.10 2137.96 June,12 16.82 143.23 2409.13 July,12 13.39 174.23 2332.94 Aug,12 1.09 136.58 148.87 TOTAL 102.83 13573.07

Previous outbreaks 2010-2011 2011-2012 Outbreak started from November Caused mortality mainly in broilers Limited to Lahore and surrounding areas, sporadic cases from other areas Subsided in 3 or 4 month 2011-2012 Caused mortality in broilers, layer, breeders Widespread in whole of the country and caused huge economic loses Subside in mid of the August

Efforts to control the disease Treatments Antibiotics, antipyretics, immune boasters (unsuccessful) Oral egg yolk, injectable egg yolk (unsuccessful) Vaccination during the outbreak (unsuccessful) In fact, all the efforts to treat the bird created more complications. Farm level All the mortality thrown outside All the morbid birds sold to the market No restriction to the movement of vehicles As a result disease spread widely in short time

Efforts to control the disease Institute level Research on the virus (velogenic in nature, genotype VII, Exotic in the nature) Research on vaccination (previous vaccines could give protection, new vaccines were also prepared) Improvement in vaccination methods, introduction of Killed vaccination in broilers. Emphasis on the biosecurity Formers meetings awareness campaigns

Preparedness before the outbreak Farm level Improve the hygiene and biosecurity measures Bird proof houses, feed stores and water tanks Minimizing, scrutinizing and controlling movements onto and off premises Disinfecting all the equipments especially vehicles, before bringing on site Ensuring that all movements for collecting eggs or carcasses, feed delivery etc are from a designated collection and delivery points, away from the poultry house Take special precaution with vaccinating teams, veterinarians as they move between farms

Preparedness before the outbreak Farm level Improve the health status of the flock by controlling respiratory and other immunosuppressive disease Reduce the stress from the flock, improve its management by taking special care of required temperature and ventilation. Vaccinate the flock according to schedule by taking proper precautions Check the status of the boiler flocks at 23-28 days of age for virus isolation and serology, and collect the samples for serology just before sale to evaluate your vaccination program Check the status of the layer and breeder flock for serology and virus isolation every month Consult veterinarian or institute if any sign of disease

Preparedness before the outbreak Institute level Surveillance of the disease should be a continuous process Broilers Any shed mortality 0.5% or higher per day for 3 or more days after first week of age is suspicious Any shed with respiratory signs lasting more than 2 days Any shed with nervous signs regardless of the duration Layers and breeders Any shed suffering 10% drop in egg production or appearance of 5% white eggs or 5% shell-less eggs over a period of 2-3 days Any shed suffering increased mortality more than 0.5 per day for 3-5 days Any shed with respiratory sign lasting more than 2 days

Preparedness before the outbreak Laboratory level Labs should increase their capacity for Newcastle disease surveillance All the labs should have facility of serology HI, ELISA (if possible DIVA) Main labs should have virus isolation identification facilities including pathotyping of the virus Isolation identification and calculation of ICPI requires minimum 7 days which is a long procedure Monoclonal antibodies for pathotyping Molecular techniques are more reliable, and time saving

In the phase of outbreak Stamping out without vaccination Those countries which have eradicated the disease and don’t do vaccination can adopt this policy Stamping out with vaccination Most of the countries which do vaccination adopt this policy Eradication by vaccination without stamping out Countries which can’t eradicate the disease and live with velogenic virus adopt with this policy

In the phase of outbreak Quarantine and movement control Live birds, mortality, eggs, liter, feed etc and other equipments should be isolated were exotic Newcastle Disease virus detected Contaminated personals should leave the area after showering and changing cloths Vehicles should also be disinfected Quarantine of Infected Premises(IPs), Dangerous Contact Premises (DCPs), Suspected Premises (SPs)

In the phase of outbreak Declaration of restricted & control areas Restricted Area (RA) It should be 2-5 km area where the outbreak of exotic Newcastle disease virus occurred, it would include IPs, DCPs, and SPs. There should be movement restriction of except general public not associated with poultry Control Area (CA) it should be 2-10 km area around the restricted area. It would make a buffer zone around the RA. Movement Should be controlled.

In the phase of outbreak Tracing Critical date should be determined as the virus entered IPs, Movement to and from IPs & DSPs, should be noticed 21 days before the first outbreak (incubation period of the virus 21 days OIE). Movement of birds, eggs, poultry product, feed, litter, waste, equipments should be traced, which would help to locate the original source of infection Surveillance Active surveillance should be started as soon as ND confirmed, initially specimens should be taken from all the species of birds died in RA. Surveillance of all the species including vaccinated and non vaccinated in RA and CA

In the phase of outbreak Treatment Treatment of the birds with ND is ineffective and not appropriate Destruction of birds Several methods (cyanide, methyl bromide, CO2, nitrogen gas) CO2 gas is preferred because lack of toxicity to humans Disposal Dead birds, eggs, litter, manure, waste products, building material that cannot be disinfected The aim should be removal of a large number of birds in short time and protection of environment

In the phase of outbreak Burial; burial is the best method, cheapest, should be very near to shed (Adopted in 2006 Avian Influenza outbreak in Pakistan) Incineration; effective and safe, but incinerators are too small or too far away from practical use. Rendering; is a good method of disposal if rendering plant has the capacity Disposal at abattoir; depends upon the authorities to decide SPs my be disposed there

In the phase of outbreak Decontamination (cleaning & Disinfection) Initially clean the organic matter from the shed, then equipment vehicles Cleaning with detergent is very much effective (Washing, Scrubbing) Quantity of disinfection used an outbreak should be several time more than the routine disinfection Restocking No repopulation at least 21 days after satisfactory cleaning and disinfection.

Conclusion New castle disease virus is more costly than any other animal virus Surveillance should be a continuous process It requires serious and joint efforts from public, private and academia to control the problem

Thanks