The International Response to Japanese Aggression 1931-1941

Context Mukden incident was the first challenge to the post-WWI international system Washington Conference, and Kellogg-Briand Pact were attempts at that collective security

Reviewing the LON’s Structure Consisted of the Assembly and the Councily Assembly One representative from all member states Met yearly and had one vote Council Britain, France, Italy, Japan and four other members elected from the Assembly Made the key decisions, could take action against a member

League’s Response to Mukden China appealed to League, hoping to invoke Article 16 League acted cautiously, meetings attended by Japan, China, U.S* Japanese government cooperated while the army continued its expansion, defying immediately request for withdrawal to the railway zone League sends a fact-finding commission under Lord Lytton to Manchuria Took several months to arrive, several months to complete a report Before a report was filed, Japan had already established Manchukuo and claimed the Manchurians were a free people

League’s Response to Mukden China appealed to League, hoping to invoke Article 16 League acted cautiously, meetings attended by Japan, China, U.S* Japanese government cooperated while the army continued its expansion, defying immediately request for withdrawal to the railway zone League sends a fact-finding commission under Lord Lytton to Manchuria Took several months to arrive, several months to complete a report Before a report was filed, Japan had already established Manchukuo and claimed the Manchurians were a free people

Lytton Report One year after the Mukden incident: Acknowledged Japanese special interests in Manchuria, but said its use of force was unacceptable Should give up territory and withdraw Manchukuo was not independent of Chinese administration Should become independent but under Chinese sovereignty Wut Recommended Sino-Japanese non- aggression pact Did not consider Japanese resolve Japan argued that the West was hypocritical, having secured its own territories through force Left the League in March 1933

Why did the League not take stronger action against Japan? France, with its own interests in Indo-China, had actually gained from a weakened China Britain lacked the military means to resist Japan and its interests were not directly threatened All nations were suffering as a result of the Great Depression Japan was viewed as an ally in containing the Soviets Meant that the Japanese would continue with expansion; encouraged Mussolini in 1935

Continued Failures of the League China would appeal again in 1937, following the Marco Polo Bridge Incident and bombing of Shanghai League condemned Japan for breaking the Nine- Power Treaty, but it was not impotent Pre-occupied by events in Europe, unwilling to act without the U.S. Nine-Power Treaty Conference of 1937 condemned Japan, but produced no real measures

Response of China Chiang Kai-Shek insisted on fighting the Communists, not the Japanese Forced to suppress uprisings of his own troops Kidnapped by Zhang Xue- liand in 1936 and forced into the Second United Front alliance with the CCP Now fighting a “war of national resistance”

Chinese Resistance 1937 saw the steepening of Chinese resolve GMD and CCP seeking “total resistance by the whole nation” War went very badly; by 1938 Shanghai, Ghangzhou and Nanjing had all fallen and the capital had been moved to Chongqing But the resistance ultimately proved effective The Japanese were drawn into a protracted war which they could not win Forced to rely on Chinese puppet governments Most famous under Wang Jingwei, who believed the GMD could never defeat the Japanese Three governments in China during the Second World War GMD central, CCP north, “New Government of China” east and north Tensions remained high between the GMD and CCP

U.S. Response to Japan – Early 1930s Following isolationism in the 1930s, reinforced by the Great Depression Hoover took minimal action even after Open Door China was broken Not the focus and lacked a strong navy in the early 30s Had strong investments/trade in Japan it did not want to Jeopardize Would only issue a non- recognition of Machukuo and the violation of Kellogg-Briand Pact Roosevelt continued the same trend; increasing export of strategic materials to Japan after 1933

U.S. Response to Japan – Early 1937-38 Japan now threatening American interests Naval building of 1936 upset the balance of power Attacks on Open Door China Offered financial support to the GMD Rejected British appeals to join mediation of Sino- Japanese conflict Roosevelt limited by Neutrality Acts

U.S. Response to Japan – Early 1937-38 U.S.S. Panay bombed on the Yangtze River Quick apology and compensation from the Japanese Public opinion for isolation Always unwilling to go past verbal condemnation FDR: “Quarantine Speech” Did not impose sanction, actually played a key role as U.S was the major supplier of oil, scrap iron and automobile parts

Changes in 1938 Roosevelt may have won out in a struggle with isolationists; used presidential powers to ignore the Neutrality Acts and provide further support to China Japan’s “New Order in East Asia” may have been the turning point U.S. feared Chiang would accept the “New Order” solidifying Japanese rule Also concerned he would receive help from the U.S.S.R Also the time of the Tripartite Pact

The Advance to War January 1939, a moral embargo was placed on planes and aviation parts February 1939, all credit to Japan suspended July 1939, trade reciprocity suspended July 1940, embargo on fuel and scrap metal 1940 and 1941, U.S. sending economic and military aid to China July 1941, Japan continue southward expansion, U.S. froze all assets

The Advance to War Japan totally dependent on American oil Thought Westerners were attempting an encirclement Choices: Withdraw from Indo-China and consolidate power in China or begin a war of conquest All negotiations demanded a full Japanese withdrawal from China